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I. What Is a Welfare State, and 
What Is Welfare? Opening 
Reflections 
 

Philipp Sandermann      
Change and Continuity in Western Welfare Practices: 
Some Introductory Comments 
The title of this book refers to a phrase brought to public attention by the then 
U.S. presidential candidate Bill Clinton in 1992, when he announced his plan 
to “end welfare as we know it” (Clinton, 2006). In television advertisements 
and stump speeches across the country, Clinton popularized the phrase to 
emphasize his will to change the U.S. welfare system dramatically. Clinton’s 
phraseology and campaign proved successful: In 1996 he was eventually able 
to sign the U.S. welfare reform into law, and the slogan materialized as the 
concrete social policy of a new era. 
Compared with the phrase that Bill Clinton took out into the world, the 
intention of this book is a rather modest one. The studies it assembles hope to 
contribute to a clearer understanding of how, where, and to what extent wel-
fare has changed since the rise of the discursive patterns that Clinton could 
draw on for his project of putting an end to the “old” way of thinking and 
conducting welfare. 
Much contemporary research in the social sciences insists that there have 
been fundamental changes in the structures of Western welfare states since 
the 1970s or 1980s, and that we can accurately describe this development as 
an “end” not only of welfare, but of the welfare state and every welfare state 
setting in general. The central goal of this volume is to offer a more nuanced 
and careful analysis of the phenomena associated with that stark thesis. 
This is not to deny the fundamental programmatic changes that have 
emerged over the last thirty to forty years of Western welfare state develop-
ment. However, the volume’s objective is to either support or challenge the 
thesis—but not simply take it for granted. Instead, we should carefully deal 
with it as what it is: a hypothesis. Whereas the academic debate usually ac-
cepts that the welfare state as it was known in the second half of the twentieth 
century has come to a definitive end, taking any further discussion of welfare 
state development from this starting point of seemingly assured knowledge 
and using such terms as “post-welfarism” and “post-welfare state” to under-
line the assumption, the authors of this book set out to examine the crucial 
question of change and continuity throughout their contributions as they ex-
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plore various Western welfare state settings in more detail. They do so with a 
special focus on what we could heuristically call “welfare practices.” 
Before going any further, the present volume’s understanding of the terms 
“welfare,” “welfare state,” and “welfare practices” must be introduced. 
Transparency in the use of these terms is evidently of great importance to any 
scholarly discussion on the issue, yet they are anything but well defined, and 
there is substantial variation in the ways they are generally used. What do we 
mean by each of these terms, and why does this volume prefer “welfare prac-
tices” as its broader framework? Why not simply use the term “welfare 
state,” or even just “welfare,” in line with the title quotation from Clinton? 
A minimal consensus among all of the volume’s contributors may be 
formulated as follows: 
 
1. The volume seeks to avoid reproducing an error that has often been made 
in recent decades of the transatlantic debate on Western welfare practices. 
This error is one that—interestingly enough—probably arose primarily 
out of translation processes, or at least from insufficient information on 
the different use of language on the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean, as 
Wacquant (2009) argues. When Bill Clinton promised to end U.S. welfare 
he was not literally speaking of putting an end to his era’s welfare state in 
general, but to a very specific part of it, using the phrase “welfare” to re-
fer to particular welfare state benefits. The specific welfare state benefits 
under attack were not the benefits directed at the upper- and middle-class 
majority of the U.S. population, namely those provided by the social in-
surance system. Instead, the narrow goal of the U.S. welfare reform of 
1996 was to reduce the costs entailed by public assistance programs that 
offered direct cash or noncash benefits to the country’s very poor. One 
could therefore say that Clinton’s welfare reform was not a welfare state 
reform at all (see Wacquant, 2009: 78) but, rather, radicalized the Ameri-
can welfare state by cementing the system’s “administrative and ideologi-
cal split between ‘welfare’ and ‘social insurance’” (Wacquant, 2009: 49). 
Wacquant’s argument may also be applicable to the European welfare re-
forms witnessed during the 1990s and 2000s. Just as it seems that not the 
American welfare state as such but only its “welfare” component was re-
formed by the 1996 welfare reform act, there may have been similar de-
velopments in Europe at that time (see Palier and Thelen, 2010). These 
parallels can easily be identified, for example by looking more closely at 
the German reform labeled “Hartz IV.” This focused narrowly on reduc-
ing costs in insurance-based benefit for the long-term unemployed and 
means-tested “social assistance,” while implementing a more disciplinary 
treatment of its recipients (see Herz, 2012). It thus, strictly speaking, 
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aimed to produce a more distinct segmentation between public assistance 
benefits and those provided by the social insurance system. 
2. That said, it would be even more unsatisfactory to reduce the academic 
debate on welfare states to such specific objects as spending programs, 
patterns of social expenditure, or (especially) social insurance benefits. 
Many traditional social policy approaches do just that when they discuss 
specific welfare states as individual cases or various welfare states in a 
comparative perspective (for example Esping-Andersen, 1990; Seeleib-
Kaiser, 2008; Starke et al., 2008; Kaufmann, 2012), thereby establishing a 
worthwhile, yet very limited view on welfare states and especially on 
welfare state development. Spending programs, patterns of social ex-
penditure, and social insurance benefits are certainly deeply embedded in 
the general model of Western welfare state settings, and perhaps even 
stand for specific ideas of welfare practices in certain national frame-
works. However, they cannot stand for the entirety of what the approach-
es focusing on them are actually trying to describe. This applies to more 
than only questions of continuity and change, but those questions make it 
particularly problematic: If Wacquant’s thesis, quoted above, is correct 
even in part, the mainstream academic debate on welfare state develop-
ment is far from possessing satisfactory tools and concepts to adequately 
observe and measure Western welfare state development, since it focuses 
on data that is only incoherently connected to the changes still under way. 
On the other hand, it seems unjustified to ignore the facts delivered by 
traditional social policy research. That is to say, it is quite as unfounded 
to take the current rise in social expenditure in most Western welfare 
states as a sign of unbroken welfare state expansion as it is to diagnose a 
general end of the Western welfare states merely because of major chang-
es in significant, but nevertheless specific, programs of welfare provision 
for the poorest, usually called “relief programs” in the tradition of the 
term “poor relief.”1 Additionally, contemporary welfare state research 
currently knows far too little about the empirical reality of public assis-
tance and relief programs (among the useful exceptions is Leisering and 
Leibfried, 2001). Whereas we have quite substantial information about 
                                                          
1  While the English phrase “poor relief,” commonly used in the past, still seems adequate to 
describe this field of interest in academic terms, it is problematic to simply internationalize 
it and to transfer it to other national contexts. For example, the German term Ar-
menfürsorge is a rather literal translation of “poor relief” and holds great historical signifi-
cance for the expansion of the German welfare state—but today the term is almost mean-
ingless as an item of welfare vocabulary, because the German welfare state has undergone a 
stepwise process of differentiation in its benefits (see Sachße, 1996), nowadays program-
matically differentiating “the poor” into “young people,” “disabled people,” “elderly peo-
ple,” “people in special life situations,” and so on. 
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the policy details and political contexts of recent Western welfare re-
forms, we know very little about what has actually changed in the lives of 
welfare professionals, institutions, and recipients due to these reforms. 
For example, even regarding U.S. welfare reform, the data looks quite 
different when we move beyond the narrow focus on the declining num-
ber of families on welfare since 1996 and the evolution of the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program (see Daguerre, 2008), to 
take into account the growing number of poor people in the United States 
who benefit from disability programs (see Joffe-Walt, 2013). It is not far-
fetched to assume that there could be a correlation between these data 
sets. Ultimately, there are reasons to believe that welfare reform may 
have changed little in the everyday life of poor people in the United 
States, apart from making them even more socio-economically discon-
nected from “normal life” because they must be labeled as disabled in or-
der to receive at least some sort of basic income—bringing us back to 
Wacquant’s portrayal of the “ideological split” in the American welfare 
state. To clarify all this, much empirical research inevitably remains to be 
done. That research will need to focus on the general question of how far 
welfare provision and reception actually change on the concrete level 
when relief programs are redesigned, replaced by new programs, or even 
completely abolished. This question is methodologically ambitious, and it 
becomes even more complex when we factor in those programs that are 
based not only on direct cash benefits (which are relatively easy to meas-
ure) but on noncash services such as counseling or educational interven-
tion. 
3. In order to initiate a more differentiated academic discussion about the 
continuities and changes of Western welfare states, a first step will there-
fore be to broaden the scope of our investigation. Not only should the fo-
cus of social policy research move beyond those realms of welfare state 
provision that are relatively easy to research, namely spending programs, 
patterns of social expenditure, and social insurance expenditures; we also 
need to think carefully about the interrelations, commonalities, and dif-
ferences between those Western welfare practices generally marked as 
“relief” on the one hand and the social insurance system on the other. 
Although the fields of relief prove quite diverse in their detail, and may 
thus be harder to explore, investigate, and compare, a scholarly discussion 
on Western welfare states cannot simply ignore these fields if it is con-
cerned with the question of welfare state transformation. Once again, this 
is all the more true because there is good reason to believe that the area of 
relief is exactly where the greatest changes in Western welfare state set-
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tings are occurring. Moreover, it is both politically and epistemologically 
alarming when, through their research designs, researchers reproduce 
what Wacquant calls the split of Western welfare practices into “welfare” 
and “social insurance.” If they fail to reflect on that split, such research 
designs will replicate the ideas proposed by Western welfare states re-
garding “normal” and “abnormal” needs or social risks, along with the 
stigmatization that accompanies this distinction. And since the institu-
tionalized gap between social insurance and public assistance benefits 
may be a feature not only of U.S. welfarism but of Western welfare state 
settings in general (see, for example, Letwin and Metzler, 2010: 75), re-
search designs that re-institutionalize the gap in this way will fail to iden-
tify a very important contextual factor of their objective. 
 
On the basis of these reflections, this volume adopts “welfare practices” as a 
heuristic term that represents a broader idea of Western welfare state reality, 
covering public assistance and social insurance alike. The contributors take 
different views on the development of Western welfare practices, depending 
on their particular focus and individual perspective. Nevertheless, every 
chapter in its own way reflects on both changes and continuities in the wel-
fare practices it investigates, aiming thereby to sketch out a broader concep-
tual notion of Western welfare state settings more generally. 
As a starting point, in the first chapter John Clarke raises the question of 
what a welfare state is (or perhaps was). He observes that, in the face of evi-
dence to the contrary suggesting an unshakable growth in most Western wel-
fare states, in recent decades some major studies have proclaimed the end of 
the Western welfare state model as such. Clarke regards this contradiction as 
the result of an argument that is consistently made in the academic discussion 
of Western welfare state settings: the studies identifying an end of the West-
ern welfare state tend to construct the existence of the modern welfare state 
themselves, above all because they implicitly or explicitly place the concept 
of the Western welfare state on the same level as spending programs or pat-
terns of social expenditure when they design their empirical research. They 
thus not only exclude significant parts of welfare provision, but also reduce 
to a minimum the diversity of meaning contained in the phrase “welfare 
state.” Rather than trying to resolve that diversity by means of a more pre-
scriptive and “correct” definition, Clarke treats the concept’s instability, flex-
ibility, and mobility as significant features worthy of our attention. He breaks 
it down into its two terms—welfare and state—in order to reflect on the prob-
lems of their meaning and the ways they have been potently combined with a 
third term: nation. This is no mere academic exercise, aiming to define and 
understand national welfare states as a theoretical entity. To exemplify points 
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of national welfare state transformation, Clarke distinguishes between famili-
alization and privatization, which enables him to show how—on a discursive 
level—both the private in general and welfare practices in particular are cur-
rently being familialized. He concludes that this tendency normalizes a trans-
fer of responsibility from the public sector to private settings, ideologically 
naturalizing bonds of affection, obligation, and future-oriented investment 
(for example in children), and can therefore be regarded as a dominant 
change in Western welfare practices that accompanies the patterns of conti-
nuity and growth highlighted early in his chapter. 
Tendencies of familialization, responsibilization, and future-oriented in-
vestment are also the focus of Sigrid Leitner’s contribution. However, she 
chooses a different perspective to reflect on continuity and changes in Western 
welfare state settings, and opens Part II of the volume with an explicitly com-
parative approach. Her chapter addresses the national contexts of child care and 
elder care in Austria, Belgium, France, and Germany—four examples of “con-
servative” welfare capitalist regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 38–41). Leitner 
asks how far the four cases differ in terms of their elder care and child care pol-
icies and their institutionalization of those policies. Introducing categories of 
familializing and de-familializing child care and elder care policies, she inves-
tigates how these four national welfare states have continuously institutional-
ized such policies as path-dependent, and describes how and why each coun-
try’s programmatic and institutional reality has changed over time. 
Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore provide the book’s second comparative 
perspective. The two authors depict the rise (and fall) of the conditional cash 
transfer (CCT) programs that have spread to every continent of the world 
since the late 1990s, whereby they try to establish a more transnational ap-
proach to identifying continuity and change in Western welfare practices. But 
this very spread raises the question of whether Peck and Theodore’s chapter 
is really about only “Western” welfare state settings. That question goes to 
the heart of their study. They pursue it by underlining the role of the World 
Bank and other multilateral development agencies that refer to utilitarian and 
responsibilizing ideologies in public assistance policy. These can certainly be 
defined in historical terms as “Western,” suggesting that the practices consid-
ered by Peck and Theodore are “Western” even when they do not occur en-
tirely within Western welfare state settings. At the same time, the authors’ 
discussion of CCT programs illustrates that even a powerful implementation 
of a programmatic design and its support through evaluation science does not 
in the end guarantee a particular way of conducting welfare practices. As the 
case of Brazil impressively shows, there is a difference between researching 
programmatic turns and researching their transfer into practice. 
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Richard Münchmeier completes Part II, and chooses a third way of com-
paring different national set-ups within Western welfare state settings, name-
ly the United States and Germany. Adopting Piven and Cloward’s (1993) an-
alytical framework on the function of public welfare policies in the United 
States, he examines two points: firstly, historical differences in the develop-
ment of welfare practices between Germany and the United States, and sec-
ondly, the recent changes in German welfare provision. In his study of this 
second issue, Münchmeier focuses on the question of whether or not the 
“Hartz IV” reform in Germany marked the beginning of a new era for the 
German welfare state and thus ushered in (or is likely to usher in) an “Ameri-
canization” of welfare practices in Germany. 
Part III of this volume comprises three case studies on continuity and 
change in selected Western welfare state settings. The analyses in this part 
of the book offer a different perspective by concentrating on single nation-
al contexts. Robert P. Fairbanks II explores welfare state transformation 
in two post-industrial U.S. cities: Philadelphia and Chicago. Fairbanks’s 
research goal is to understand the nexus of urban poverty survival strate-
gies and the implementation of social welfare policy and practice reforms, 
as embodied by the lived experience of addiction and recovery. Using the 
Philadelphia recovery house and the Sheridan Correctional Center as sites 
of ethnographic analysis, Fairbanks explores the ways in which drug and 
alcohol recovery—from its most informal inception in the self-help realm 
to state monitoring in prison and parole—works as an ancillary modality 
of poverty management to resolve the current crises of mass incarceration  
in the U.S. and to reinvent urban welfare practices in the twenty-first cen-
tury. 
In the second chapter of Part III, Philipp Sandermann firstly questions the 
popular analysis that claims we can interpret current changes in welfare prac-
tices adequately as a move towards “post-welfarism,” or—in its specific 
German version—a move towards post-welfare statism (“Post-Wohlfahrts-
staatlichkeit”). Sandermann argues that this analysis lacks a clear theoretical 
delimitation of what actually constitutes a “welfare state,” “social work,” 
or—to use the heuristic term of this volume—“welfare practices.” In con-
trast, Sandermann outlines an approach to understanding welfare practices as 
practices of a specific welfare system; he draws on basic arguments of con-
temporary systems theory to critically examine important questions around 
change in the German welfare state setting. At the same time, this chapter 
specifically brings together various analytic factors of welfare, or welfare 
state, development to describe the current state of the German welfare system 
as a combination of both change and continuity. 
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Vincent Dubois completes the third part of the volume with an analysis of 
practices among clients and agents in French welfare offices. He draws on his 
own ethnographic research on the relationships between agents and recipients 
at the front desks of family benefit offices to show the importance of these 
face-to-face administrative interactions. Dubois makes the point that such in-
teractions are gaining in importance in line with the unprecedented decline in 
objective social rights and the worsening of socio-economic problems. The 
concrete welfare practices co-produced by agents and recipients at the front 
desks of welfare offices are therefore far from being neutral routines of poli-
cy implementation. Instead, Dubois argues, the relational and bureaucratic 
work in welfare offices constitutes the very core of welfare practices. 
Edited volumes like this one are always the product of collaboration on 
many levels. I would like to thank the following people and institutions in-
volved in the project. My foremost thanks go to the authors collected in the 
volume, every one of whom contributed commitment and extraordinary reli-
ability during the whole process of preparing, writing, and editing the book. 
The book’s evolution goes back to a series of public lectures at the University 
of Trier with almost the same title, and I would also like to thank the authors 
for their contributions to that series. I express my gratitude to the whole So-
cial Pedagogy II Unit at Trier University for their help and enthusiasm: Julia 
Gill, Onno Husen, Magdalena Joos, Duygu Kececi, Mareike Patschke, and 
Shadi Rajabi were all actively involved in organizing the lecture series and 
discussing each contribution with our colleagues from abroad. I also thank 
the president of Trier University, Michael Jäckel, the Freundeskreis Trierer 
Universität, and the Nikolaus Koch Stiftung for their support. Special thanks 
go to Alexandra Lemonides and Kate Sturge, kind and helpful translators and 
copy editors for the volume, and to Duygu Kececi, who supported me 
throughout the editing process. 
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John Clarke      
The End of the Welfare State? The Challenges of 
Deconstruction and Reconstruction 
Over the last four decades, the crisis of the welfare state and the end of the 
welfare state have been announced many times. Such claims are certainly 
dramatic and attention catching. But they also raise some problems: concep-
tual, empirical and political. The first set of problems (conceptual) concerns 
the assumption that we know what a welfare state is. The second set of prob-
lems (empirical) concerns the assumption that we would be able to tell when 
the welfare state had ended. The third set of problems (political) concerns the 
anticipated response to the announcement of the welfare state’s death. In this 
chapter, I will explore these problems and argue that—for social scientists—
they result from a sort of conflation of conceptual, empirical and political 
presumptions about welfare states. Instead, I will suggest that we might gain 
some analytical advantage by deconstructing the term ‘welfare state’ and 
thinking of it in different ways—as a form of institutionalized assemblage 
and as a political “keyword”—in the sense that Raymond Williams used the 
term (see Williams, 1976). 
Such a deconstructionist approach to the problem of welfare states may 
enable us to think better about how they are being reconstructed. This ap-
proach explores how the two terms—welfare and state and their institutional-
ization as “welfare states”—have become destabilized and unsettled in prac-
tice. What happens when taken for granted terms become problematic? 
1. Accounting for Welfare States 
But let us begin at the beginning: we all know (do we not?) that we have seen 
the end of the welfare state. Sociologists, political scientists, economists, ge-
ographers and others have queued up to pronounce the funeral oratory: once 
there was a welfare state, but now neo–liberalism, globalization, post–
fordism, or advanced liberal governmentality (take your pick of the contem-
porary grand narratives) have demolished, diminished and destroyed it. 
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Table 1  OECD Government social spending: Total public social 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
 1980 1990 2000 2005 2011 
Australia 10.3 13.2 17.3 16.5 18.1 
Austria 22.4 23.8 26.6 27.1 27.9 
Belgium 23.5 24.9 25.3 26.5 29.6 
Canada 13.7 18.1 16.5 16.9 18.3 
Chile –– 9.9 12.8 10.1 9.5 
Czech Republic –– 15.3 19.1 18.7 20.9 
Denmark 24.8 25.1 26.4 27.7 30.0 
Estonia –– –– 13.9 13.1 18.8 
Finland 18.1 24.1 24.2 26.2 28.6 
France 20.8 25.1 28.6 30.1 32.1 
Germany 22.1 21.7 26.6 27.3 26.2 
Greece 10.3 16.6 19.3 21.1 23.5 
Hungary –– –– 20.7 22.5 21.8 
Iceland –– 13.7 15.2 16.3 17.8 
Ireland 16.5 17.3 13.4 16.0 23.5 
Israel (1) –– –– 17.2 16.3 15.8 
Italy 18 19.9 23.1 24.9 27.6 
Japan 10.2 11.1 16.3 18.5 n/a 
Korea –– 2.8 4.8 6.5 9.2 
Luxembourg 20.6 19.1 20.9 22.8 22.5 
Mexico –– 3.3 5.3 6.9 7.7 
Netherlands 24.8 25.6 19.8 20.7 23.7 
New Zealand 17 21.5 19 18.1 21.5 
Norway 16.9 22.3 21.3 21.6 22.6 
Poland –– 14.9 20.5 21.0 20.7 
Portugal 9.9 12.5 18.9 23.0 25.2 
Slovak Republic –– –– 17.9 16.3 18.0 
Slovenia –– 0 21.8 21.1 24.0 
Spain 15.5 19.9 20.2 21.1 26.0 
Sweden 27.1 30.2 28.4 29.1 27.6 
Switzerland 13.8 13.5 17.8 20.2 20.2 
Turkey 3.2 5.7 –– 9.9 n/a 
United Kingdom 16.5 16.7 18.6 20.5 23.9 
United States 13.2 13.6 14.5 16.0 19.7 
OECD total (2) 15.5 17.6 18.9 19.7 21.7 
Last updated: 16 November 2012; disclaimer: http://oe.cd/disclaimer 
(1) The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Is-
raeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Go-
lan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of interna-
tional law. 
(2) Refers to an unweighted average of 33 OECD countries and Estonia 
 
Source: Social expenditure: Aggregated data, OECD Social Expenditure Statistics (database) 
Adapted from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/20743904–2012–table1 and OECD Stat Social Expendi-
ture–Aggregated data (28.01.2013) 
 
Such definitive pronouncements contrast strikingly with a stubborn set of 
empirical details that are well known to those working in comparative social 
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policy studies. European Union data indicates that between 1980 and 2011 
the proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) committed by OECD (Or-
ganisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries to social 
expenditure largely stayed the same, even increasing in some cases (see Ta-
ble 1). The data covers a period that contains several economic, financial and 
fiscal crises—and several proclaimed ends of the welfare state. 
Such data pose several puzzles: is social expenditure the same as welfare? 
Are such data a satisfactory way of accounting for or representing welfare 
states? How is the persistence of such spending patterns to be accounted for? 
Do the data disguise changes that take place below or beyond such spending 
patterns? The problems of selecting specific indicators as proxies for welfare 
states are extensively discussed in the social policy literature (see, inter alia, 
Skyes, 1998; Daly, 2000; Castles, 2004; Clasen, 2007; Clasen and Siegel, 
2008), but these tend to center on the contested principles of selection—the 
adequacy, the focus (the relative visibilities and invisibilities that are creat-
ed), or the comparability of the data sets selected. They rarely extend to the 
conceptual problem of the relationship between the proxy and the object be-
ing discussed (but see Clasen and Siegel, 2008, on the “dependent variable” 
problem for a different approach). For instance, Castles sets up his use of the 
OECD Social Expenditure Database by noting that: “In respect of the majori-
ty of chapters focusing on social expenditure trends, an important preliminary 
point to recognize is that spending is not the be–all and end–all of the welfare 
state” (Castles, 2004: 14). But in what follows, the other things that might 
make up the welfare state remain resolutely invisible, obscured by the might 
(and availability) of the expenditure data. 
Nevertheless, whatever empirical and conceptual problems surround these 
figures, the data exist; they demand our attention and—however crudely—
they suggest that the grand narratives about the end of the welfare state have 
to account for them, rather than ignore them. Ignoring them has typically 
been the position of choice for those interested in the grand narratives, where 
“welfare state” (or its political–ideological alter ego, “welfarism”) has tended 
to be used as a symbolic counterpoint to the contemporary trends and trans-
formations that command attention. So the welfare state has variously been 
mythologized as the victim of globalization; as subordinated to the economic 
interests and logics driving the rise of neo–liberalism; or as lost in the “death 
of the social” in the face of advanced liberal governmentality (Rose, 1996). 
Such representations treat the welfare state as the emblematic representa-
tion of something (social democracy; the triumph of the social/political over 
markets; collectivism rather than individualism; government from a “social” 
point of view), rather than as a specific—and complex—object in its own 
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right. Such mythologies capture something of the popular political–cultural 
symbolism and significance of the idea of the “welfare state,” but they pay 
relatively little attention to the empirical questions of what states do by way 
of welfare. They treat the welfare state as a normative symbol—embodying a 
certain progressive or benevolent set of political and policy developments. 
This normative orientation to benevolence is, of course, not shared by Fou-
cauldian approaches which tend to a bleaker view of governmental policies 
and practices. 
This leads to a different analytic puzzle: how might we make sense of the 
persistence of high levels of welfare spending during the period when the 
welfare state was supposedly in decline, retreat or crisis? There are many dif-
ferent answers. Some stress the dynamics of survival and resilience; others 
the sheer weight of either path dependency or the impact of demography (no-
tably the costs of increasingly elderly populations in Europe and North 
America); e.g., Castles (2004) and Kuhnle (2000) have focused on the dy-
namics of survival and resilience, while Pierson (2004) has emphasized “path 
dependency” in the institutional logics of welfare states. Some have pointed 
to the relation between continued social welfare spending and the changing 
roles and functions of the state, moving from direct provision to regulated 
contracting out or disaggregation (e.g., see Seeleib–Kaiser, 2008). Others 
have argued that the persistence of aggregate spending may disguise chang-
ing strategies and objectives that rework the form and dynamics of the wel-
fare state. Authors such as Peck (2001), Hartmann (2005) and Ellison (2006), 
have identified changing strategies and objectives in the processes of what 
Jones and Novak (1999) termed the “retooling” of the state. 
Nevertheless, almost all of these answers ignore a conceptual problem—
the question of what is (or was) a welfare state? Studies of welfare states 
have tended to assume the existence of a specific object of analysis—the wel-
fare state (or sometimes its plural companion, welfare states). This assump-
tion has some troubling consequences. On the one hand, it means that con-
ceptual difficulties about the character of welfare states are avoided—
displaced by a presumption that authors and readers will share a common, or 
take–for–granted, conception of welfare state–ness. As usual in the social 
sciences, taken–for–granted assumptions or forms of knowledge should be 
marked “handle with care.” On the other hand, the lack of conceptual atten-
tion leads directly into a casual empiricism—in which more specific objects 
are allowed to stand for welfare states. Typically, these are spending pro-
grams or patterns of social expenditure (as above). 
In what follows, I raise some questions about how we understand the 
“welfare state” as a concept and link these to recent developments in study-
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ing states as compound entities. Terms such as assemblages, constellations, 
and articulated formations point to new possibilities that might, and perhaps, 
ought to be extended to thinking about welfare state–ness (see the more ex-
tended discussion in Clarke, 2008). I then suggest that thinking about welfare 
states as formations that articulate welfare, state and nation can illuminate 
the different, and potentially divergent, dynamics of transformation that are 
at stake in the reconstruction of welfare states. 
2. Deconstructing and Reconstructing Welfare States 
I am not the first to make the claim that the welfare state is too readily taken 
as an obvious and self–evident object of analysis. As long ago as 1963, Rich-
ard Titmuss raged against the elusive and ill–defined character of the phrase, 
arguing that it should be bracketed in quotation marks (see Veit–Wilson, 
2000). Perhaps more important was Titmuss’ recognition that the phrase 
moved—and was given meaning—in the realm of popular consciousness. 
The prolific and elusive usage of “welfare state” is testimony to its political 
and cultural currency. It is a marker or a symbol of something important in 
popular understandings and political discourse. At the same time, the fluidity 
of its use and the absence of rigorous definition mark it out as a contingent 
symbol whose meanings are variable and contested so that the phrase “wel-
fare state” marks the site of major political and cultural conflicts. Where so-
cial democrats and progressives have treated the welfare state as a symbol of 
modernity, equality and progress, the New Right made it a negative symbol 
identifying the welfare state as the cause of, rather than solution to, social 
problems. This is exemplified in the assertion by Milton and Rose Freidman 
in the early 1980s that “The Soviet Union is the immediate danger perceived 
by Americans. Yet it is not the real threat to our national security. The real 
threat is the welfare state” (Freidman and Freidman, 1984: 73). The idea of 
the “welfare state” has served as a potent mobilizing symbol for a variety of 
political projects. It is precisely this murkiness of the term—its multiple po-
litical, cultural and normative capacities and valences—that makes it interest-
ing. Rather than trying to resolve this diversity of meaning by a more pre-
scriptive and “correct” definition of the phrase, I want to treat its instability, 
flexibility and mobility as significant features worthy of our attention. 
My starting point then, is to recognize the welfare state as a variable so-
cial construction (historically and nationally). Then we can deconstruct the 
phrase “welfare state”—and, I will suggest, its conceptual shadow, the na-
tion–state—in order to see why it might be hard to categorize and conceptu-
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alize welfare state change or transformation. In these terms, we need to think 
about the welfare state as an invention—a political–cultural fiction—an im-
aginary (Lewis, 2000). The wide public and academic circulation of the 
phrase since then suggests that it functions as what Raymond Williams 
(1976) called a “keyword:” a focus of political and cultural investment and 
contestation. Here, I want to decompose the phrase into its two terms—
welfare and state—to reflect on the problems of their meaning as well as how 
they have been brought together into such a potent combination with a third 
term—nation (since welfare states have been imagined as nation–states). 
Welfare:  
Welfare is both abstractly elusive and concretely difficult to specify. Sykes 
has rightly argued in relation to comparative studies of welfare state diver-
gence and convergence, there are important questions of what policies should 
be considered and why (see Sykes, 1998:14). I have already suggested that 
comparative studies have tended to ignore these questions, preferring to treat 
welfare states as if they were income transfer programs. But where does this 
orientation leave public services such as health care, social care, housing or 
education? Comparative studies—as well as national ones—have also tended 
to treat income transfer programs as acting on a limited number of social ax-
es, typically, socio–economic strata and age groupings (or “class” and life 
cycle distributions). However, social policies, programs and practices also act 
on and enact other social relationships—not least those of racialized or ethni-
cized divisions, formations of able–bodiedness and disability, and gendered 
divisions of labor. These include welfare practices and relationships formed 
at the intersection of the state and the family (more accurately, the private, 
household or domestic realm). Such policies and practices are harder to ob-
serve and quantify than the income transfer programs and have typically been 
left out of account by welfare state studies. 
There are also other state policies and practices with significant social 
dimensions—such as criminal justice and leisure provision—that are rarely 
included as elements of welfare states, or thought worthy of inclusion in so-
cial policy (see, for scarce examples, Cook, 2006, and the chapters by Clarke, 
A., Muncie and Stenson in Lewis et al., 2000, as well as the chapter by Rob-
ert Fairbanks in this volume). Along with overseas aid programs, these might 
be thought of as welfare–related things that states do in different ways. Some 
commentators have argued that the very high levels of incarceration in the 
U.S. prison system can be seen as a functional alternative to male unem-
ployment programs and as a means of managing a “problem population” (see 
Christie, 1996; Morley and Petras, 1998; Wacquant, 2009). However, penal 
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policies are not conventionally counted as welfare or included in studies of 
social policy or welfare states. Welfare normally, and normatively, excludes 
other state policies and practices that might be understood as contributing to 
social order, social regulation, social reproduction and the management of 
complex social populations. 
Examinations of this wider range of state practices involved in “govern-
ing the social” have tended to emerge from critical standpoints—e.g., femi-
nist, marxist, post–structuralist and post–colonial studies (see, inter alia, Of-
fe, 1984; Jones and Novak, 1999; Petersen et al, 1999; Lewis, 2000; Daly, 
2000). In such studies, we can glimpse of forms of social differentiation and 
inequality that go beyond the conventional focus on class as either a distribu-
tional field or a set of economic relations. We can also catch sight of the role 
of the state in shaping, defining and managing the field of social groups who 
make up the “nation” served by welfare (and those who are excluded from 
it). Such approaches also call into question the assumptions that “welfare” is 
intrinsically benevolent and that its recipients (as users, clients or customers) 
desire welfare provision. Instead, questions of control, regulation, surveil-
lance, and the norms embedded in such processes require us to think of the 
relationships between welfare, states and citizens in a more difficult way. 
Such approaches also suggest that these relationships have a long history, ra-
ther than simply being an effect of the contemporary move away from a be-
nevolent welfare state to a harsher form of politics and policies (see, e.g., 
Somers, 2010). 
In all these ways, it seems important not to short–circuit the analysis of 
welfare states with assumptions about their content (e.g. income transfer pro-
grams), their (re)distributive dynamics or their social/political character. At-
tending to the diversity of programs and processes through which “welfare” 
is organized and enacted certainly makes comparison (across space and time) 
more difficult, but possibly more productive. From such a starting point, 
studying welfare state change demands our attention to a range of govern-
mental programs and their impacts on differentiated populations. That cer-
tainly means, as Clasen and Seigel (2008) have argued, attention to the 
changing conditions and conditionalities of welfare provision. How are the 
claims of universalism being varied? How are the forms of inclusion and ex-
clusion of welfare subjects changing? What is at stake in the proclaimed “re-
balancing of rights and responsibilities” between citizens and the state? What 
is the experience of welfare when one is made into an active and responsible 
citizen? What disqualifications are brought into play in the “reform” of wel-
fare benefits and services? E.g., the withdrawal of benefit from people 
(women) who have children while in receipt of welfare; who are found to use 
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illegal drugs; who refuse “offers” of work or work experience; who live in 
housing that is “too expensive”… and many more. What Jeremy Gould has 
called “the new conditionality” (Gould, 2005) is increasingly widespread—
and is by no means limited to development policies. 
Finally, thinking about the conditions and consequences of welfare poli-
cies opens up further questions about (re–)distribution. Some analysts have 
argued that the reform of welfare—particularly in Anglophone settings—has 
seen a move towards “corporate welfare” (Farnsworth, 2012). A variety of 
changes, such as public–private partnerships, outsourcing or contracting of 
services, involve an “income transfer” process to corporations who have be-
come major “welfare beneficiaries.” There are also other transfers to the cor-
porate sector, such as  subsidies for employing people. As with questions of 
changing conditionality, these changes suggest that stable figures for public 
spending on social protection may conceal significant changes in the focus, 
aims and effects of such schemes. 
Welfare, then, is both difficult to specify and variable, between countries 
and across time. Recent attempts to “reform” welfare have been primarily le-
gitimated by reference to the costs of welfare (in a long series of fiscal crises 
since the 1970s) and to the consequences of welfare (such as neo–
conservative claims about producing a “dependency culture”). These chal-
lenges to welfare have been closely tied up with neo–liberal and neo–
conservative anti–statism—but in the following section, I will suggest that 
conceptually separating welfare and state may be important. 
State: 
Anti–statism is certainly entangled with anti–welfarism in contemporary 
politics, but it has a wider reach and significance in at least two respects. 
First, it draws on a considerably more diverse set of political experiences and 
discourses—linking Hayekian neo–liberalism’s hostility to state “interfer-
ence” in the imagined free market to anti–totalitarian and anti–authoritarian 
demands to liberate people from the scrutiny and domination of the state 
(e.g., in former communist societies or in the dictatorships of Latin America 
and the Middle East). In such contexts, social democratic assumptions about 
the progressive and benevolent qualities of the state are—to say the least—
brought into question. Such different tendencies—partly concealed by the 
dominance achieved by neo–liberal orientations in the institutions of global 
governance—have certainly fuelled very significant programs of state re-
form: from the current fiscal austerity to processes of decentralization and 
devolution; from outsourcing public services to the promotion of civil society 
or third sector organizations (Newman and Clarke, 2009). 
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Arguments about the state of welfare have addressed these changes in a 
number of different ways. Political economy accounts of the crisis or end of 
welfare states have tended to argue that the dominance of global capital, 
market relations and market forces have subordinated the social and political 
objectives of welfare states (see the discussion in Clarke, 2007). Elsewhere, 
institutionalist accounts have tended to stress the reform and retrenchment of 
welfare, albeit in new institutional arrangements. Here the rise of “mixed 
economies of welfare” (Johnson, 1996) or “welfare pluralism” (Rao, 1996) 
are ways of designating the shifts between different economic or organiza-
tional sectors—with corporate or third sector organizations taking on welfare 
functions as the state withdraws or contracts. Others have pointed to the 
changing scope and functions of the state in such changes, with the state sur-
rendering roles in the direct production and distribution of welfare, retreating 
instead to functions of financing and regulation (see, e.g., Seeleib–Kaiser, 
2008). 
Such political economic, institutional and sectoral analyses have tended to 
neglect another dynamic of privatization; the shift towards the family–
household–domestic realm that I mentioned earlier. Where these analyses did 
not neglect this realm, they at least only grasped it as a “fourth sector” within 
the mixed economy. 
I use the rather cumbersome formulation family–household–domestic 
realm intentionally. Much social policy analysis refers to this too casually as 
“the family.” This ignores the fact that many people do not live their lives, 
and do not produce and consume welfare, within families. It also obscures 
the way in which many social policies attempt to represent the complex ways 
in which people organize their personal lives as families. The family is both 
the normalized and normative conception of the “private” realm in most Eu-
ropean societies. 
The “sectoral” view of the mixed economy of welfare finds it difficult to 
accommodate this realm satisfactorily. It is not a sector, comparable to the 
other three named sectors. It is not organized by economic logics of calcula-
tion or forms of coordination. There may be “contracts”—e.g. for marriages 
or civil partnerships—but they are not the means of organizing and regulating 
welfare transactions. Specific households may be organized around particular 
relationships, commitments and expectations—but they are not organizations 
equivalent to welfare bureaucracies, commercial corporations or non–
governmental organizations. Despite increasing efforts to estimate their eco-
nomic value, they are not subject to the calculations of the economic value of 
welfare providing sectors or organizations. They are certainly the focus of 
governmental interventions, directions and attempts at regulation—but they 
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are not directly or tightly coupled into the changing mix of welfare. Despite 
claims about how the market is taking over more areas of social life, the pro-
vision of welfare in this intimate sphere is at least partly driven by logics of 
attachment, obligation, concern and even desire. These are not easily ren-
dered controllable, nor can they be easily subjected to current governmental 
obsessions with performance management and evaluation. 
Of course, states regulate some aspects of this private or personal realm, 
especially in relation to the care of children. They also, of course, fund cer-
tain practices and forms of relationship (tax incentives for married couples; 
parental leave; allowances for carers and so on). It is also the case that states 
intervene—taking children into public care; prosecuting parents who fail to 
ensure their children attend school; and establishing both formal and informal 
norms about “care.” But in all these respects, the private–personal realm re-
mains elusive and unpredictable—because it is governed by logics other than 
those of the legal–contractual public realm. I do not mean this to be a roman-
ticized contrast between “cold” logics of the public realm and the “warm” 
logics of the private or personal realm. The relations and practices of this in-
formal welfare are often strained, contradictory and freighted with appalling 
emotional weight—and the private sphere is intimately bound up with forms 
of abuse and violence. So the fact that it (partially) escapes scrutiny, regula-
tion and intervention by public authorities is—at best—a mixed blessing. 
However, the issue of this site of welfare practices is significant in at least 
three ways. First, it troubles conceptual distinctions between public and private, 
and the concept of a mixed economy of welfare. In particular, it challenges 
“sectoral” models of the social organization of welfare and economizing under-
standings of welfare as an object to be produced, delivered and consumed. 
Second, the family–household–domestic realm is increasingly valorized by 
governmental policies that seek to displace varieties of welfare responsibility 
away from the state. In the process, the realm of the personal and the private 
has become increasingly responsibilized—in choice policies, in ideas of inde-
pendence and self–sufficiency, and in the growing interest in the “co–pro-
duction” of welfare outcomes. Third, in this valorization of the family–
household–domestic realm, governmental policies systematically represent this 
as the place (and work) of the family (even if they acknowledge varieties of 
family form). This discursive familialization of welfare normalizes the transfer 
of responsibility from public to private settings by evoking the “natural” bonds 
of affection, obligation and future–oriented investment (e.g., in children). 
Out of this field of changing relationships, there are two questions about 
the state and its changing relationships to welfare that command particular at-
tention. The first concerns the changing form of states: are we seeing the 
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diminution of the state, its disaggregation or the dispersal of state power 
through other agents and agencies? In part, answers to this question depend 
on whether one takes an institutionalist view of the state or considers it 
through a relational perspective. Many have argued about the end of the 
state—in both its welfare state and nation–state forms, taking the shrinking 
(or contracting, Harden, 1992) trajectory of the state as the dominant, if not 
irreversible tendency. The “disaggregation” thesis is argued by Slaughter 
(2004) and is linked to the rise of “private authority” (Hansen and Salskov–
Iversen, 2007). It perhaps relies too heavily on an image of an integrated or 
monolithic state as the previously prevailing state form. “Dispersal” is dis-
cussed in Clarke and Newman (1997) in the context of managerialism, but 
stresses the recomposition of both the sites and forms of state power by draw-
ing other agents and agencies into the work of the state. I do not intend to try 
to resolve this issue here, but want to stress the importance of attending to the 
shifting forms of state organization and the field of relationships in which 
states are articulated, rather than reifying the idea of the state and equating it 
with one geographical/historical form (the European nation–state “constella-
tion,” as Leibfried and Zürn, 2005, call it). 
The second major issue concerns the remaking of the relationship be-
tween the state and the nation in changing transnational conditions (Gupta 
and Sharma, 2006). This is certainly a critical issue in studying states, and 
one that is increasingly widely recognized. But there is an unfortunate temp-
tation to mistake a historical phenomenon—the current visibility and salience 
of transnational relations and processes—for a conceptual one: that states 
now need to be understood transnationally, where previously they were in-
deed closed national systems. We might think more carefully about the histo-
ry of forms of open–ness and patterns of interrelationship on the one hand, 
and forms of closure and models of integration on the other that have charac-
terized nation–states. At the most general level, European nation–states have 
been constituted through the effort to create a nation out of contradictory, di-
verse and sometimes conflicting, conditions, including their colonial fields. 
Colonies provided the economic resources for capital accumulation and eco-
nomic development; they provided populations on whom to practice innova-
tive modes of governance; and they provided (some of) the others against 
whom the (racialized) “national” identity could be defined and elaborated. I 
want to insist on the importance of locating the trajectories of nation–states in 
changing transnational conditions and processes, rather than see them as 
moving from a national to a “post–national” form (or merely staying nation-
al). In the process, we might come to see specific nation–states as temporary 
constructed achievements (see the fuller discussion in Clarke, 2005). 
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For me, states are simultaneously objects of political struggle and con-
densates of the balance of social forces. They are marked—scarred, even—
by previous struggles: their apparatuses carry the traces of those struggles 
even as they are being transformed by new political projects and governmen-
tal programs. They are relationally constituted even as they are imagined as a 
separate agency and power standing over society (Gupta and Ferguson, 
1992). They are profoundly contradictory—in their constitution, in their com-
position and in their effects. 
And Nation? 
Welfare state studies have been dominated by “methodological national-
ism”—in both individual country studies and comparative approaches. In 
keeping with the imagery of the nation–state discussed above, this methodo-
logical approach assumed that welfare states were to be studied with the 
framework of separate nation—states, each of which provided a container 
enclosing its own welfare states. This container conception of the nation—
state saw a people, united in a culture, occupying a clearly defined space, 
whose collective identity was expressed in a national politics, working 
through national institutions that delivered collective security and progress to 
the people of the nation. Instead of this organic and expressive unity, we can 
now think of the institutionalization of welfare, state and nation as a con-
structed unity: as an assemblage that presented itself as natural and normal, 
and as the highest point of social development (Leibfried and Zürn, 2005). In 
the unsettled world of contemporary globalization, the solidity of the national 
(as space, as way of life, as sovereignty) cannot be taken for granted. The 
traces of this disturbance can be seen in discussions of the shift from closed 
to open economies; the relationships between national, regional and global 
governance; the forms of mobility and migration; and the proliferation of na-
tions and states, as new or revived collective identities lay claim to places. 
One way of reading these changes is that globalization has changed the world 
from one in which organic nation–state/welfare state formations existed, to 
one in which they have become destabilized. Such an analysis makes possi-
ble, and even risks legitimating, a certain political–cultural nostalgia. But we 
can think of the nation differently. Eley and Suny (1996) argue that nations 
should be seen as the outcome, rather than the basis, of “nation building” pro-
jects that lay claim to spaces, defining their boundaries and what they con-
tain, and attempting to “nationalize” them. 
The “nation” occupies a double role in relation to welfare states, drawing 
on a distinction between peoples and populations developed by Partha Chat-
terjee (2003). First, nation appears in the guise of the people—the nation as 
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an imagined unity, bonded by a shared place and a common culture (tradi-
tion, way of life, etc.). This national character is then understood as infusing 
the public institutions of the society. At the same time, the nation also ap-
pears as a population (in Foucault’s sense)—the imaginary aggregation of 
differences that are seen to matter. Despite its apparent “naturalness,” such 
socio–demographic categorization is a contested mapping of difference—
making visible certain distinctions (and concealing others); making them 
available (or not) for public calculation and intervention); and often produc-
ing a plan for their improvement or perfectibility. In passing, it might be not-
ed that populations are typically “imperfect,” requiring interventions to im-
prove them. 
In sum, we might think of welfare states as articulated formations in 
which conceptions of welfare, state and nation are assembled in a more or 
less stable, institutionalized form. There is much more to say about such ar-
ticulated formations, but in this context I want to concentrate on the condi-
tions and consequences of these formations becoming unsettled and dis-
articulated—the ways in which welfare states are becoming transformed and 
reformed. A view of them as something more than singular objects opens up 
questions of the different forces, tendencies and pressures that play around 
each of the terms—welfare, state and nation. In the process, we may see 
more—and more divergent—tendencies at work in the re–making of welfare 
states. Welfare is the focus of conflicting projects—to reduce or retrench it; 
to make it “active;” to shift responsibilities; to expand its range (of provision 
and of those who have access to it). Similarly, states have been the focus of 
divergent political projects and claims: from ‘roll back’ to expanded capaci-
ties; from multi–level governance to the new public management; from mar-
ketization to enhanced technologies of democratic and participatory engage-
ment. A singular or unilinear conception of the transformation of states and 
their state–ness risks missing the complex and contradictory politics of state 
remaking. Finally, nation has also become unsettled and the focus of compet-
ing imaginaries—in which nationalized traditions encounter transnational 
multi–culturalisms. 
3. Reassembling Welfare, State and Nation 
I have tried to argue that what we call “welfare states” are articulated for-
mations of welfare, state and nation, which in specific national settings have 
taken particular forms. It is not just “welfare” that changes between welfare 
states, but so does the form of state organization (and its relationship with 
32 John Clarke 
other institutions), and so too does the imagined nation—the people/popu-
lation that welfare is intended to support, develop or bring into being. When 
studying “welfare state” change, we need to be attentive to both how each of 
these elements might be changing, and how their combination is being recon-
structed. It is clear that such a view makes comparison harder—certainly 
harder than tracing how welfare states differ along a single axis, such as pat-
terns of social protection spending. But it might get closer to what is going on 
with welfare states, particularly in a period where the politics of anti–
welfarism and anti–statism have been dominant in Anglophone countries, 
where there is a widespread enthusiasm for going “beyond the state,” and an 
interest in promoting societies of entrepreneurial individuals and responsible 
families. 
The reform, re–making or reconstruction of welfare states is rarely a sim-
ple or singular process. Attempts to create/support an entrepreneurial indi-
vidualist population may sit uncomfortably with existing commitments to an 
increasing elderly population. Attempts to move services “beyond the state” 
may generate increasing costs of processes of performance management, 
evaluation, surveillance and audit as problems of governing at a distance are 
discovered. In almost all of these reforms, images of the past, present and fu-
ture of the nation (and who is included or excluded) are at stake—and often 
fiercely contested. These make the assemblages or ensembles that currently 
strive to “govern the social” ill–fitting, tension–filled and often contradictory 
formations. We should not look for, or at least, we should not expect to find, 
coherent, uniform and non–contradictory systems of doing welfare. 
In the end, it may be more productive to see the dynamics of “welfare re-
form” as a set of processes that seek to create—and institutionalize—new 
mappings of the social, carried through political and governmental projects. 
This remaking of the social extends well beyond its articulation with the eco-
nomic, involving new assemblages of people, positions and practices. Such 
changes require the reconstruction of ways of life, the elaboration of sets of 
distinctions and relations within a population, and the inculcation of habits 
and practices that fit with dominant conceptions of a “modern people” taking 
their place in a global world. Such projects also require “modern” ways of 
governing to sustain them. These are the stakes of contemporary efforts to re-
assemble welfare, state and nation. 
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1. Introduction: What is Familialism? 
The concept of familialism was developed in the context of international 
comparative welfare state and family policy research (see Leitner, 2006). It 
focuses on the family—or, more broadly defined, on private households—as 
an important resource of welfare production and emphasizes the role and 
function of the family, especially of familial care, for the social security sys-
tem. In fact, the care of children, the elderly, and the disabled is mostly pro-
vided free of charge by close, usually female relatives in private homes—and 
welfare states tend to rely on these resources, although to different degrees. 
Some welfare states explicitly attempt to increase care responsibilities among 
family members, others relieve families from care responsibilities, and sever-
al regimes do not intervene at all or apply a mixed strategy. Esping-Andersen 
(1999: 51) distinguishes between familialistic and de-familializing welfare 
regimes: 
A familialistic system […] is one in which public policy assumes—indeed in-
sists—that households must carry the principal responsibility for their members’ 
welfare. A de-familializing regime is one which seeks to unburden the household 
and diminish individuals’ welfare dependence on kinship. 
Welfare state policies are therefore able to act in a familializing or de-
familializing way. Accordingly, we need to identify those social policy 
measures that attach more and those that attach less importance to the family 
as the place of welfare production. In the following, I briefly outline some 
theoretical considerations around familializing and de-familializing social 
policy measures and different types of familialism. I then classify the three 
well-known types of welfare regimes named by Esping-Andersen (1996) ac-
cording to the typology of familialism. My focus is on conservative welfare 
states and their historical development of child care and elder care policies. I 
ask not only whether and how such policies arose, but also how these chang-
es can be explained. 
                                                          
1 This article summarizes the main findings of my habilitation project. 
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2. Theoretical Foundations of the Concept2 
In the concept of familialism, a distinction is made between familializing and 
de-familializing instruments of social policy. What is the impact of these two 
analytical categories, and what are the expected effects on the caring function 
of the family? The following sections address this question, and then set out a 
typology of familialism. 
2.1. De-familializing Social Policy 
Social services can be classified as mainly de-familializing instruments be-
cause they socialize or “marketize” the caring responsibilities of the family. 
However, in order to evaluate the de-familializing effects of social services it 
is important to consider how extensively services are used and what kind of 
service is provided. Care facilities such as private child minders, preschools, 
kindergartens, and afterschool care constitute the core of possible child care 
provision. Besides education, they aim to reconcile the needs of family and 
employment, hence to de-familialize parents. Overall, the de-familializing ef-
fect of child care provision depends on how well the provider meets this goal 
of compatibility: long and flexible opening hours, easy access to care facili-
ties (high supply and low costs), and a high quality of care provision, for ex-
ample, would be indicators of a high degree of de-familialization. 
Ambulatory social services and partially or fully residential care facilities 
form the core of elder care provision. They certainly contribute to relieving 
families, as they reduce the amount of care the family has to afford by itself. 
At the same time, however, they can also contribute to the maintenance of a 
predominantly familial care arrangement (“crowding in”), in which case their 
de-familializing effects are rather weak. A high degree of de-familializing 
would only obtain if a family were effectively unburdened of the main re-
sponsibility for care. This is the case in residential or partially residential care 
facilities or when a dense network of ambulatory care services exists, allow-
ing people in need of care to live largely independently of familial care.  
2.2. Familializing Social Policy 
In contrast, there are familializing policies that actively support the family in 
providing care: time rights and cash rights for familial care work. Time 
rights, such as parental leave or care leave, aim to provide legally regulated 
periods of leave during which employed people are able to fulfill their care 
                                                          
2 This section draws on Leitner (2011: 86–88). 
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responsibilities. They have a familializing effect, supporting temporary care 
by the family. Their familializing effects become stronger the longer the time 
periods defined, especially because long periods of leave from employment 
have a negative influence on reintegration into the labor market. In this con-
text, part-time employment constitutes a special case. On the one hand, it of-
fers an alternative to full-time employment, and the reduction of work hours 
can be used for familial care. It is only in this way that part-time work has a 
familializing effect. On the other hand, part-time work can also be an alterna-
tive to non-employment for familial carers: if the amount of familial care re-
sponsibility allows part-time employment—for example in combination with 
the use of social services—then part-time employment does encourage  labor 
market participation, but does not automatically have a de-familializing ef-
fect. De-familializing effects arise, if at all, only indirectly, through the out-
sourcing of the care of a family member to social services. 
Familial care may be supported by various cash benefits. These include 
indirect transfer payments to family members—for example the survivor’s 
pension or free membership of the spouse’s health insurance plan—and indi-
vidualized transfers such as parental leave benefits or care leave benefits. The 
increase in the familial carers’ income through these direct and indirect trans-
fers results in direct support for familial care work and the empowerment of 
familial carers. The transfers offer an alternative to securing the family’s in-
come through paid employment, and can therefore be classified as an incen-
tive for care by the family. The higher the transfer payments, the more com-
prehensively they enable the “right to time to care” (Knijn and Kremer, 1997) 
and the stronger are their familializing effects. 
2.3. Four Types of Familialism 
Assuming that welfare regimes contain both familializing and de-familia-
lizing policies, and that each of these has either a weak or a strong expres-
sion, a four-field matrix emerges. This matrix allows us to distinguish be-
tween four ideal types of familialism (Table 1):3 
 
Table 1: Four types of familialism  
Familialization 
 
Strong 
Weak 
De-familialization 
Strong                                    Weak
Optional familialism Explicit familialism 
De-familialism Implicit familialism 
Source: Leitner, 2003 
                                                          
3 This typology is theoretized, and also empirically tested for the first time, in Leitner (2003). 
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Explicit familialism supports the family in caring for children, the disabled, 
and the elderly by means of familialistic policies. At the same time it lacks 
de-familializing policies. Familial care is thus not only encouraged, but ex-
plicitly enforced through the lack of any alternative to care by family mem-
bers. 
Within optional familialism there are both familializing and de-
familializing policies. The caring family is strengthened, but also given the 
option of receiving partial relief from caring responsibilities. In both explicit 
and optional familialism, the “right to time for care” is honored by familialis-
tic policies that enable the family to care. Only in optional familialism, how-
ever, is the family’s right to care not equated with the family’s obligation to 
care. 
Implicit familialism offers neither de-familializing nor familializing poli-
cies. Nevertheless, the family is—ex negativo, so to speak—the primary 
caregiver in these welfare regimes, since there are no alternatives at hand. 
This type implicitly relies on the family with respect to care issues. It might 
also be called “familialism by default.” 
Finally, de-familialism—or anti-familialism—is characterized by strong 
de-familialization due to the state or market provision of care services along 
with weak familialization. Thus, familial carers are unburdened fully or in 
part, but the family’s right to care is not honored. 
3. Welfare Regimes and Types of Familialism 
An analysis of different types of familialism might be most interesting for the 
case of the conservative welfare states, because these accord special im-
portance to child care and elder care within the family and are thus prototypi-
cal familialistic welfare regimes. One of the main foundations of a conserva-
tive welfare regime is the gender division of labor institutionalized through 
the “strong” male-breadwinner model (Ostner, 1995). This model guarantees 
that within a heterosexual couple one partner is available for the care of 
young, disabled, or frail family members while the other partner is gainfully 
employed and secures the family’s income. In combination with the principle 
of subsidiarity, which defines social service provision as first and foremost 
the duty of the family, a division of labor between the state and women 
emerges (Kulawik, 1989: 246). On the one hand, women are enabled to re-
main in a state of “pre-commodification”: the male breadwinner and his so-
cial security protection give women the opportunity not to participate in the 
labor market in order to care for family members. On the other, unpaid care 
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of the family by women secures the functioning of the “service-lean” con-
servative welfare regime. 
Conservative welfare states that provide cash transfers or time rights for 
care can be characterized as explicit familialistic regimes, while conservative 
welfare states that have no familializing policies are implicit familialistic re-
gimes. The former access care by offering positive incentives for families to 
bear the responsibility of care. The latter assume that the family will take on 
care responsibility as a matter of course (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Classification of welfare regimes according to the types of 
familialism 
Optional Familialism 
Scandinavian Welfare Regime 
Explicit Familialism 
 
 
 
 
 
De-Familialism 
 
 
 
Implicit Familialism 
 
Scandinavian welfare states, as opposed to the conservative welfare states de-
scribed above, fall into the category of optional familialism. Gender egalitar-
ianism (whether actual or only desired) leads to a high level of direct transfer 
payments for familial care and to an adequate level of de-familializing struc-
tures. Liberal welfare states, on the other hand, pursue implicit familialism 
and only offer transfer payments for familial care in cases of impending pov-
erty; existing attitudes to gender roles remain unchallenged. Although the 
liberal welfare state could alternatively be associated with de-familialization, 
this would be a market-driven process, with the corresponding consequences 
for social inequality. 
The following section examines the historical development of familialism 
in four conservative welfare state settings: Belgium, Germany, France, and 
Austria. These four countries have in common that, over time, they have 
gone through various forms of familialism within both child care and elder 
care. The “critical junctures” (Collier and Collier, 1991), the crucial timing of 
the changes, will be identified and explanations offered. 
Liberal Welfare Regime 
Conservative Welfare Regime 
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4. Child care Policies in Conservative Welfare States 
In conservative welfare states, two paths of development towards familialism 
in child care policies can be identified. For one of these paths, there is a simi-
larity in the development of policies in Austria and Germany. Both these 
countries originally applied implicit familialism, followed by a phase of ex-
plicit familialism (starting in the 1930s) in which only indirect cash benefits, 
such as free co-membership of the statutory health insurance plan, survivor’s 
pensions, or tax reductions for single-income families, were available. Dur-
ing the second phase of explicit familialism, these structures were supple-
mented by direct structures, namely parental leave and subsidies for new par-
ents. This development started in Austria in 1957 and in Germany in 1977. 
The transition to explicit familialism is in particular need of explanation, as is 
the trend in Germany to abandon the conservative path in favor of optional 
familialism, which has become more apparent through the increase in child 
care facilities since 2005 and the introduction of compensation for lost in-
come during parental leave, the “parental money” or Elterngeld, in 2007. 
Regarding the second path, the development of familialism in France re-
sembles that in Belgium. Both countries saw the introduction of a form of de-
familialization in the late nineteenth century. By the early-1970s, as the low 
employment rate of mothers in that period shows, these measures were used 
more for the education of preschool children than for the task of reconciling 
work with family life. To that extent, this phase of development could be de-
scribed as an implicit familialism constructed by the culture itself. In both 
countries, this was later replaced by explicit familialism, but whereas Bel-
gium developed only indirect strategies, France adopted both indirect and di-
rect instruments  of familialism. In the 1980s, both countries then moved to-
wards an optional familialism whereby welfare policy could build on the 
child care structures already established during the period of de-familiali-
zation, while also adopting new measures. 
The introduction of directly familializing structures during the mid-1980s, 
and the parallel expansion of child care options towards an optional familial-
ism, in this second version of the development of familialism within con-
servative welfare states also deserves explanation. 
Aside: Conservative Optional Familialism 
Contrary to earlier categorizations of welfare states within the typology of 
familialism, empirical analysis has shown that conservative welfare states are 
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not simply either implicitly or explicitly familial: they can also be optionally 
familial. The specificity of optional familialism in conservative welfare states 
is that it features socioeconomic differentiations, in line with the status-
reproducing nature of this type of welfare state. Whereas optional familialism 
with a social democratic character offers high-quality, egalitarian benefits, 
the nature of conservative welfare states means that parents’ freedom of 
choice (between caring for their children themselves or using external carers) 
exists only for those who have the necessary monetary resources. This is es-
pecially true in France and Belgium, though in Germany, too, freedom of 
choice is available only if the income to be compensated is high enough. 
Moreover, France demonstrates a socioeconomic bias within its child care 
options, one that can also be seen in Belgium: the tax benefits for using a 
child minder or nanny create extra options only for those in a middle to high 
income bracket. 
The specific attributes of conservative optional familialism also emerge in 
the gender-discriminatory arrangement of its familializing structures. In 
France and Belgium, the new parents’ subsidy is not high enough to cover 
living costs, leading to a gender skew in its adoption. In Germany, the gender 
skew arises from the income-dependent nature of the subsidy, which means 
that the incentive to share at-home child care is higher for those with better 
incomes. Contrary to this, the optional familialism of the social democratic 
model would ideally provide familializing cash benefits that covered the 
costs of living for all income brackets. 
The conservative welfare states’ move towards optional familialism 
should therefore not be seen as a move towards the social democratic model, 
but rather as another form of conservative welfare states, since there is a con-
servative version of optional familialism. 
5. Explaining Change in Child care Policies 
This section outlines the introduction of directly familialistic measures in 
Germany and Austria and the change from explicit to optional familialism in 
France, Belgium, and Germany. I argue that the changes in child care policy 
in Germany, Austria, France, and Belgium can largely be seen as a response 
to rising employment (or at least desire for employment) among women, es-
pecially young women, in all these countries. I also add some other major 
factors to my explanatory model to do justice to this multifaceted picture. 
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5.1. The Introduction of Paid Child care Leave in Austria and 
Germany 
The difficulties that mothers in Austria and Germany face in combining work 
and child care were a major factor in the introduction of paid parental leave. 
For both countries, in other words, the rising employment rate of young 
women can be identified as the generator of this development. Despite a 
similarly low level of female employment, Austria was quicker than Germa-
ny to identify the incompatibility of work and parenting as a social problem 
and a political issue. 
In the late 1980s, both the leading Austrian political parties agreed that 
women should not work during the first months after giving birth. Whereas 
the Social Democrats saw this maternity leave as an incentive for women to 
return to work within a three-phase model (initial employment, child-care 
break, reentry to employment), the Christian Democrats saw it as a motiva-
tion for mothers to leave work permanently and rely on the traditional male-
breadwinner model. As a result of these ideological differences between the 
two parties and the compromise-based nature of the Austrian political sys-
tem, the new familializing legislation included concessions on both sides. At 
this time, de-familialism was avoided, being deemed too radical. In the end, 
the social policy that was institutionalized was a modernized breadwinner 
model. Until 1990, mothers were entitled to one year of parental leave. The 
period was generally extended to three years, however, because the dearth of 
child care options precluded an earlier return to work. Even then, the half-day 
pattern of kindergarten availability meant that mothers were only able to re-
turn to work part-time. The later extension of official parental leave to two 
years and the option to include fathers changed little with regard to the three-
phase model of female employment (Neyer, 1996). 
The new regulations introducing a universal child care cash benefit in 
2002 extended the paid leave of absence once again, while at the same time 
fostering the practice of mothers working in positions with fewer weekly 
hours. It is therefore still the case that previously employed mothers become 
dependent on a breadwinner once they have a child, and that their opportuni-
ties to contribute financially to the household dwindle as they take up part-
time jobs or positions with low weekly hours. In addition, previously non-
employed parents are now entitled to claim the benefit, which encourages 
familial child care as a sole occupation. This change can be attributed to the 
loss of political power for the Social Democrats (Leitner, 2010). 
In Germany, the Social Democrats were the first to respond to the prob-
lems of reconciling work and family life, in 1979, followed by the Christian 
Democrats in 1985. Similarly to the Austrian case, the two parties were di-
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vided by fundamental ideological differences. Whereas the Social Democrats 
wanted to enable mothers to enter employment and allow parents to choose 
between caring for their children themselves or organizing external care, the 
Christian Democrats saw employment and motherhood as incompatible. With 
the change of government in 1982, the Social Democrat maternity leave, 
which allowed employed mothers to take a leave of absence, was replaced by 
Christian Democrat subsidies for new parents. This embedded the compati-
bility of motherhood and work in the framework of a three-phase model, and 
generally endorsed the familial care of children. Unlike in Austria, the result 
was the institutionalization of an only partially modernized breadwinner 
model. Under the maxim of freedom of choice, even mothers who had not 
worked before the birth of their child were supported (Kolbe, 2002). In Aus-
tria, this dual target group was not established until 2002. 
The above shows that the transition to directly explicit familialism was 
induced by increased female employment and the resulting problems around 
combining work with child care. In both countries there were ideological dif-
ferences between Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. In Austria, this 
led to a modernized breadwinner model due to the forces of coalition and ne-
gotiation, while in Germany the Christian Democrat government’s power 
was sufficient to establish an only partly modernized breadwinner model. In 
both cases, it is noteworthy that not only the Social Democrats but also the 
Christian Democrats accepted the employment of mothers in the form of a 
three-phase model. This indicates a new perception of women that was pre-
viously not detectable. 
5.2. The Diversification of Child care in France and Belgium 
The motivation for extending child care options in France and Belgium was 
also the increase in female employment and the resulting compatibility prob-
lems. Unlike in Austria and Germany, however, the introduction of directly 
familializing measures was not the initial goal. Rather, the aim was to extend 
de-familializing child care structures. France and Belgium were able to build 
on an existing tradition of “écoles maternelles” for preschool children of two-
and-a-half to six years of age. This demonstrates the importance of the politi-
cal legacy of the late-nineteenth-century argument on who should have sov-
ereignty over childrearing (Morgan and Zippel, 2003). Preschools in France 
are part of the state education system, which is meant to be open to all chil-
dren. The compatibility problem increased the demand for places within that 
system, and had to be satisfied if only for egalitarian reasons. In Belgium, on 
the other hand, competition between different educational systems had led to 
a patchwork of preschools, which over time were increasingly used to im-
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prove the compatibility of work and family life. This tradition of external 
childrearing provision meant that France and Belgium had a head start over 
the conservative welfare states with regard to de-familializing measures. This 
became apparent during the expansion of care for under-three-year-olds. The 
fact that since the late nineteenth century children had spent a great deal of 
time in preschool facilities rather than with their parents made cultural ac-
ceptance of family-external care for the under threes much easier. 
The secularized Christian Democrats introduced an increase in child care 
places in the 1970s with the aim of counteracting the labor shortage by in-
creasing female employment. The Socialists wanted to continue this increase 
in child care places in the 1980s in order to fulfill the demands for equality 
put forward by the women’s liberation movement. However, they were not 
able to carry out this enterprise, mainly for financial reasons. As an alterna-
tive, since the mid-1980s there has been a diversification in forms of child 
care. This is mainly driven by employment-market considerations, being in-
tended to help fight the high unemployment rate. It includes support for nan-
nies and child minders to improve the child care situation and the introduc-
tion of directly familializing measures to increase familial child care by 
mothers who leave work to stay at home with their children (Fagnani, 2000). 
In this respect, France is offering the same socioeconomically differentiated 
and gender-discriminatory choice as the conservative variety of optional fa-
milialism. 
In Belgium, the increase in child care by child minders was implemented 
for financial reasons as early as the 1970s. The national family fund for em-
ployers, a response to the compatibility problems of a mainly female clien-
tele, was an important political lobby and a considerable motor for this de-
velopment. 
Directly familializing measures were introduced in both Belgium and 
France in the mid-1980s, and were motivated mainly by employment market 
issues. Mothers were offered a successive—as opposed to simultaneous—
model of compatibility in order to take pressure off the employment market 
(Marques-Pereira and Paye, 1998). 
For both countries, the transition to the conservative version of optional 
familialism was connected with two developments: firstly working mothers’ 
increasing reconciliation problems, and secondly the increasing importance 
of economic arguments in political problem-solving. The two countries have 
had similar reasons for their conservative familialistic solution to the recon-
ciliation problem: the development of familialism was determined by the po-
litical legacy of preschools, the tight financial situation, and the functionali-
zation of child care for employment-market goals. 
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5.3. Germany: From Explicit to Optional Familialism 
Germany’s transition to optional familialism is still at a fledgling stage. This 
is especially worthy of attention since (1) Germany, unlike France and Bel-
gium, does not have the political inheritance of a child care infrastructure that 
could be built upon, and (2) for the first time a conservative welfare state is 
guaranteeing independence from a breadwinner income for once high-
earning parents by introducing Elterngeld, the compensation of lost income. 
The German reform policies are a reaction to the falling birth rate and the 
predicted future labor shortage. By expanding child care for under-three-
year-olds, the compatibility of family life and employment is to be improved 
in order to increase the female employment rate in the medium term. In the 
long term, in combination with Elterngeld this expansion is intended to lead 
to a higher birth rate, especially among higher-income (and better educated) 
groups, and thus to a higher workforce volume. The early care of children 
outside the family also, through appropriate adaptation to children’s devel-
opmental needs, has the potential to increase the quality of the future work-
force. This productivist paradigm of family policy is shared by both Social 
Democrats and Christian Democrats, and competes with the traditional view 
of women and family that is still quite widely held within the Christian Dem-
ocrat party (Leitner, 2008). 
6. Elder care Policies in Conservative Welfare States: Changes 
and Explanations 
The patterns of development within elder care are similar in all four coun-
tries. Not unlike child care policies, the first step was the move from implicit 
to indirectly explicit familialism, with familializing measures introduced 
comparatively early in Belgium and Austria. In Austria and in Germany, di-
rectly familializing measures were then introduced in the 1990s, whereas in 
Belgium familializing structures within employment policies had been put in 
place during the 1980s, and France had already provided cash benefits for the 
care of the disabled by family members as a part of its disability policies 
since the 1970s. In the area of elder care policies, the progression from indi-
rectly to directly explicit familialism is particularly interesting. 
In three of the countries discussed here, the transition from indirectly to di-
rectly explicit familialism within elder care happened because of social struc-
tural transformation processes—specifically, increasingly aging societies and 
the increase in female employment—and the resulting costs for social policy. 
Belgium is the only one of the four where the predicted deficit in future provi-
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sion of care by family members played no role in the introduction of directly 
familializing measures. 
In both Austria and Germany, specific “advocacy coalitions” were the 
most significant motivators for this policy development. In Austria, the 
Green Party and the “Zivilinvalidenverband,” an organization advocating for 
the rights of the disabled, put pressure on the government. In Germany, it 
was the municipalities and states that joined forces with welfare organiza-
tions and pushed for action to counteract mounting costs in the care sector. 
Both countries also introduced their care allowances as an incentive for care 
to be performed by family members. For financial, cultural, and moral rea-
sons, it was the concept of familial care that determined the organization of 
these benefits (Behning, 1999). 
The first directly familializing measures were introduced in France quite 
early, in the mid-1970s, in the framework of disability policies. The main con-
sideration was to give those needing care autonomy by means of the benefits 
provided. Over time, the benefits originally directed at disabled people were 
taken up by an increasing number of elderly people in need of care, over-
whelming the municipalities, which were financing this care out of their social 
welfare budgets. The number of elderly people in need of care became a seri-
ous financial problem for the public authorities, and forced the politicians to 
act. The answer they found was the introduction of an “allocation personalisée 
d’autonomie” (APA) in 2002, which basically continued the previous policy by 
new means. The benefit remained income-dependent and recipients had to 
prove that they used it to pay for care. In this case, we can identify a clear con-
tinuity in social policy, probably as a result of path dependency. Unlike in the 
other three countries, in France the question of care by family members has 
played only a marginal role. There is an unspoken assumption that morality 
alone will motivate the closest relatives or partners to take on the role of caring 
even without external motivations. The goal of the APA was less to assist care-
giving relatives than to increase employment in the sector of social service pro-
vision. The economic gain to be expected from this measure was therefore one 
important political legitimization for the policy (Holdenrieder, 2003). 
In Belgium, in contrast, the transition to directly explicit familialism in 
elder care policies was reached via the detour of employment-market poli-
cies. The introduction of a paid leave of absence for carers was mainly moti-
vated by the politics of unemployment: employed caring relatives who take 
advantage of this leave of absence relieve pressure on the employment-
market. 
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7. Conclusions 
The historical development of familialism differed for child care and elder 
care policies in the four conservative welfare states I have discussed. In child 
care, Austria and Germany moved from implicit familialism to indirectly, 
then directly explicit familialism. Belgium and France moved from de-
familialization (culturally implicit familialism), via indirect and direct forms 
of explicit familialism, to optional familialism. Germany is now on the way 
to optional familialism. It is important to mention the special character of 
conservative optional familialism: it reproduces social status at the point of 
choice between home-based care and external care and between the different 
forms of external care. 
In elder care policies, all four countries progressed in a similar way from 
implicit familialism to indirectly and later to directly explicit familialism. 
Only the timing of this development differed. 
On a more abstract level, several theories can be applied to explain these 
changes in child care and elder care policies in Austria, Belgium, France, and 
Germany: 
 
• Factors that reflect the societal structure, such as increased female em-
ployment and the aging society, played a role in the transition to directly 
explicit familialism for both political fields, since the political pressure 
they generated ultimately led to political action. 
• The economic frameworks were—albeit negatively—the main motivation 
for the transition to directly explicit familialism in elder care and to op-
tional familialism in child care in France and Belgium. 
• The development of familialism was influenced by the varying cultural 
frameworks  in the four countries. The transition to directly explicit famil-
ialism in child care was triggered by a modern perception of women, 
while the transition to optional familialism in child care ultimately mir-
rored two competing models: the care of children within their family ver-
sus care by external parties. The overall model of care within the family 
also played an important part in the transition to explicit familialism in 
elder care in Austria and Germany. 
• Political parties and their ideologies played a role in Germany and Aus-
tria in the transition to directly explicit familialism in child care, while in 
both countries theme-specific advocacy coalitions shaped the move to-
wards familialism in elder care. 
 
The political inheritance of the nineteenth century was a relevant factor in 
the transition to optional familialism in child care in Belgium and France. 
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Overall, functionalist and interest- and conflict-theoretical approaches, 
culturally sensitive explanatory theories, and path dependency theories have 
all proven relevant in explaining individual timings and countries. However, 
a specifically “conservative” explanation for the change in familialism cannot 
be inferred from the empirical findings. 
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Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore      
On the Global Frontier of Post-Welfare Policymaking: 
Conditional Cash Transfers as Fast Social Policy 
Introduction: Globalizing Post-Welfare States 
The period since the declaration of the Millennium Development Goals1 has 
been marked by an unprecedented attempt to build, advance, and consolidate 
a new hegemonic front in the field of social-welfare policy. Conditional cash 
transfer (CCT) programs have been in the vanguard of this effort. CCTs pro-
vide modest cash payments only to those low-income households that “play 
by the rules,” enrolling children in school, attending to domestic hygiene and 
appropriate healthcare, and building the human capital of the next generation. 
The CCT model encapsulates a new logic of social assistance quite different 
to the welfare-state rationalities of needs-based entitlement and universal 
coverage: it emphasizes socioeconomic promotion over social protection and 
long-term human-capital investment over temporary relief; it advances the 
principles of reciprocal obligation and “co-responsibility” over universal hu-
man rights or top-down forms of social responsibility; it privileges targeted 
interventions over generalized entitlements; and it inculcates active engage-
ment over passive benefit receipt, an approach captured in the phrase often 
associated with these programs: “paying for good behavior.” 
Often styled as a Latin American “invention,” the operational principles 
and programming practices of CCTs have been actively co-produced, almost 
since their inception, by multilateral development agencies like the World 
Bank. They have since spread throughout South America, and indeed to eve-
ry continent, at a prolific rate. The “onward march of conditional cash trans-
fer [programs],” Anthony Hall (2012: 26) has noted, “is an increasingly glob-
al phenomenon.” In less than a decade, what began as a pair of isolated ex-
periments (in Mexico and Brazil) has become established, in effect, as the de-
fault setting for anti-poverty reform: “the international development commu-
nity has clearly defined CCTs as the new norm” (Sugiyama, 2011: 264). 
But what Lawrence Aber and Laura Rawlings describe, writing for the 
World Bank, as the “remarkable global expansion” (Aber and Rawlings, 
2011: 1) of CCTs has not been achieved by way of heavy-handed coercion; 
                                                          
1 See http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml. 
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these widely emulated programs have been subject to a distinctive form of 
best-practice contagion, fueled by expensively marshaled evaluation evi-
dence and guided by expert networks: “CCTs have been closely studied and 
well evaluated, creating both a strong evidence base from which to inform 
policy decisions and an active global community of practice.” Classically 
modeled on Progresa-Oportunidades in Mexico, CCTs are now found in ap-
proaching fifty countries. They have been trumpeted by the Economist (2010: 
10) as “the world’s favourite anti-poverty device,” while for Nancy Birdsall, 
president of the Center for Global Development, they are “as close as you 
can come to a magic bullet” (quoted in Dugger, 2004: A1). 
CCTs seek to be both pro-poor and pro-market by incentivizing those 
human-capital building behaviors, like regular school attendance and preven-
tative healthcare, determined to benefit the children of low-income house-
holds. As such, they borrow concepts from behavioral economics and moti-
vational psychology, melding these with the pragmatic, best-practice style 
characteristic of the “new” Washington Consensus, in service of building a 
post-welfare rationale for “safety net” spending. Conditioning cash transfers 
is the crucial maneuver here, for this transforms what might be seen as an 
ameliorative “hand out” into an instrumentalist “hand up,” while enabling a 
form of social targeting actively linked to human-capital investment. Accord-
ing to the World Bank’s logic, “by supporting minimum levels of consump-
tion, helping credit-constrained poor people to be productive, and providing 
incentives for long-term investments in human capital, safety nets have a po-
tentially important role in compensating for the market failures that help per-
petuate poverty, particularly in high inequality settings” (Aber and Rawlings, 
2011: 4). 
The global CCT wave has been enabled, bankrolled, and steered by the 
World Bank and its allies in the multilateral community (in concert with a 
small army of policy entrepreneurs, consultants, evaluation scientists, and 
practitioner-advocates), both through established channels like policy-based 
lending and, no less consequentially, through the increasingly isomorphic 
fields of expert knowledge and technocratic practice. The World Bank, the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IABD), and other multilateral develop-
ment agencies often underwrite the operating costs of CCT programs—this 
having become, in effect, their authorized mode of social-policy interven-
tion—but they have also actively fostered an explicitly experimental ethos 
around these programs, supporting the deployment of randomized control tri-
als and the extensive dissemination of impact-evaluation studies. Echoing the 
way in which CCT programs incentivize “appropriate” behaviors amongst 
poor families, the multilateral development agencies have been “paying for 
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good behaviour” in policymaking communities themselves, insisting that 
elaborate evaluation strategies must accompany all new interventions, and 
that the policy-development process must be rigorously evidence-based. This 
speaks to a new style of transnational policy development, the terms and the 
terrain of which are preemptively shaped by fast-traveling models like CCTs. 
But where do these models come from? 
Immaculate Invention: Making the CCT Model in Mexico 
It is no exaggeration to say that Mexico’s CCT program (Progresa, as it was 
originally called) was born as a model. But the “iconic” status that it would 
eventually achieve, to borrow the World Bank’s munificent phrase (Fiszbein 
et al, 2009: 36), would need to be secured through a combination of astute 
technocratic design and enduring political will. The case for radical reform of 
the Mexican social-assistance system was pressed in the midst of the Peso 
crisis of 1994-1995, when it was championed by Santiago Levy (a US-
trained economist and senior official in the Ministry of Finance, previously a 
World Bank consultant on poverty issues) and José Gómez de León (a de-
mographer, director of the National Population Council, and confidant of 
then-President Zedillo). Fulsome reconstructions of the rationale, justifica-
tion, and decisive steps that were taken at the time to build and secure Mexi-
co’s pioneering CCT program have since been published by Levy (now Vice 
President for Sectors and Knowledge at the IADB). Levy’s (2006) book, 
Progress against poverty, is effectively presented as a model-making manual. 
On Levy’s (re)telling, there were three circumstances of the Mexican re-
form process that were decisive. First, the new approach was theoretically 
grounded, being predicated on the latest “analytical advances” concerning the 
multi-dimensional determinants of poverty achieved by economists, sociolo-
gists, and nutritionists, which together established the “analytical backbone” 
for Progresa (Levy, 2006: 10, 11). Rendered in technical terms, these con-
cerned the management of risk aversion, the containment of dependency, and 
the active engagement of beneficiaries. Second, deliberate attention was paid 
to the “lessons” from previous Mexican experiences, most of which were 
deemed to be negative. Previous interventions were judged to have inade-
quately targeted extreme poverty; they were prone to bureaucratic corruption 
and political manipulation; and a wide range of inefficiencies was associated 
with the use of food subsidies. And third, key decision-makers at the time 
knowingly “use[d] the crisis as a motivation for change,” (see above refer-
ence: 13) as an opportunity for systemic reform, sold as a single, bold leap to 
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world best practice, and designed to bring costs under control in anticipation 
of long-run budgetary pressure (see above reference: 10, 14, 15). 
Here, the refinement of a rigorous conceptual definition of the CCT mod-
el preceded not only practical but even political considerations: 
[The] challenge […] was to bring academic researchers’ analytical insights and 
[an] individual nation’s best practices together in a unified conceptual framework 
in order to incorporate that knowledge systematically in the design of the poverty 
program […] While the economic crisis created the immediate motivation for 
change—and the beginning of a new administration naturally created a political 
climate that facilitated change—the accumulation of empirical evidence, adminis-
trative experience, and analytical arguments was fundamental in gradually per-
suading the members of the Cabinet to make substantive adjustments to the exist-
ing food subsidy and related poverty programs. (above reference: 13-14) 
This amounted to an extreme form of technocratic policymaking, prosecuted 
in the teeth of opposition not only from civil-society groups but also from the 
leadership of the federal government’s own social-policy ministry (Teich-
man, 2009). Exaggerated faith was placed in the kind of economistic techno-
science favored by the World Bank, for whom Levy had worked as a profes-
sional economist-cum-policy analyst, an organization later credited for “gen-
erously provid[ing] technical advice” (Levy, 2006: 114) during the design, 
piloting, and startup phases of the program. Crucially, however, the involve-
ment of the multilateral development agencies (in particular, the World Bank 
and the IADB), while formative, was not to be rendered politically legible in 
the form of a large-scale loan, notwithstanding the severe financial pressures 
under which the Mexican government was operating at the time. In an in-
stance of mandarin-class bureaucratic understatement, Levy would later ex-
plain that, “it was not deemed convenient to obtain international funding for 
the program [in] 1996-97 [because] such financing would have added yet one 
more controversial aspect to what was already a fairly significant change in 
poverty policy, perhaps giving the impression that the program was the result 
of a mandate or an adjustment program agreed upon with international finan-
cial institutions” (Levy, 2006: 114; see also Teichman, 2007; Dion, 2010). 
This said, Progresa was in many respects a World Bank/IADB-style pro-
ject in all but name, since in its basic rationale and fundamental design the 
program reflected ascendant currents in expert opinion across the multilateral 
agencies, albeit mostly at the level of conceptual principle rather than (as yet) 
actually existing practice. In as far as Progresa really was a bold experiment, 
this was because it sought to capture, and then to act decisively on, a still-
emergent expert consensus—what might be called “pre-best practice.” Retro-
spective accounts, however, continue to position the experiment out in front 
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of global best practice, which not coincidentally confers leadership status on 
an inner circle of elite decision-makers in Mexico City. According to one of 
those closely involved, 
[The Progresa] proposal was received with great skepticism and opposition by 
some Mexican policy makers as well as by international agencies. In Mexico, 
some policy makers saw the proposal as a ‘neo-liberal attempt to eliminate subsi-
dies for the poor’ and as ‘an imposition by international agencies.’ Political par-
ties were concerned about a federal program that would ‘give out money,’ pre-
sumably with electoral and political motives. International agencies thought it op-
erationally and politically unfeasible. (Rodriguez, 2008: 288) 
The international agencies, one can perhaps conclude, did not however find 
the Progresa proposal to be conceptually incoherent. Its model-like rationali-
ty would not have been questioned by policy experts in Washington, DC, and 
indeed the robustness of this rationality—that “analytical backbone”—was 
the basis on which the audacious experiment was defended during the pro-
tracted debate around the program’s rationale and design in Mexico City 
(Levy, 2006; Rodriguez, 2008). 
A key strategy of those championing Progresa had been to focus “discus-
sions as much as possible on objective and technical elements,” bringing in 
“well-known national and international experts” where necessary to bolster 
the case for controversial aspects of the plan, in order to technocratically set-
tle matters “where there had been differences of opinion” (Rodriguez, 2008: 
297). Decisively, it would later transpire, a state-of-the-art evaluation frame-
work was built into the program at the design stage, based on a randomized 
control-group methodology and managed by the well-regarded Washington, 
DC evaluation house, IFPRI.2 Program-design components such as the de-
velopment of an index of marginality and the specification of targeting and 
(random) assignment procedures were designed and enacted with nothing 
short of scientific rigor, even as “[c]ritics, particularly leaders of civil society 
organizations, expressed moral revulsion at a program evaluation process that 
involved the use of a control group (10 million Mexicans) who received no 
Progresa support [on the basis of a purely statistical rationale, so that their] 
progress could be compared with those who did” (Teichman, 2009: 79). The 
denial of aid to millions of the rural poor in the midst of a macroeconomic 
crisis, whose extreme poverty had been meticulously verified as a prelude to 
assignment to the off-program control group, was deemed a price worth pay-
ing, evidently, “to test whether the design hypothesis was correct […] to 
quantify the impacts of the programme [and] to determine whether design 
                                                          
2 The International Food Policy Research Institute (see Adato and Hoddinott, 2010). 
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guidelines were being followed and identify if observed outcomes were at-
tributable to implementation or design aspects” (Rodriguez, 2008: 293). 
Some would no doubt argue that the greater good was in fact served, 
since the first results of the IFPRI evaluation—which were interpreted in 
largely positive terms—became available on the eve of the transition from 
the Zedillo to the Fox presidency in 2000. The newly elected President Fox 
was persuaded (by Santiago Levy, whose services he was to retain) not only 
to preserve the program, but to expand it. Rebranded as Oportunidades, what 
would become the country’s flagship social program was extended to the cit-
ies and to other rural regions, eventually reaching one-fourth of the Mexican 
population and becoming a celebrated test case-cum-lesson for “scaling up 
success” (Cohen and Easterly, 2009; see also UNDP, 2011). The IADB initi-
ated large-scale funding for the expanded program in 2001, which was soon 
the object of lavish praise in nearly every quarter of the multilateral policy 
community. 
When James Wolfensohn finished his term as president of the World 
Bank, in July 2006, one of his first acts as eponymous head of the Brookings 
Institution’s new Center for Development was to commission Santiago Levy 
to write the definitive account of the Progresa/Oportunidades story. In the 
foreword to the book, Wolfensohn (2006: vii) rather generously—but certain-
ly not innocently—chose to characterize the Mexican CCT as a “homegrown 
[program], based on solid economic and social analysis,” indeed one prem-
ised on an arrestingly “simple idea,” generously (but again not innocently) 
credited to Levy himself. Wolfensohn’s hope was that “this volume can serve 
[…] as a model of effective design of large-scale sustainable poverty reduc-
tion programs,” since the Progresa/Oportunidades story amply demonstrated 
that, “in addition to the technical aspects of a poverty program, institutional 
elements that can ensure adequate scale and continuity are equally indispen-
sable for effective poverty alleviation” (Wolfensohn, 2006: ix-x, emphasis 
added). As an experiment that worked, the Mexican experience stood as a 
shining example of rigorous model building, but model building with a pur-
pose. The scientific rationales and rigorous evaluations that had defined this 
experiment, and which have since sustained it through several transfers of 
presidential power, were the means to end of a form of technocratic 
(re)production effectively “insulated” from politics. 
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Transnationalizing the CCT Model: a More-than Washington 
Consensus 
“The widespread distribution of published reports of PROGRESA’s out-
comes,” Sugiyama (2011: 254) notes, “furthered the notion that Mexico had 
developed a model social program.” The model had apparently found its 
moment. But nothing about this was accidental, of course. The IABD had 
discreetly funded the IFPRI evaluation program in Mexico from the start, fur-
ther cementing close relationships between the project’s technocratic leader-
ship and the bank (Teichman, 2007), and the evaluation itself had been ad-
dressed as much to external audiences as to internal policymaking constitu-
encies. Even though the IFPRI evaluation team relocated to Mexico for three 
years to manage the project there, the first presentation of the evaluation re-
sults took place not in Mexico City, but in Washington, DC. 
Little wonder, then, that Aber and Rawlings (2011) credit the ascendancy 
of evaluation-driven and evidence-based policymaking—especially involving 
randomized trials—as one of three decisive factors behind the globalization 
of CCTs. Long maligned as “gray” literature, destined for the back drawers 
of ministry filing cabinets, evaluation research has been propelled from the 
shadows to the spotlight in this process, emerging as a significant model-
building arena in its own right. Positive evaluation results, especially where 
these meet the stern tests of statistical validity, have become an international 
currency of sorts. Progresa’s state-of-the-art evaluation not only ensured the 
program’s longevity (especially at the vulnerable moment when the incoming 
Fox administration had both a clear mandate and a presentational need to 
break with the Zedillo inheritance), it effectively secured international-model 
status for the rebadged Oportunidades program, which was (re)born as a val-
idated best practice. 
A rigorous evaluation design, based on experimental principles, was liter-
ally embedded into Progresa-Oportunidades, initially as a way to insulate the 
program from the threat of political “interference.” (Note that this maneuver 
positions the imperatives of social-policy technoscience ‘above’ domestic 
politics.) Its longer-term impact, though, has been to propel the Mexican pro-
gram into the center of international debates over social protection, while al-
so contributing to the “culture of evaluation” (Fiszbein et al, 2009: 94) that 
has enveloped the design and implementation of CCTs worldwide (see above 
reference: 94-5). Aber and Rawlings state that CCTs “are now arguably the 
best evaluated development initiative in the Global South,” their rapid global 
spread having been 
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fueled by [the] compelling design features [of the paradigmatic programs], their 
promising evaluation results and the emphasis on knowledge sharing within the 
CCT and welfare reform community. This experience provides an example of the 
speed with which innovation can be adopted and scaled up, following a dynamic 
demonstration effect, with a solid grounding in evidence. (2011: 7, 10) 
As randomized control trials have become the common currency in interna-
tional policy debates, their high implementation costs impose implicit entry 
barriers for participation in the global social-protection debate. Since it costs, 
in effect, several million dollars to ask a question using a randomized-control 
methodology, only the institutions with the deepest pockets get to determine 
the questions. This creates a macro selection bias in favor of orthodox inter-
ests, issues, and lines of policy development. Evaluations without a signifi-
cant experimental-design component are also prone to be treated as “softer” 
and “less scientific,” being seen as potentially subject to political manipula-
tion or overselling, and suspect in terms of innate evaluative rigor. The 
World Bank, other multilateral development agencies, and the leading evalu-
ation houses, on the other hand, enthusiastically promote those programs that 
have been evaluated using randomized-control procedures, to external audi-
ences as best-practice models with papers. 
Not only does this tend to naturalize certain forms (and directions) of 
technocratic reproduction, it further contributes to the sense that the “big 
questions” concerning the philosophy and design of CCT programs are firm-
ly settled. The biggest of these concern the efficacy and ethics of conditional-
ities themselves which are systemically bracketed out in a situation in which 
the experimental universe is dominated by different kinds of conditional pro-
grams and only a few unconditional programs. 
If the rise of evaluation science is the first of the drivers of transformation 
in social-welfare policy identified by Aber and Rawlings, the second con-
cerns the use of incentives in program design, a trend that reflects both the 
behavioral turn in economic thinking and the political embrace of approaches 
that “responsibilize” the poor. And just as the behavioral turn has played a 
part in unifying economic theory, breaking down—in tandem with neoliber-
alization—some of the old distinctions between a “mainstream” economics 
ostensibly applicable in the Global North and “development” economics for 
the South (see Naím, 2000), so too have the policymaking boundaries be-
tween different “welfare worlds” (see Esping-Andersen, 1990) become in-
creasingly porous, as policy discourses and debates associated with the Glob-
al North and South have become increasingly interrelated, combined, and 
mutually referential. It has become commonplace to position developments 
in, say, US social and labor-market policy (like the transition to the Tempo-
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rary Assistance for Needy Families program or the rise of Earned Income 
Tax Credits) as part of the same “movement” as CCTs, with the Latin Amer-
ican experiments assuming the vanguard, as a moderately disruptive technol-
ogy. The unifying “focus on a ‘hand-up and not a hand-out’ has broad politi-
cal appeal,” note Aber and Rawlings (2011: 5), one that has “crossed tradi-
tional party lines and is reflected in political discussions and popular debate 
in both the North and South calling for an emphasis on work, on investing in 
human capital, on temporary assistance and on co-responsibility between the 
state and its citizens.” 
Not coincidentally, such interventions also invoke, hail, and work upon 
an ostensibly universal economic subject, a rational actor duly enabled to act 
on her/his own to escape poverty, once appropriate adjustments have been 
made to the structure of opportunity costs, the patterning of incentives, and 
the calibration of risk and rewards. Amongst the notable features of the rise 
of CCTs, in this context, has been a certain leveling of the experimental play-
ing field, as the Global South is reimagined as a potential site of positive pro-
gramming lessons, and not simply as a location of wicked problems or a “re-
ceiving region” for made-in-Washington solutions. The agencies of the 
Washington Consensus remain deeply involved, of course, but in a situation 
in which the hubris of unilateral imposition has given way to a more facilita-
tive posture, one that emphasizes the coproduction of expertise with govern-
mental and nongovernmental actors in the South, the enabling of “horizontal” 
learning across sites and policy fields, and studied deference to well-
documented impact evaluations and evidence of “what works.” 
In this era of (supposedly) “pro-poor” policymaking, moreover, the lan-
guage of the incentives paradigm yields obvious presentational advantages: 
what defines incentive-based programs like CCTs is that they pay for good 
behavior, in contrast to the negative undertones of workfare-style programs 
(with their penalties or “sanctions” for “noncompliance”). This said, both 
negative sanctions and positive incentives work on a behavioralist, “deficien-
cy model” of the poor, since both seek to adjust inappropriate behaviors (de-
pendency, underinvestment in schooling, poor hygiene, etc.) in order to mold 
more productive and more responsible subjects. CCTs, though, represent the 
positive side of this coin. 
The third driver of transformation in globalizing social policy identified 
by Aber and Rawlings (2011), in addition to the turns towards behavioralism 
and evaluation scientism, is the shift in policy thinking and program design 
towards human-capital focused approaches. This involves what they portray 
as an historic reconciliation of the imperatives of humanitarian aid and short-
term assistance on the one hand with the goals of long-term economic growth 
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on the other, which had previously involved tradeoffs and tensions. CCTs are 
held to achieve this by fusing cash assistance with future-oriented invest-
ments in the children of the poor (see Jenson, 2010). It is recognized that 
“CCTs are highly ambitious,” seeking as they do to “foster human capital ac-
cumulation among the young as a means to breaking the inter-generational 
cycle of poverty” (Aber and Rawlings, 2011: 6), and conceptualizing this as a 
multidimensional problem and endeavoring to mobilize positive synergies 
between education, nutrition, and health. With their distinctive emphasis on 
experimental practice, however, CCTs are credited with “pushing the bound-
aries of new thinking,” (Aber and Rawlings, 2011: 7) as a programming 
technology positioned at “the threshold of the global policy debate” (see 
above reference: 1). These boundaries are being pushed in such a way, how-
ever, as to consolidate new social-policy orthodoxies, certainly not to upend 
them. 
CCTs, in this respect, can be seen as carriers of a new policy rationality, 
one that is understood to be continuously in the making in the style of an 
emergent form of deliberative technocracy. They not only encapsulate the 
“new thinking” on safety-net policy (see Table 1), which emphasizes social 
promotion over social protection, responsibilities over rights, and long-term 
investment over short-term amelioration, but they proactively substantiate an 
aspirational project located seductively on the threshold of leading-edge real-
ization. This means that while the new generation of social-policy programs 
are globally diffused technologies, they are far from mature technologies. It 
is here, for all the uninterrupted soft sell of the best-practice industry, for all 
the debilitating barriers to entry and selection biases created by the “big 
science” evaluation regime, for all this paradigm-building momentum, un-
scripted surprises continue to occur, new mutations appear in the wild, and 
alternative or vernacular models find their way into the limelight. 
 
Table 1 Conceptions of social assistance, before and after CCTs  
 Temporality  Philosophy  Tools Barriers Goals 
Welfare  Assistance in 
times of need 
Entitlement: 
social respon-
sibility for the 
poor; 
“handouts” 
Entitlement-
based transfers 
Dependency 
culture 
Poverty allevia-
tion; social re-
distribution 
Post-Welfare Activation 
through tar-
geted interven-
tions 
Reciprocity: 
partnership 
with the poor; 
“hand up” 
Incentive based 
transfers 
Access to in-
formation, in-
centives 
Exits from pov-
erty, economic 
growth and 
human capital 
Source: developed from Aber and Rawlings (2011) 
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Multilateral Agencies, Message Control, and its Limits 
In its multiple roles as a funder, evaluator, and technical assistance provider, 
the World Bank has been directly engaged the purposeful pump-priming and 
rapid diffusion of the CCT model, and it has been intimately involved in not 
only steering the course but managing the population of “experiments.” In 
supporting CCT experiments in more than 45 countries, including the provi-
sion of $5.4 billion since FY 2001 for the development and scaling up of 39 
CCT initiatives in 22 nations (Grosh, 2011), the World Bank is positioned de 
facto as the principal global broker of CCT “best practice,” even as (for un-
derstandable ideological reasons) this is typically represented in terms of an 
enabling, facilitating or clearing-house function. In this role as an especially 
proactive intermediator, the Bank not only finances preferred lines of policy 
experimentation, it hosts international conferences; it funds and facilitates 
practitioner networks such as the South-to-South learning network, the “In-
ternational CCT Community of Practice,” and others for midlevel and senior 
program managers (Fiszbein et al, 2009); and has published countless pro-
gramming briefs, technical reports, policy presentations, and blogs advising 
governments on matters pertaining to CCT policy design, implementation, 
and evaluation. 
Across these many channels, the World Bank’s policy advice has tended 
to coagulate around three poles of CCT practice, which effectively define the 
preapproved reform universe as well as the field of experimentation with 
CCTs: First (and foremost) the Mexican Oportunidades program, with its so-
phisticated targeting mechanisms, reliance on unambiguous conditionalities, 
and inbuilt evaluation infrastructure; second, the newer and relatively small-
scale Chile Solidario program, which provides time-limited, highly targeted, 
and intensive interventions that are strictly contractualized and closely man-
aged by social workers; and third, Brazil’s Bolsa Familia, which despite be-
ing the largest CCT program in the world credited for measurable reductions 
in both poverty and economic inequality, has a rather more questionable rep-
utation—in orthodox circles—for having adopted a “softer” approach to con-
ditionalities and targeting. World Bank researchers summarize the relative 
merits of these three CCT models as follows: 
What really makes Mexico’s program iconic is the successive waves of data col-
lected to evaluate its impact, the placement of these data in the public domain, and 
the hundreds of papers and thousands of references to them that this easy access 
has generated […] Brazil’s CCT provides something of an interesting contrast to 
the Mexican case in various respects. [It] takes a softer, more gradual tack on 
conditions [and] puts a shade more emphasis on redistribution than on human cap-
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ital formation. Also, unlike the Mexican program, the Brazilian programs did not 
explicitly incorporate impact evaluations in their design […] Chile Solidario […] 
differs notably from classic CCT programs by customizing its conditions.  Fami-
lies initially work intensely with social workers to understand actions that could 
help them get out of extreme poverty, and then they commit to action plans that 
become the household-specific conditions of the benefit […] Chile Solidario is 
thus far a model unto itself, although other programs are moving to emulate it to a 
degree. (Fiszbein et al, 2009: 36-39) 
It is Oportunidades and Chile Solidario, two “model programs” that stress 
strong conditionalities and social obligations, that are most frequently pro-
moted as appropriate for emulation. In a sense, Bolsa Familia is too large to 
ignore, but the paucity of officially sanctioned evaluation evidence, the de-
centralized administration of the program, and what is seen as a “loose” ap-
proach to conditionalities combine to deny the program favored model status 
in World Bank circles. The Bank’s definitive report on Bolsa Familia aptly 
travels under the unassuming title of The nuts and bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa 
Familia program (Lindert et al, 2007). As a leading figure on the internation-
al CCT evaluation scene later reflected, “Nuts and bolts” was kind of self-
effacing. “We're just putting the thing together, and this is how it basically 
works. There was no Model, capital-M, selling of it.”3 Crucially, what the 
Brazilian government chose to do with their “non-model” would depart from 
World Bank orthodoxy on the definitive terrain of conditionalities. In Brazil, 
the first C of CCTs has a rather different meaning: A member of the World 
Bank team in Brasilia explained it this way: “[Here], the poor are poor be-
cause of a historical process of social exclusion, and we owe them a debt. 
That’s fundamental in Brazilian thinking: They have citizens’ rights [but] 
have not always had access to those rights, and we have to pay this debt back 
to the poor […] If I have a child not attending school [but on the] program, 
are we going to take it [the Bolsa allowance] away? Is my first response a 
penalty or a punishment? No, our response should be to go and investigate, to 
use it as a flag—use it as a flag for more care. For them, they would say that 
the C, as in CCT, is for care. [The idea is] not condition right away, it’s not a 
contract right away.”4 
While it may not meet with the approval of World Bank economist-
evaluators, Brazil’s approach of combining soft conditionalities with social 
rights has resonated with program planners in sub-Saharan Africa, where 
large segments of the population live in abject poverty and where service de-
                                                          
3 Evaluation manager, nonprofit research center, Washington, DC, interviewed by Jamie 
Peck and Nik Theodore, May 2009. 
4 Senior manager #1, World Bank Brasilia team, interviewed by Jamie Peck and Nik Theo-
dore, May 2009. 
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livery systems are, by and large, inadequate. Here, capacities for targeting 
and monitoring are likewise underdeveloped. Correspondingly, CCT pro-
grams are less likely to stress conditionalities—partly out of choice, partly 
out of necessity—and there is often no penalty for noncompliance (Garcia 
and Moore, 2012). Across Africa’s emerging CCT frontier, the centralized 
and tightly managed Oportunidades program has notably less traction. In-
stead, Brazil has proved to be a source of more prosaic and practical lessons, 
as well as a different kind of model for what might involve into less condi-
tional, rights-based CCTs. As a relatively late adopter of CCTs, Africa could 
potentially be a proving ground for alternative approaches, approaches that 
are not simply “suboptimal” in relation to the preferred models from Latin 
America, but which effectively redefine cash-transfer practice en route (see 
Ferguson, 2010). 
Faced with extraordinarily high levels of poverty and social distress, a co-
alition of civil society organizations in Namibia sought to develop an alterna-
tive model of social protection centered on unconditional cash transfers. In 
the spirit of a citizen’s income approach, the Basic Income Grant (BIG) pro-
gram provides 100 Namibian dollars ($11.90 US) per month to all residents 
of the settlement of Otjivero, where unemployment exceeds 70 percent and 
more than four in ten children are malnourished (Krahe, 2009). While a ran-
domized trial was ruled out as “ethically problematic,” a non-randomized 
evaluation of the two-year BIG pilot project nevertheless revealed promising 
results: malnutrition plummeted, school attendance and health clinic visits 
rose, and residents increasingly sought employment opportunities in outlying 
areas—outcomes that were achieved without the requirements imposed by 
conditionalities.5 Yet the findings from this program have garnered little at-
tention from the World Bank and other multilateral development agencies, 
and the Namibian program remains something of an anomaly, if not an ideo-
logical orphan, in international debates regarding the future of social-
protection policy. Largely overlooked in orthodox circles, the BIG stands as a 
case of largely unrequited model building, the relative isolation of which 
stems not from inferior performance but because it challenges the expert con-
sensus in cash-transfer policy, which remains rooted in technocratic ap-
proaches to policy design predicated on means-testing, targeting, and, of 
course, conditionalities. 
Countercultural experiments in unconditional cash transfers, such as the 
Namibian BIG program, may indeed be exceptions that underscore the more 
                                                          
5 Civil society representative, Windhoek, Namibia, interviewed by Nik Theodore, October 
2009; senior manager, think tank, Windhoek, Namibia, interviewed by Nik Theodore, Oc-
tober 2009. 
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general rule. But it would be premature to foreclose the possibility of muta-
tion beyond the CCT consensus. In fact, the International Labour Office 
(ILO) has been taking up this cause in its evolving campaign around the “so-
cial protection floor.” This relatively progressive current in the multilateral 
policy debate diverges from the “liberal-residualist” approach of the World 
Bank, where targeting and conditionality remain axiomatic (if not dogmatic) 
principles, while at the same time transcending the accommodationalist ap-
proach to “capabilities” and “social investment” paradigm favored by the 
OECD (Jenson, 2010). The Bachelet report on the social protection floor dip-
lomatically acknowledges the achievements of the mainstream CCT pro-
grams, but more assertively insists that the debate around conditionalities is 
“ongoing” (ILO, 2011: 82). Its conclusion that the conditionality “debate re-
mains open” is a position that is echoed on the progressive flank of OECD 
deliberations on social assistance (see above reference). The more unvar-
nished articulation of this principle on the Global Social Protection floor 
website is that “human rights are unconditional, and as social security is a 
human right, it is therefore unacceptable to deny it through the enforcement 
of conditions.”6 
Thanks to these and other interventions, there may yet be surprising twists 
and turns in the global pathways of CCT experimentation. Despite the fact 
that only a tiny fraction of the massive global “experiment” in cash-transfer 
programming has been devoted to testing the viability and effectiveness of 
progressive others to the dominant CCT model—such as unconditional social 
transfers and basic-income initiatives—a perverse consequence of the single-
minded focus on conditionality may have been to beg, by exclusion, ques-
tions around heterodox alternatives. Whatever the long-term fate of the ILO’s 
social-protection initiative, this underscores the fact that policy development 
via model building remains a somewhat uncertain and inescapably political 
process. Heavily resourced attempts at technocratic (fore)closure will doubt-
less continue, and they will also continue to shape both reform and the for-
mation of social-policy norms, but all such attempts at formatting, templat-
ing, and prescription are destined to remain incomplete and contradictory, no 
matter how asymmetrical the accompanying power relations. Model power 
may be formidable, but it is not limitless. 
                                                          
6 Quoted from “Potential and limitations of CCTs,” at http://www.socialsecurityextension. 
org/gimi/gess/ShowTheme.do?tid=2845. 
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Conclusion: Post-Political Social Policy? 
Conditional cash transfers are a prime example of especially fast-traveling, if 
not hypermobile, policies. Realized through an international infrastructure of 
purposive experimentation and technocratic persuasion, buttressed by the fa-
vored evaluation technology of the randomized control trial, the status of 
CCTs as programs “that work” has been firmly secured in global debates on 
social safety nets. Sophisticated (and costly) experimental designs have facil-
itated the construction of a “post-political” veneer around CCTs, the biparti-
san appeal of which can be traced to their intriguingly kaleidoscopic charac-
ter: conservatives see in them a rejection of the something-for-nothing wel-
fare ethos, while liberals place value on progress in realizing social rights for 
marginalized populations. As a result, CCT models have come to define the 
innovative frontier in social policy across much of the Global South and in 
parts of the Global North (Peck and Theodore, 2010), foreshortening policy-
development phases and often preempting meaningful debate at the same 
time. These political valences, coupled with the formidable resources (in both 
dollars and expertise) of the multilateral organizations, mean that the CCT 
wave has had the benefit of a strong institutional and ideological tailwind, 
meeting relatively few serious obstacles in its rapid transnational diffusion. 
Needless to say, the CCT “experiment” would never have been likely to 
surge from just two or three to nearly fifty countries in the space of a little 
more than a decade had it been ideologically countercultural or seriously dis-
ruptive in political or macroeconomic terms. Quick to implement and badged 
with expert approval, this model was made to travel. 
Through the global diffusion of CCTs, the principle of behaviorally fo-
cused interventions, which at least at some level presumes that “corrective” 
action is both required and legitimate, has been consolidated as a post-
welfare axiom across the political mainstream. In this context, fast-moving 
policy models also exert more subtle forms of normative influence, by es-
tablishing parameters around “acceptable”’ policy options. In some cases, 
the propensity of best-practice models to arrive on the scene, almost fully 
formed, as policies that work (albeit somewhere else), can have the effect 
of forestalling, foreshortening, or completely circumventing processes of 
local deliberation, debate, and consensus-building around policy reform ef-
forts. Indeed, even in those cases where imported policy models do not di-
rectly “format” local responses, they will often exert indirect effects by 
canalizing and prefiguring the terms of debate. Brazil may have been pur-
suing a relatively autonomous course as the architect and manager of its 
own regime of not-really-conditional cash transfers, but at the same time its 
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approach is being increasingly “relativized,” not least by the purveyors of 
authorized CCT expertise at the World Bank. Bolsa Familia duly becomes 
the least-loved corner of a triangular reform universe, with the “iconic” 
Oportunidades and the “compelling” Chile Solidario occupying the more 
favored corners (see Fiszbein et al, 2009). The effect of this triangulation 
strategy is not simply to lift the relatively modest Solidario program into a 
status of implied equivalence with the big-league players in Mexico and 
Brazil, it also tilts the field in favor of the two more strictly conditional 
schemes favored by the Bank. In orthodox circles, there has been no squar-
ing of the triangle through the elevation of Namibia’s BIG or other uncon-
ditional cash transfer programs, despite their potential applicability else-
where, although the ILO and others have more recently attempted to desta-
bilize this premature consensus. 
Despite the undeniable influence of these best-practice models, backed by 
the multilateral development agencies and promoted through their distended 
networks of policy expertise, it would be incorrect to conclude that CCTs 
have been completely remaking the social-policy world in their own image. 
The CCT wave seems to be generating its own undertow, and the stubborn 
question of unconditional cash assistance has refused to go away. Counter-
cultural alternatives to the CCT status quo persist, even as they remain large-
ly sidelined within global policy debates. Meanwhile, unmet, real, and urgent 
needs in low-income communities around the world demand alternatives that 
go beyond the new-found orthodoxy of targeted, temporary, and conditional 
social assistance, which has so clearly failed to reverse decades of immisera-
tion. Sustaining the case for such alternatives will surely necessitate, howev-
er, quite different forms of model power. 
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Richard Münchmeier      
Regulating the Poor—Revisited. 
Notes on the Shifting Relationship of Social Policy and 
Social Work in the German Welfare State 
In 1964, the president of the United States of America, Lyndon B. Johnson, 
declared a special kind of war on a special kind of enemy. He declared the 
“war on poverty” (Zarefsky, 1986). Faced with a national poverty level of 
19%, Lyndon B. Johnson demanded a policy change that would create jobs, 
secure income replacement, and foster social integration. This demand was to 
become the 1964 “Economic Opportunity Act,” which, to this day, is cele-
brated as a groundbreaking piece of legislation. It was a breakthrough in gov-
ernmental strategy, because it no longer simply relied on police intervention 
and repression, but instead developed relief programs in the area of job crea-
tion, but, notably, also in the areas of education and training, health promo-
tion, and general wellbeing. 
Seven years later, Frances Fox Piven and her husband, Richard A. 
Cloward, who at that time lectured in social politics and social work in New 
York, published a book, in which they attempted to expose the putative 
breakthrough of the “war on poverty” as a short-term effect. They sought to 
define the programs rolled out under the Economic Opportunity Act as a 
mere phase within the larger process of contractions and expansions in social 
politics. Entitled “Regulating the Poor. The Functions of Public Welfare” 
(Piven and Cloward, 1971), this book triggered controversy and debate in 
both the political and scientific spheres as soon as it was released, and it be-
came a seminal work of theory for the protest and civil rights movements in 
the U.S. Following a variety of critical reviews, the authors produced a re-
vised and extended version in 1993, in which they tried to define their basic 
ideas more precisely, and to extend the application of these ideas to include a 
period up into the 1990s. 
As the title of this article indicates, I will be making my deliberations 
with reference to this book. My primary concern here, however, is not so 
much the empirical validity of all the details of American politics from Roo-
sevelt to Reagan (see Dodenhoff, 1998). Instead, my main interest is in ex-
ploring the theoretical model, i.e. the explanation that underpins the authors’ 
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attempts to understand the ups and downs of social politics, with its charac-
teristic oscillations between expanding welfare programs and rigid financial 
curtailment. In addition to this, I will also use the theory of Piven and 
Cloward on the function of public welfare policy to examine the following 
two points in sequence: first, the historical differences in the development of 
public welfare policy that exist between Germany and the U.S. and, second, 
the recent changes in German social politics, focusing in particular on the 
question of whether this has become “Americanized” or, in other words, 
whether an American understanding of society has been adopted. 
The Function and Strategy of Welfare Politics in the U.S. 
(According to Piven and Cloward) 
In their 1993 book, Piven and Cloward summarized their interpretation of the 
function of social policy right from page one, with some short and provoca-
tive wording in the preface stating: “relief arrangements […] have a great 
deal to do with maintaining social and economic inequities” (see Piven and 
Cloward, 1993: XIX). These are tough words that attack not only the success 
stories of social work but also its very nature, given that the self-concept of 
social work is one of operating under the banners of “assistance” and “equal-
ization.” In essence, its social function, so Piven and Cloward, comes down 
to the question of “how some people are made to do the harshest work for the 
least reward” (see above reference). 
According to their analysis, it is this basic function that underlies the long 
cycles of expansion and contraction of social support. These run counter-
cyclical to the prevailing phases of the economy and, thus, reflect the rise and 
fall in unemployment and social disintegration. There is yet more, however: 
with the help of historical analyses, the authors demonstrate that simply 
“supporting” the disadvantaged is not the main issue; instead, the crucial 
point is “regulating the poor,” or, put differently, controlling and guiding 
their behavior. Further, they claim that linking socio-political aid programs 
with behavior control through the means of social work was necessary to 
avoid civil disorder. Therefore, a willingness to work would not be sufficient. 
Being willing to integrate into the existing social environment, accepting the 
constraints of one’s present life situation, adopting basic social standards and 
values, learning to act responsibly, and taking initiative would also be re-
quired. For this reason, the interlinking of social, anti-poverty, or unemploy-
ment policies with both social work and person-centered socialization strate-
gies would be inevitable. The provision of relief would thus be conditional on 
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changes in the recipient’s behavior. In the words of Piven and Cloward: “Re-
lief arrangements deal with disorder, not simply by giving aid to the dis-
placed poor, but by granting it on condition that they behave in certain ways” 
(see above reference: 22). 
Insights from modern social politics gained under the conditions of a cap-
italist system underpin this concept and can be summarized as follows: 
“simply providing aid to quiet the unemployed will not stop disorder; it may 
even permit it to worsen, for although the remedy may prevent workers’ star-
vation, the trigger that sets off disorder is not economic distress itself but the 
deterioration of social control. To restore order, the society must create the 
means to reassert its authority. Because the market is unable to control men’s 
behavior” (see above reference: 7).  
The short list provided below describes the theoretical model of modern 
social politics, as envisaged by Piven and Cloward: 
 
• Superficially, welfare aid is a means of supporting the needy; at its core, 
however, it is a tool to ensure that the order of state and society is retained 
or reinstated. 
• Therefore, any provision of help is conditional on the regulation and con-
trol of behavior. Support is made dependent on the willingness to inte-
grate. 
• The risk of the erosion of societal order increases during periods of eco-
nomic crisis. As a consequence, relief programs have to be expanded at 
these times. 
• Once a period of economic crisis has been weathered, it is necessary to 
scale back the previously expanded programs, to avoid the risk of creep-
ing habituation (and with this, the risk of destroying core standards, in 
particular, the duty to work). 
The Case of Germany: A History of Task Separation Between 
Social Politics and Social Pedagogy  
If the development of the German welfare system is viewed through this in-
terpretational lens, striking differences immediately become apparent. In par-
ticular, this applies to the intermeshing of support provision and behavior 
regulation, and also to the conditionality of aid upon controlled behavior. In 
the context of the German storyline, a determined separation of material from 
non-material support, including counseling, education, training, and therapy, 
was apparently central to shaping the structure of its welfare system. 
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In fact, a ‘dual structure‘ specific to the German welfare system emerged 
during its development in the last third of the nineteenth century (see Sachße 
and Tennstedt, 1991: 441). According to this, tasks that either deal with se-
curing a livelihood or providing support in cases of a material emergency are 
governed by social insurance and welfare aid legislation. While social 
work—in the sense of a pedagogical self-concept—is focused on person-
centered services that are educative or psychological in nature, such as, 
among many other activities, counseling, individual case work, social group 
work, educational support, and re-socialization opportunities. Indeed, social 
work in Germany would not have been able to develop its specific socio-
pedagogical self-concept without this sort of division of labor. Its creation 
and development, therefore, can be told as a tale of the ever-expanding roles 
of pedagogy and psychology (see Münchmeier, 1981).  
The most important existential risks for the working classes—disability 
(inability to work), sickness, advancing age, and unemployment—were there-
fore to be covered by insurance benefits (the so-called “social insurances”). 
Although this entailed contribution payments, the entitlement to claim in the 
case of a contingency was enshrined in law. The first piece of legislation to 
be passed was the health insurance law of 1883. This was followed by the 
statutory accident insurance in 1884 and the statutory disability and old age 
insurance (i.e. a pension) in 1889. It was not until 1927 that unemployment 
insurance was to join them. The socio-political aim of these insurance 
schemes, which had been sanctioned by law, was to stop poverty arising in 
the first place by offering an effective prevention. In turn, this permitted the 
system of poor relief to enter into an arrangement with social politics and ar-
rive at a sort of division of responsibilities by reorganizing itself according to 
social principles. These principles were no longer repressive in outlook, but 
were instead aligned with the ideas of social pedagogy. 
Through this “dual structure” of monetary benefits and pedagogic assis-
tance—the division of social policy into material support, on the one hand, 
and social pedagogy, advisory services, and socialization opportunities, on 
the other hand—it was possible to mitigate and dilute the main criticism and 
resistance from the early labor movement. Social democratic organizations 
had actually opposed the idea that welfare for the poor should be structured 
around pedagogical principles, because it did not include any material im-
provement of living conditions. They argued that this new form of poor relief 
handed out “kind words instead of bread”, meaning that it dispensed advice 
and appealed to people’s sense of moral duty without making the slightest 
difference to their material existence and situation in life. In this way, the 
poor would be subjected to the haphazard and unreliable charity of old. They 
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would be disempowered by the legitimization of aid providers to interfere in 
their ways of life and behavior, and to distribute aid according to questiona-
ble and uncontrollable standards of who is “deserving” and who is “unde-
serving.” For a long time, therefore, the labor movement had been calling for 
charity to be replaced by legal rights that would come into action when spe-
cific factual circumstances were met, regardless of the standing or behavior 
of a person, and which triggered aid payments according to pre-agreed sets of 
measures and amounts. They termed this principle “objective welfare,” be-
cause it did not consider specific subjective characteristics or conditions, but 
instead only took into consideration the degree of need as assessed by objec-
tive criteria. 
It was precisely this fundamental “legalization” of material support provi-
sion without the consideration of a person’s standing that came into existence 
with the introduction of the social insurance laws, although only relatively 
few workers were able to benefit from this in the beginning. At the same 
time, those providing poor relief, which was becoming ever more tightly fo-
cused on a pedagogical approach and would be known as “social work” only 
a few decades later, were able to deflect accusations of merely offering “kind 
words” by pointing to the social insurance system. 
Under the auspices of the state, the institutionalization of material sup-
port, which was increasingly established through legally binding indemnifi-
cation, meant that the initial development of a welfare state in Germany fol-
lowed a different pathway to that reconstructed by Piven and Cloward for the 
U.S. It enabled a specifically German, pedagogical focus of welfare, which in 
turn allowed social pedagogy to develop as an autonomous system outside 
the traditional structures of poor relief (see Münchmeier, 1981).  
The Rise of Pedagogy in German Welfare 
With the separation of welfare tasks and the legal protection of material sup-
port in place, the old system of poor relief in Germany was superseded by a 
new system of support that was characterized by a new pedagogical under-
standing of itself. The contemporary expression for this development at the 
end of the nineteenth century was the “social organization” of welfare. 
The associated trend of taking a pedagogical perspective of the definition 
of problems and tasks had begun earlier, during the last third of the nine-
teenth century, when the organization of poor relief according to social prin-
ciples initially started. The adoption of a pedagogical outlook was synony-
mous with a gradual, step-by-step change in the perception and interpretation 
76 Richard Münchmeier 
of the causes of social problems and the ways in which these problems 
should be solved (see Münchmeier, 1981: 82–84). Over time, two patterns of 
thought have become established: 
 
(1) The problems that are relevant to social work are defined as primarily 
pedagogical in nature: i.e. as developmental, learning-related, motivational, 
or moral disturbances, etc. Importantly, what constitutes an historical trans-
formation of a social problem of cumulative disadvantage into a pedagogical 
problem of developmental and educational deficits, is not an associated re-
duction in material hardship, but instead an associated change in the way the 
welfare state addresses the problem. The more the nature of material hardship 
was interpreted in the light of socialization theories and, thereby, effectively 
moved into the sphere of personal circumstances, the greater the historic op-
portunity became for the welfare state to no longer simply deny the existence 
of social misery, describe it as a passing phase, or downplay it in any way. 
Instead, the welfare state was able to acknowledge social misery and, at the 
same time, tie it to a reason for intervention that would limit public commit-
ment, as this reason was based on influencing the individual and on the idea 
of one fellow human being helping another. 
 
(2) In analogy to the above, there is the view that finding a solution to social 
hardship requires above all else a change in the behavior of those who are af-
fected. Only through this hypothesis of intervention can the goal of a social 
work-related intervention be understood. In the face of social hardship, peda-
gogical intervention would become nonsensical and impossible to undertake 
in a rational way, if the necessary solutions are not first converted into “steps 
of learning” and “gains in maturity” on the part of the disadvantaged. Shift-
ing the focus of the intervention on to the person and his/her behavior does 
not, however, mean that the importance of external material needs is denied. 
On the contrary, it reflects the assured claim that no external hardship, what-
ever its nature, is not also paralleled by the simultaneous presence of an inner 
need. The following quotation is characteristic of this point of view, which is 
becoming increasingly widely established: “However, if you see a poor man 
as a human being in his totality, then every case of destitution will, as it were 
inevitably, be associated with a psychological problem” (Hetzer, 1929: 3 
[orig.: German]).  
 
In this point there is overlap with the views of Piven and Cloward. They too 
interpreted the historical developments in such a way that the provision of 
material aid alone, i.e. financial support without education or behavioral 
changes on the part of the recipient, would be perceived by the majority of 
society as ineffective or even as worsening the original problem. In Germany, 
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however, the debate is focused less on controlling the politico-social align-
ment of the disadvantaged, and more on the pedagogic and psychological 
paradigm of the poor. The fact that material and person-centered support can 
also be differentiated in terms of the institutional boundaries that have been 
drawn within the welfare state reflects the impact of this debate. 
Incorporating Pedagogy Into Social Work—a Process Fraught 
with Contradictions 
When looking at the next steps in the development of the German welfare 
system, it becomes obvious that the “money versus person” separation did 
not run smoothly from the start. Theory and practice were caught up repeat-
edly in the contradictions that were inherent in the above-mentioned dual 
structure and the pedagogical focus of social work. These contradictions sur-
faced time and again. 
Social work repeatedly stumbled over the fact that societal causes were 
at the root of subjective and individual problems. A vast knowledge base on 
the structural and social reproducibility of individual problems was accumu-
lated through the practice, research and theory of social work. Therefore, re-
garding its interventional strategies, social work was confronted with a lack 
of success owing to its structural set-up. After all, dispensing advice to the 
unemployed does not create job vacancies. Similarly, group work with the 
socially disadvantaged will not touch the causes and/or reach the perpetra-
tors of this disadvantage. Such insights grew stronger in the 1960s and 
1970s, when social science studies came to prominence and took over in 
importance from psychology-based theories. At the same time, this 
knowledge proved “cumbersome” in practice, because it went beyond any of 
the given institutional, legal and political possibilities of action that were 
open to practitioners. “If social structures, their origins and reasons, etc. 
were to be incorporated into a regression analysis of causality, then the 
chain of causality would lead into areas that lie outside a social worker’s 
current range of remit. A sociological analysis would make a single case ap-
pear to be a concrete illustration of generally applicable factors, and thus 
suggest a course of action to the social worker that goes beyond the concept 
of ‘one fellow human being helping another’” (Peters, 1973: 161 [orig.: 
German]; see Peters and Cremer-Schäfer, 1975). 
From this dilemma, three supporting strategies have arisen to stabilize the 
pedagogical base-paradigm: a strategy of politicization, a strategy of morali-
zation, and a strategy of socio-politicization and socio-political obligation. 
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The strategy of politicization: This strategy refers to social work demand-
ing political solutions to the problems it encounters. The tension that exists 
between society causing and individuals enduring situations of social hard-
ship creates and continually drives the need to take political thinking and 
problem solving to the next level. It also leads to calls for an effective social 
reform policy. If the pedagogical response to social problems is not to be la-
beled as cynical (in that it would correspond to the “kind words instead of 
bread” allegations of the labor movement), then a political context for social 
reform is essential for the type of social work that operates under a pedagogi-
cal banner. Such pedagogical social work needs a social policy that can shape 
living situations, supply the resources that are required for daily living (in par-
ticular, the opportunity to earn a wage), tackle social injustice, and ensure a 
socially fair distribution of opportunities and risks as well as developmental 
burdens and chances. It requires a policy of “including everyone.” 
Consequently, the boundaries between pedagogy and material help that 
exist within the dual structure of the welfare state have to be made porous 
and crossed time and again. In this sense, the German model of two separate 
systems is again starting to resemble the intermeshed system that is found in 
the U.S. 
The strategies for marginalized groups developed in Germany in the 
1970s by a group of critically minded social workers serve to illustrate the 
disintegration of task-related boundaries within the dual structure. The hall-
mark of these strategies was the politicization of the social workers’ clientele, 
who in this way were maneuvered “into position politically.” The ultimate 
aim was to exert pressure on policy makers, through the pooling of interests 
and the mobilization of the disadvantaged, and to push for the political solu-
tion of problems. 
Another example includes the community work projects that were under-
taken in Germany. These projects attempted to take the shared concerns of 
people whose lives were blighted by infrastructural deficits or social flash 
points, and to turn these, at the level of local government policy, into initia-
tives for the restructuring of communities and the improvement of liveli-
hoods. 
In this context, the so-called “strategy of interfering” has come to particu-
lar prominence in Germany. Its “inventor,” Ingrid Mielenz (1981), insists that 
social work—specifically, in this case, child and youth welfare services—
should not be allowed to find its limit in the provision of person-focused psy-
chosocial help, but should instead interfere in other policy areas in order to 
protect its clients’ interests at a political level. According to the fundamental 
idea behind this concept, German child and youth welfare services could only 
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fulfill their responsibilities if they cooperated with or, if need be, confronted 
other areas of political jurisdiction and policy making. 
This fundamental idea famously appears, no less, in paragraph # 1 of the 
“Kinder- und Jugendhilfegesetz (KJHG),” Germany’s child and youth wel-
fare services code, which specifies that a young person’s legal right “to the 
advancement of personal development and education” means that the ser-
vices should “contribute to creating and sustaining a child- and family-
friendly environment” (paragraph # 1 (3) 4 KJHG). 
The strategy of moralization: To enable and legitimize its adoption of 
pedagogy, social work requires a socio-moral postulate of justice (Rawls, 
1999). It is, therefore, forced to repeatedly make moral demands. Indeed, to 
gain legitimacy of its status as an educative authority, social work must insist 
on a public policy that is receptive to the “soft” postulates of emancipation, 
equal opportunities, education, and self-fulfillment. By taking this approach, 
social work attempts to introduce basic pedagogical concepts and standards 
into the system of social politics, where they will be subject to implementa-
tion difficulties and budgetary limitations. 
In this respect, German social work experienced a comparatively ideal 
environment during the 1970s. During this time, the then-governing social-
liberal coalition publically and politically defined a very clear postulate for a 
fair and egalitarian society of equal opportunities, and declared this to be the 
goal of their social reform policy. Without this connection between the polit-
ical and the public dimensions, it is difficult to maintain the concept of adopt-
ing a pedagogical approach. 
So, yet again, social work is confronted with the question of how to inter-
pret the relationship between a subjectively problematic situation and an un-
just society? Does the focus on pedagogy not lead to the privatization, famil-
iarization, and de-politicization, i.e. to “individualization” in its negative 
sense, of what should actually be the responsibility of society as a whole? 
The strategy of socio-political obligation: Of course, the moralization 
strategy that is outlined above puts social work in danger of exceeding the 
limits of what is politically possible and enforceable. Particularly, when it 
comes to comparatively complex problems that are triggered by multiple dif-
fuse causes, German politicians and authorities tend to delegate the task of 
problem solving back to social work. They make it, as it were, the duty of so-
cial work to take responsibility for finding a solution to social problems. For 
example, even as early as in the late 1970s, reports on Germany’s social af-
fairs picked up on the socio-political obligation that the German child and 
youth welfare services were under and rejected this trend (see Bundesminis-
terium für Familie, Jugend und Gesundheit, 1978). 
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Nonetheless, a host of state-run programs have meanwhile become estab-
lished that all take advantage of social work in terms of finding solutions to a 
wide range of public problems, including xenophobia, hostility towards spe-
cific groups, the phenomena of societal drop-outs and escapism, or even the 
increasing loss of civic solidarity, dangerous radical sects or groups, the in-
creased use of violence, political dissatisfaction, the risk of burnout, school 
absenteeism and many more issues. In addition, the German state is now 
switching from an approach of institutional funding of social work to an ap-
proach of program control, at all levels. The greater the extent of these 
switches is, the more effective the state becomes in making social work re-
search and practice adopt socio-political aims, and also in exerting control 
over them in the sense of service and quality agreements. 
Seen from the perspective of Piven and Cloward, this is leading to the 
dissolution and breach, by politics, of the structural boundaries between so-
cial policy and social pedagogy. So, what remains of the dual structure of the 
German welfare state as outlined above, and what remains of its much-
praised tradition? 
From the Welfare to the “Activating” State: Regulating the 
Poor Revisited 
Germany’s dual structure has enabled and shaped the development of Ger-
man social work over the past 140 years, by virtue of dividing labor between 
social policy, which is responsible for securing livelihoods, and social work, 
which is responsible for providing non-material assistance to individuals. If 
one concedes that this arrangement has always been fragile and in danger of 
being obscured, then the most recent signs point towards the venerable dual 
structure seemingly vanishing altogether. At least, this is true for a specific 
area: the area of labor market policy and unemployment support, which has 
been reformed primarily through the introduction of what has come to be 
known as the “Agenda 2010,” devised by the German chancellor of the time, 
Gerhard Schröder, and by the so-called “Hartz-IV” legislation, which came 
into effect in 2005. 
If, compared with historical data, the current overlap between material 
and pedagogical services in the German welfare state could be shown to be 
expanding, then this would indicate that the proposition of Piven and 
Cloward (1993) is becoming more applicable: in other words, social work is 
contributing significantly to the disciplining of the impoverished. The follow-
ing observations are intended to test this hypothesis. 
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The concept of an “activating” state has been discussed for the best part 
of the last 25 years, and it has found its chief expression in German law in the 
so-called Hartz-IV legislation (see, in particular, book II of the German So-
cial Code [Deutsches Sozialgesetzbuch II]). In the dual principle of “encour-
agement and challenge,” which is stipulated in this legislation, commentators 
see “a certain turning away from the concepts of the welfare state that have 
been handed down up until now” and assume that this “paradigm shift [...] 
may lead to a more stringent social control of the unemployed” (Münder, 
2006, introduction, paragraph # 6 [orig.: German]). A change in the system 
of public and social policies had been called for in the U.S. since the 1980s, 
under the slogan “from welfare to workfare.” This concept reached Europe 
predominantly through the “New Labour” program that was spearheaded by 
then prime minister of the United Kingdom, Tony Blair, and which referred 
to the work of the social democratic theorist, Anthony Giddens. In the case of 
Germany, the “welfare to workfare” concept was translated into practical po-
litical suggestions by the Hartz commission, who based their proposals on the 
philosophy expounded by Gerhard Schröder in the “Agenda 2010.” 
It is not only the crisis of an employment-centered society or the fiscal 
emergency of public sector budgets that are the reason for this paradigm 
shift. The program of the activating state represents more than a mere austeri-
ty measure. It incorporates the propositions of welfare-state critics, such as 
Esping-Andersen (e.g. 2002), concerning the functional deficits of traditional 
welfare politics, and it demands a fundamental conceptual change in direc-
tion. The following statements encapsulate some of the functional criticisms: 
the states welfare services destroy the citizens’ motivation to work (the ar-
gument of “reclining in the welfare hammock”); the scope and depth of the 
services are too large and therefore not affordable (the argument of cost); and 
social services are usually non-reciprocal, thus increasing the passivity of the 
claimant. Finally, welfare services are funded by the contributions of the em-
ployed, thus the payment of income benefit to those among the unemployed 
who could work, but choose not to, means that a demographically already un-
just situation is set to worsen: ever fewer people in employment will have to 
support ever more people claiming insurance benefits. 
Accordingly, the principles of the “Third Way” (Giddens, 1998) state the 
following: no service without reciprocity; an absolute commitment to work 
by those receiving employment benefits; creation of a low-paid sector for the 
long-term unemployed or those who are difficult to place; sanctions (for ex-
ample, a cut in income support), if the claimant refuses to cooperate or shows 
no self-initiative; and a duty of the social employment services to establish or 
re-establish the “employability” of risk groups. The strong emphasis on the 
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claimant’s “duty to cooperate” signifies, at least in a symbolic sense, that 
support has to be “earned”. The relevant stipulation can be found in volume 
II of the German Social Welfare Code: 
Paragraph 2: The principle of demand. 
(1) Persons who require social support and who are capable of gainful employ-
ment, and their dependents, if they share the same household, must exhaust every 
possibility to end or reduce their need for support. Claimants who are capable of 
gainful employment must actively cooperate with all measures that are undertaken 
to facilitate their reintegration into employment; in particular, they must enter into 
a reintegration contract. If employment within the general labor market is not pos-
sible within a foreseeable period of time, then a claimant who is capable of gain-
ful employment must accept any reasonable offer of work that they receive. 
(2) Persons who require social support and who are capable of gainful employ-
ment, and their dependents, if they share the same household, have to take respon-
sibility themselves for exhausting every possibility that lies within their own 
means and powers to secure their livelihood. Claimants who are capable of gain-
ful employment must utilize their ability to work for the purpose securing a liveli-
hood for themselves and for their dependents, if they share the same household. 
How seriously the rules governing the behavior of claimants are taken, is re-
flected in the legal definition of the “capacity for gainful employment”:  
Paragraph 8: Capacity for gainful employment. (1) If not prevented by sickness or 
disability in the foreseeable future, a person is considered capable of gainful em-
ployment if they can work for a minimum of three hours a day under the condi-
tions of the general labor market as they usually apply. 
The “encouragement and challenge” maxim for action makes it obvious that 
the realization of a new social policy has also created new objectives, respon-
sibilities and functions of social work. It, too, has to align interventions and 
services with the aim of maintaining or re-establishing employability. In fu-
ture, the classic tools of social work—consultation, care, support, and devel-
opment of assistance plans—have to be integrated into the modules that are 
specified by law, namely: assessment (checking the placeability of a claim-
ant), profiling (at the job placement center), contracting (handling the support 
agreement), and case management. This means that the assistance offered by 
social work has to be allied with the primary goal of reintegration into the 
world of work. If this assistance does not appear to promise success, it should 
be discontinued and proof of employment opportunities should be provided 
instead. 
With social policies being structured in this new way, it is clear that the 
long-established interplay between politics and pedagogy, or in other words, 
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the historical division of labor between social politics and social work, re-
quires re-organization and adjustment: From this point onwards, the purpose 
of social work is behavior control, with the aim of achieving placeability in 
the labor market. Personal responsibility and flexibility, a willingness to 
adapt in terms of job location, and active self-help are the new goals of so-
cialization and education strategies. The most crucial point here is that these 
goals can be enforced by repressive means (even going as far as cutting in-
come support). 
According to the analysis in our reference theory by Piven and Cloward 
(1993), these are observations that classically typify the concept of “Regulat-
ing the Poor.” In addition, a tendency for repressive aid provision, once be-
lieved to be an historic relic long left behind, is apparently again making its 
presence felt in the arena of social work. This tendency goes far beyond the 
basic dilemma of help and control that is much discussed in social work theo-
ry, and is openly repressive in nature. It was precisely the pedagogical ap-
proach, meaning its separation from the authorities of control and sanction, 
that was the pride of Germany’s social work professionalism. Education in-
stead of regulation, consultation instead of interference, offers instead of en-
forcement, and support a person’s own strengths in place of control and su-
pervision were considered central maxims of a forward-looking and modern 
practice that had finally overcome the ideas of authority and control belong-
ing to the old style of welfare. 
The politics of an activating social state take the direction of “lifestyle 
politics.” German social work of the past decades emphasized a focus on the 
everyday life of their clients, and in doing so, always claimed to want to in-
fluence and improve conditions. In other words, it aimed to practice a pre-
ventative approach and provide resources and conditions tailored to the social 
environment in order to assist with the problems of daily life. In contrast, the 
new “workfare” concept emphasizes a strategy of molding behavior. The new 
strategy does not rely on a correction of economic market rules by regulatory 
or socio-political approaches. It does not seek to fix the failures of the market 
as in the Keynesian concept. It is not concerned with external “conditions,” 
but instead explicitly exerts influence on “behavior patterns,” attitudes, and 
mentalities, with the aim of conforming these to the existing conditions. In-
appropriate types of behavior, such as inflexibility, convenience, aspirations, 
and a mentality of dependency, etc. have to be changed or corrected. As such, 
social politics regains a character of education politics, or as Giddens puts it, 
“life politics” (Giddens, 1998: 90), in particular, where the distribution of in-
come benefits is concerned. This indicates that the classic dual structure of 
the German welfare state is breached in another way: not only is social work 
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increasingly characterized by regulatory policies, but regulatory politics, too, 
are increasingly characterized by policies borrowed from social work, be-
cause these are more pedagogical. 
At the same time, this also precipitates changes in the aim and content of 
what constitutes “pedagogy.” The use of pedagogy as a facility to promote 
personal development, the acquisition of key competences, learning opportu-
nities and the introduction to culture and tradition—in brief, a facility of en-
lightenment in the sense of autonomy and emancipation—is relegated to a 
secondary role. Primarily, now, it is used as a facility of standardization, social 
control and assimilation. The threat of exclusion is its means of sanctioning. 
Marginalized groups and those under threat of exclusion, such as recipi-
ents of social benefits or the unemployed, are the main targets of the activat-
ing state. For this reason, they are also the main recipients of its education ef-
forts. Nonetheless, this practice sends out waves, acting as a warning to all 
citizens, especially those at “the middle level” of society: 
Enabled by the tool of social exclusion, the social politics of demand take on the 
role of an educator and, precisely through this step, attempt to achieve the repro-
duction of shared values. After all, social exclusion is supposed to create a strong-
er commitment to these values among those, who are prepared to fulfill their ‘du-
ties’, and who themselves, in turn, expect all of those included in the system to do 
the same. (Lahusen and Stark, 2003: 370 [orig.: German])  
Summary 
For the first time in the history of the German welfare state, there appear to 
be signs of a break with tradition, for example, in the areas of labor market 
policy and unemployment benefit. The defining dual structure is becoming 
fragile, and this will and must have consequences for social work. These con-
sequences will extend beyond unemployment benefit to other activities, pos-
sibly, in the sense that a new type of two-tier system or differentiation will 
emerge in German social work. On the one side, there will be the social work 
that applies to normal, integrated citizens. This will be based on offers and 
voluntary participation, with the aim of a general improvement in quality of 
life. On the other side, there will be the social work that targets problem 
groups and marginalized citizens, and this will be based on making demands 
and exerting social control (or even compulsion and repression). Here, the 
aim will be to achieve, through encouragement or enforcement (in the worst-
case scenario, through the stabilization of exclusion), a willingness to exer-
cise self-help and integration (see Münchmeier, 2007). 
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In my opinion, why this vision of the future, which is described by Piven 
and Cloward as a social process that has already taken place in the U.S., is 
not yet a reality in Germany is due to two factors. For one, because of the 
German state policy of compensation, fluctuations in the economy do not 
lead to the same degree of widespread poverty in Germany as they do in the 
U.S.; in other words, state intervention buffers the negative economic conse-
quences. For the other, the ideas of social justice and the proverbial “social 
peace” that is built upon these ideas still provide sufficient levels of cohesion 
and social solidarity, to spare Germany the sort of riots and mass movements 
that were, and still are, a typical part of the history of the U.S., and therefore 
played a central role in the theories of Piven and Cloward. 
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III. Case Studies on Continuity and 
Change in Selected Western 
Welfare State Settings 
 

Robert P. Fairbanks II      
Recovering Post-Welfare Urbanism in Philadelphia and 
Chicago: Ethnographic Evidence from the Informal 
Recovery House to the State Penitentiary 
This chapter focuses on a selective scale of welfare state transformation in 
two postindustrial U.S. cities: Philadelphia and Chicago. Specifically, the 
chapter explores ethnographically and theoretically the relationship between 
the restructuring of urban and state-level social welfare systems, on the one 
hand, and informal street-level urban poverty survival strategies, on the other. 
A central objective of the chapter is to understand the nexus between the 
lived experience of addiction/recovery and the implementation of social wel-
fare policy and practices reforms. I seek to understand how this nexus differ-
entially distributes life opportunities for poor and predominantly African 
American drug users. In this respect, my work is situated in a long line of 
scholarship that envisages welfare systems as fundamentally stratifying insti-
tutions, insofar as they differentially distribute rights and opportunities—
often along racial, class, and gender lines. 
And yet while the stratifying functions of welfare practices have long 
been recognized, there has been a paucity of empirical work on matters con-
cerning the transformation of regulatory imperatives in urban poverty gov-
ernance and political economy. This chapter takes as its object the regulato-
ry principles that continuously shape (and are shaped by) the sifting and 
sorting mechanisms of contemporary welfare arrangements. Through the use 
of two ethnographic case examples, the chapter contends that nuanced trans-
formations operating across institutional scales—from the micro to the mez-
zo and macro level—are essential to the project of making and remaking of 
citizenship in accordance with the broader political economic mandates of 
late capitalism. A central analytic objective is to illustrate how welfare ar-
rangements—albeit perhaps in altered form and yet still or even especially 
in an era of market liberalism—are more necessary than ever for the em-
powerment of a new class of market actors. Welfare arrangements are con-
tinuously essential to setting the rules of the game; the conditions of possi-
bility for the management, regulation, and governance of problem or surplus 
populations. 
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In order to get a view onto these processes up close, my work on two eth-
nographic examples allows us to unpack the ways in which state building 
projects—formal or informal—entail a making and remaking of race, rights, 
and citizenship in accordance with the regulatory imperatives of the welfare 
state and the political economy of the contemporary United States. The first 
case derives from Fairbanks (2009); while the second derives from the field-
work for a second book in progress.1 In both studies, my analysis provides 
empirical and theoretical nuance to the pressing questions explored by the au-
thors of this volume: how can welfare scholars discern historical, geograph-
ical and political novelty from continuity in the institutionally inherited land-
scapes of welfare state transformation? I will explore this question in the two 
ethnographic examples that follow. 
The Philadelphia Recovery House Movement 
The city of Philadelphia is home to more than 60,000 vacant properties, 
30,000 of which are abandoned row homes. The former textile-
manufacturing neighborhood of Kensington, in the city’s northeast section, 
an iconic locale for Philadelphia’s rust belt woes, is the site of ethnographic 
research for this study. Originally comprised of British, German and Irish 
immigrants, Kensington stands today as a remarkable instance of racial di-
versity at roughly 30% African American, 35% Latino, and 30% white. The 
neighborhood has been disproportionately ravaged by deindustrialization as 
75% of Philly’s manufacturing base dissolved in the postwar era. Today, 
55% of Kensington lives below the poverty line and 40% of properties are 
classified as vacant. More than half of the population is detached from the la-
bor force, with over 50% receiving some form of public assistance. The epi-
center of my fieldwork, affectionately dubbed “K&A” to denote neighbor-
hood around the intersection of Kensington and Allegheny Avenues [zip 
code 19134], also leads the city in drug arrests (sales and possession); as well 
as deaths by drug overdose. 
Formerly a proud symbol of working class home-ownership, the Kensing-
ton row home has become an architectural testament to the structural vio-
lence of postindustrial decline. But a closer look at these houses reveals how 
street-level operators have re-appropriated the row home as a strategic site 
for poverty survival. Taken collectively, the efforts of these operators have 
                                                          
1 The book is provisionally entitled “Structure Up! The Political Economy of Prison Based 
Treatment and Re-entry Programming in Illinois and Chicago” (in preparation [n.d.], Uni-
versity of Chicago Press). 
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produced what I am calling the Philadelphia recovery house movement, 
whereby 400-500 row homes have been transformed into unregulated, unli-
censed recovery houses since the early 1980s. Recovery houses have no offi-
cial licensure or regulatory board in Pennsylvania, and they are run almost 
entirely by non-professional recovering addicts. With very few exceptions, 
the houses operate without formal state or city funding. They do so by pool-
ing the resources of impoverished addicts, which historically derived from 
General Assistance (GA) in the form of cash assistance and food stamps (and 
secondarily, Supplemental Security Income [SSI]). By pooling these meager 
resources in a collective strategy for risk management and poverty survival, 
recovery houses generate sustainable economies that combine food and shel-
ter with a street-level brand of self-help. 
Not surprisingly, the recovery house movement has been quite controver-
sial throughout its 30-year history. Politicians, community groups, and the 
media have referred to the industry as an underground economy ripe for ex-
ploitation and fraud. Operators, however, have typically extolled the houses 
as spaces of hope in ghetto neighborhoods, arguing that they labor for the 
good of the city without formal funding. This was the folk wisdom I con-
fronted when entering the field: a story of either rogue street hustlers preying 
on addiction and poverty, or heroic agents of self-help. To challenge these 
dichotomous framings, I posed a central research question: How have extra-
legal recovery houses managed not only to survive, but also to burgeon in a 
seemingly inhospitable landscape over 25 years in postindustrial Philadel-
phia? 
To answer this question and provide a nuanced portrait of the recovery 
house movement, I conducted two years of participant observation research 
on the activities necessary to sustain the informal yet highly structured sys-
tems of operation, placing particular emphasis on the nature of the houses as 
viable mechanisms for poor relief. The findings reveal how old and relatively 
obscure and vestigial welfare formations (such as GA, a form of outdoor re-
lief that in one form or another dates back to the Colonial Poor Laws) inad-
vertently provide the foundation for urban poverty survival strategies that are 
new and in urgent need of study. Analyzing welfare state restructure at this 
scale requires ethnographic precision due to the ways in which GA seeds in-
formal local subsistence economies, with rules that are constantly made and 
remade by street-level operators 
In order to comprehend the persistence of this extralegal welfare economy 
on a larger scale and to situate my ethnographic case, I traced the relation-
ships between recovery house actors (addicts and operators) and sites such as 
the public welfare office, the criminal justice system, city government, and 
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the community behavioral health system. I conducted key informant inter-
views with city officials and professionals, including housing inspectors, 
formal treatment providers, elected officials, and public welfare officials. 
Recovery houses are not merely a haven for benevolent self-helpers or 
unscrupulous actors in the informal economy, but are rather a manifestation 
of processes stemming from postindustrial decline and welfare reform. In-
deed the recovery house movement has been forged at the vortex of several 
factors—among them a degraded postindustrial landscape, modest pump-
priming dollars from a declining welfare state, hollowed out urban institu-
tions (licenses and inspections), and the agency of recovery house operators 
themselves. I argue that Kensington recovery houses have become sustaina-
ble economies by promulgating ways of knowing and acting that are attuned 
to the contingencies of the social, economic, and welfare politics of the post-
Keynesian era. My work thus contributes to recent trends in urban studies 
and the ethnographic study of social policy, whereby informal survival strat-
egies are situated within the context of macro-structural forces and the politi-
cal economy of cities (see Fairbanks, 2009: 65-98). 
Forging ethnographic linkages between the survival mechanisms of poor 
subjects, meso-level urban institutions, and the state, I illustrate how gov-
ernmentality operates at two levels in the recovery house movement. One is 
at the street-level, within the recovery house system itself, which acts as an 
anti-poverty mechanism through calculated interventions deployed to exact 
certain desired outcomes in governance—autonomy, sobriety, self-respon-
sibility, good citizenship, surveillance, financial subsistence, and the regula-
tion of bodies through a free market. The fierce competition for bodies and 
the intense downward pressure on operating costs are transmuted onto recov-
ering subjects, effectively producing a street-level mode of regulation and a 
complex, historically specific post-welfare poverty management system for 
the state (see Fairbanks, 2009: 99-188). This leads to a secondary vector of 
governmentality, which operates between the recovery house movement and 
the city. The meta-analysis of urban institutions exposes a variegated regime 
of regulation, tolerance, and indifference among city elites, elucidating the 
ways that recovery houses have become situated within the fabric of Phila-
delphia’s social service sector as an informal mechanism of the welfare state. 
Taken together, these factors help to explain the persistence and proliferation 
of an extralegal and irregular form of housing located conspicuously in Phil-
adelphia’s most notorious areas of spatially concentrated poverty (Fairbanks, 
2009: 189-260). 
The primary contributions of the book are two-fold: first, to illustrate the 
fall out, or lived realities, of contemporary social policies and urban process-
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es associated with welfare state restructure and postindustrial decline; and 
second, to illustrate the agonistic reconfiguration and reconstitution of vestig-
ial poverty survival strategies and forms of urban subjectivity in accordance 
with the reconstructed and rescaled economic and social policies of neoliber-
alism. In other words, ethnographic data are deployed to illustrate how mech-
anisms of poverty survival are induced by neoliberal reform, while simulta-
neously acting as a form of resistance to these trends. Along these lines, the 
state’s variegated responses to recovery houses are shown to not simply ena-
ble an informal economy to persist, but in fact these responses deepen urban 
informality while attenuating and accelerating the capacity of informal actors 
to function as agents of urban restructuring. The restructuring in question 
here refers to meso-level institutions such as public welfare and criminal jus-
tice, as well as to relationships between citizen and state and the contempo-
rary boundary institutions of the postindustrial city. At the street-level, this 
occurs within the informal subsistence economies of recovery house markets, 
which are driven by the many innovations in informal welfare provision and 
in highly competitive census building projects that illustrate the ways in 
which operators remake the rules of GA and SSI. Apart from the predatory 
markets of recovery houses themselves, processes related to “relapse” and the 
“wreckage of one’s past” reveal the ways in which addicts are caught up not 
only in informal and highly contingent low wage labor markets, but also any 
number of meso-level disciplinary nets, from child support, to criminal jus-
tice, to public welfare. And while these processes pertain to the recovering 
self, I have also revealed recent citywide efforts to formalize the recovery 
house as a form of statecraft operating within the compendium of the work-
fare state and the prison (Fairbanks, 2009: 231-260). 
Taking these points together, I have followed Jamie Peck’s lead in con-
ceiving of the recovery house system as a highly localized and rhyzomatic 
regulatory project—a set of interrelated tendencies expressed through chron-
ic unevenness, instability, and insecurity rather than a coherent or achieved 
post-welfare regulatory end state (see Peck, 2001). Perhaps most importantly, 
ethnographic research enables us to conceive of the ways in which street-
level actors respond to, interpret, and manipulate state selectivity and differ-
entiation at the level of conduct. Poverty survival strategies, in this case those 
that regulate and discipline subjects informally, embody the stakes in politi-
cal struggles; as local actors in the recovery house movement act through lo-
cal strongholds (at the street and the urban institutional level), capitalizing on 
a recovery knowledge that has both parochial and universal appeals to moral-
ity and ethics, as well as local economic appeals to subsistence and profiteer-
ing. The recovery house operator must build on, complement, and accelerate 
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the objectives of a complex set of institutional regulatory logics that in turn 
facilitate the broader restructuring imperatives of the postindustrial city. 
Far from an “unregulated” phenomenon, the recovery house experience 
ensures a constant negotiability regarding welfare eligibility, probation and 
parole, child support, low wage employment, security of tenure in informal 
or invisible housing markets, and even land use. It is this very negotiability 
that gives birth to a very peculiar and highly contradictory type of poverty 
management system that operates on the periphery of the workfare state and 
the criminal justice system. By conceiving of the recovery house as an in-
strument of poverty management, I mean to denote an informal welfare ap-
pendage which functions on the condition of its inhabitants’ insecurity in 
their attempts to manufacture survival. The end result is to churn and manage 
surplus populations through the performance of recovery with little possibil-
ity of mobility or integration into formal labor markets. Far from seeing this 
as a depoliticization, however, my analysis suggests the ways in which the 
political production of recovering subjectivity, in formal and informal sites of 
social service administration, articulates with a number of regulatory restruc-
turings in public welfare and criminal justice. 
The recovery house therefore operates as a boundary institution, whereby 
the city and the state empty out overcrowded jails and prisons through recov-
ery house networks, relying on the system as a kind of pressure valve or 
floodplain, to manage the crises of mass incarceration in an urban labor 
economy that simply cannot absorb surplus bodies. Along these lines, my 
analysis recasts the stakes of recovery well beyond conventional questions of 
abstinence from drugs and alcohol. It does so by showing how surplus wel-
fare populations in postindustrial cities become bound to a set of recovery 
practices, rituals, and discourses that come to occupy and entangle idle citi-
zens in zones of spatially concentrated poverty with little hope for upward 
mobility. The research for my first book has led me to the growing intersec-
tion of recovery programming—both formal and informal—on the one hand, 
and prisoner re-entry on the other. In maintaining this focus, I am operating 
under the hypothesis that we cannot understand 21st century urbanism or wel-
fare policy without understanding its links to penal policy. At precisely this 
intersection, we find new imperatives to manage urban marginality in 
postindustrial cities. 
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The Fall Out of Mass Incarceration in Chicago  
The State of Illinois currently incarcerates more than 49,000 inmates on any 
given day, and upwards of 36,000 of this total number are released each year. 
Roughly two-thirds (25,000 annually) return to just seven zip codes located 
on the West and South sides of Chicago, where black male unemployment 
exceeds 45% even before ex-felons return home (see Olson and Rozhon, 
2011; Peck and Theodore, 2008; see also La Vigne et al., 2004). The num-
bers involved in these estimates comprise a veritable crisis that has come un-
der the name of prisoner re-entry, a growing policy obsession at the national, 
state, and urban scale. From George W. Bush’s 2008 Second Chance Act, to 
the 2009 Illinois Crime Reduction Act, to numerous municipal policy and 
practice initiatives at the Cook County Jail (a massive institution in its own 
rite, holding 10,000 inmates per day), the re-entry imperative operates across 
multiple scales and along multiple administrative fronts. It has been fueled by 
a convergence of disparate ideological positions and the formation of novel 
political coalitions among policy elites. 
A central component of the Illinois re-entry initiative is the Sheridan Cor-
rectional Center, a level 4 medium security state prison located 70 miles 
southwest of Chicago. Billed as the nation’s largest and only fully dedicated 
substance abuse treatment prison (and the only program of its kind that is 
medium security), the Sheridan Correctional Center is a bold experiment in 
the history of criminal justice reform. In the state of Illinois’ current econom-
ic and political crisis, Sheridan has been framed as a hopeful—and potential-
ly replicable—model for changing the way in which the criminal justice sys-
tem addresses the complicated nexus between addiction, urban poverty, and 
recidivism. Opened in 2004, Sheridan has been designed and planned with an 
eye toward the pathways and channels to successful urban reintegration, both 
in terms of neighborhoods and social service delivery systems. 
To date, I have conducted 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork inside the 
walls at Sheridan Correctional Center (the last ethnographic project to take 
place inside the walls at an Illinois state prison was for James Jacobs Stat-
eville, published in 1977). My primary aim thus far has been to assess the 
pervasive significance of treatment on the social ecology of the prison. 
Whereas historically there have been two codes to live by—that of the guards 
and the inmates—Sheridan introduces a new historical moment in which a 
third party (treatment) actively transforms modalities of governance and 
praxis. However, in this chapter I will not discuss the ethnographic fieldwork 
inside the prison per se, but rather present parts of the research that put the 
history of Sheridan in conversation with its broader political economic con-
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text. I will therefore show how Sheridan came into being and then index a se-
ries of theoretical and philosophical placeholders for ongoing thinking about 
what Sheridan means for theories of political economy and welfare state 
transformation. On both accounts, my analysis is meant to provide an inroad 
for consideration of how substance abuse treatment works as an ancillary 
modality of criminal justice to resolve the crises of recidivism, re-entry, pris-
on overcrowding, and prison expenditure. These I contend are the most visi-
ble symptoms of the still muscle-bound regulatory framework of mass incar-
ceration, the gradual weakening of which has led to context-specific forms of 
regulatory experimentation. 
To begin with a quick sketch of mass incarceration in the United States, 
there has been an explosive growth of the U.S. prison system since 1970 that 
is by now well documented. Statistical overviews are rehearsed with such 
frequency and alarm that they have an almost numbing effect. Nonetheless, 
this descriptive rite of passage is important to understand the true magnitude 
of the prison and its central role in today’s political economy of urban pov-
erty, social welfare, and labor stratification. Following a 50-year period 
(1920-1970) in which the prison population in the United States held relative-
ly constant at 200,000, the incarcerated population in state and federal pris-
ons grew five-fold in three short decades, reaching 1 million persons by 1995 
and 1.3 million persons by 2002 (see Harcourt, 2011: 198; Wacquant, 2009: 
60-61). If we include those incarcerated in local jails, the number reached 2 
million persons by 2002 and is up to more than 2.3 million today. The in-
crease in state and federal prisoners between 1970-1995 alone (from 200,000 
to 1 million) represents a 442% increase in a quarter century, a growth mag-
nitude never before witnessed in a democratic society (see Wacquant, 2009: 
61). By 2008 the U.S. was incarcerating more than 1% of its total population. 
The US has the highest incarceration rate in the world, five times the rate of 
England and twelve times the rate of Japan (see Harcourt, 2011:198). With 
merely 5% of the world’s population, the U.S. now holds nearly 25% of the 
world’s prisoners (see Gottschalk, 2006: 1). The carceral boom has been any-
thing but colorblind. In four short decades (1970-1990), the racial and ethnic 
composition of the incarcerated population reversed, from 70% white, 30% 
black and Latino inmates; to 70% black and Latino, 30% white inmates (see 
Wacquant, 2009: 60-61). 
While beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that historical ex-
planations for the incarceration boom are broad and diverse, ranging from 
postindustrial decline, to globalization, to shifts in sentencing, to the war on 
drugs, to welfare state retrenchment. For the purposes of this chapter I will 
focus on one particular historical explanation for mass incarceration: the re-
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soundingly new consensus after 1970 that prison works “not as a mechanism 
of reform or rehabilitation, but as a means of incapacitation that satisfies 
popular political demands for public safety and harsh retribution” (Garland, 
2001: 14). More specifically for my purposes, I am most concerned with the 
putative eclipse or gutting of rehabilitative frameworks from the 1970’s-early 
2000’s said to act as a mainspring of the warehousing logics of mass incar-
ceration, and their eventual and (perhaps) still quite nascent re-emergence in 
the contemporary present. 
The most extensive exploration of this trend has been undertaken by Da-
vid Garland (1985, 1993, 2001), whose books on 20th century criminal justice 
map the transition from “penal welfarism” (1900-1970) to what many critics 
have described as a neoliberal turn in punishment policy. In describing the 
penal welfarist era, Garland sketched the monopoly that clinicians (social 
workers, psychiatrists, psychologists, even sociologists) once held in the long 
rehabilitative horizon that dominated life in the prison up until the close of 
the 1960’s. The core assumptions of criminology in the welfare era were 
premised on a faith in the perfectibility of man. Crime was perceived as the 
sign of an underachieving socialization process, and society looked to the 
state and its clinical expertise for social adjustment (see Dilts, 2008; Garland, 
2001). Since the late 1960’s, Garland contends, the correctional facility has 
reduced its rehabilitative ambition to ground zero. Contemporary criminolo-
gy (1970-2000) views crime as “routine, [and] committed by individuals who 
are for all intents and purposes normal” (Garland, 2001: 15). Offenders are 
now envisaged as rational economic actors responsive to disincentives and 
fully responsible for their actions, leading to a theory and rationality of crim-
inology that strongly reinforces retributive and deterrent policies. Crime is 
explained no longer on a theory of individual deprivation, but rather as an 
outgrowth of inadequate controls that can be governed through risk manage-
ment strategies (see Garland, 2001). 
The death of penal welfarism is said to have been accompanied by the 
disappearance of rehabilitative programming in prisons, which has indeed 
been eulogized consistently in the literature on prisons since 1970 and also 
posited as a central component of mass incarceration. By Garland’s own ad-
mission (2001: 7), we would be wise to take precautions when dealing with 
broad-brush strokes and historical periodizations. Any complex, multidimen-
sional field undergoing transformation will show signs of continuity and dis-
continuity as institutionally inherited landscapes are reworked en route to 
new welfare settlements (see Clarke, 2006; Polanyi, 1944). Nevertheless, and 
bearing in mind these precautions and rules of methodological good sense, if 
we take Sheridan as a case study it seems clear that something is happening 
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in recent machinations of prison reform in the early 21st century. And my 
contention here is that we may not quite know yet just what it is. Resolution 
of the consequences, failures, fallout and crises of mass incarceration have 
perhaps entered us into a new phase for consideration, and the Illinois version 
of the carceral boom certainly points us in this direction. 
The state of Illinois has experienced its own exceptionally aggressive in-
carceration boom. The state’s prison population doubled from 1973-1982, 
then doubled again by 1991, and then rose another 55% by the close of the 
1990’s (see Peck and Theodore, 2008: 252). Put another way, from fewer 
than 20,000 inmates prior to 1987, the Illinois prison population grew to 
45,000 by the year 2001 and stands at nearly 50,000 today. To accommodate 
the population growth, Illinois opened 21 prisons between 1980 and 2004, 
adding 20,318 beds to the system’s statewide capacity of 31,000. The present 
population of almost 50,000 inmates speaks conspicuously to the crisis of 
overcrowding in Illinois (see Olson and Rozhon, 2011: 9). 
Originally opened as a juvenile center in 1941, Sheridan changed to an 
adult prison facility in 1971. After a brief closure between 2002-2004 (due to 
a budget skirmish under former Illinois Governor Ryan’s watch), the Sheri-
dan Correctional Center was re-opened as a fully dedicated substance abuse 
treatment prison on January 2, 2004 (see Olson and Rozhon, 2011: 13). The 
newly opened Sheridan prison was engineered to solve the current crises of 
recidivism and overcrowding through the re-emergence of substance abuse 
programming for re-entry. Early advocates for Sheridan (notably Deanne Be-
nos, as well as Diane Williams at Safer Foundation and Pam Rodriguez of 
Treatment Alternatives for Safe Communities [hereafter TASC]) convinced 
then-Congressman Rod Blagojevich to take a chance on reopening the re-
cently closed Sheridan Correctional Center as the nation’s first fully dedicat-
ed substance abuse prison. A central impetus at the time was that the Illinois 
recidivism rate (defined as the number of inmates returned to prison within 3 
years of release) had hit record highs of 54.4% in 2003 and 54.6% in 2004. 
The recidivism rate was even higher—nearly 66 percent—when based on re-
arrests for a new crime within three years (i.e., regardless of whether it re-
sulted in their subsequent return to prison). With Blagojevich’s backing, the 
early architects of Sheridan researched best practices in those “leading” states 
with the lowest recidivism rates. They came to focus on substance abuse 
treatment as the most effective, evidence-based intervention to reduce recidi-
vism and to strengthen reentry programming. 
For the prison phase of the process, all bets were placed on the Therapeu-
tic Community model (TC), described by the National Institute on Drug 
Abuse as residential [programs] using a hierarchical model with treatment 
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strategies that reflect increased levels of personal and social responsibility (as 
cited by Olson and Rozhon, 2011: 13). The TC model depends upon “peer in-
fluence, mediated through a variety of group processes […] used to help in-
dividuals learn and assimilate social norms and develop more effective social 
skills” (Olson and Rozhon, 2011: 13). At Sheridan, this is accomplished 
through the provision of individual and group treatment, delivered by a con-
tractual service provider known as WestCare Foundation. Inmates also re-
ceive a variety of ancillary services, including educational programming, job 
training, vocational training, anger management classes, parenting skills, and 
relationship skills. The TC treatment approach is also augmented by a hybrid 
modality that adjoins Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), Motivational In-
terviewing (MI), and 12-step recovery. Treatment takes place all day every 
day across the Sheridan compound, which is comprised of 25 separate hous-
ing units (mostly single story “x houses” or “k houses,” although two of the 
larger housing units contain two stories). Within each housing unit at Sheri-
dan, the population is divided into several (usually four) therapeutic commu-
nities or “families.” 
The development and planning of Sheridan articulates with three national 
trends driving the contemporary debates in prison reform: cost effectiveness, 
recidivism/reentry, and recovery. Let me address each of these trends briefly. 
First, we are witnessing a crisis in the rising costs of incarceration, made 
even more acute by the financial collapse of 2008 and its associated fiscal 
austerity mandates. Federal and state spending has grown exponentially since 
1972—Illinois currently spends $1.5 billion per year on corrections out of a 
state budget of $25 billion. In the wake of unprecedented expenditures, the 
fiscal crisis of 2008 has produced strange political bedfellows from a range 
of ideological backgrounds—Christian fundamentalists, prisoner’s rights ad-
vocates, political progressives, libertarians and fiscal conservatives—are now 
in agreement that the exorbitantly expensive carceral state build up of the last 
40 years is no longer tenable. These nascent coalitions also seem to be in 
some agreement that they have to spend money to save money, at least selec-
tively. 
Second, and accordingly, we have seen an increase in public and political 
attention to the costly problems of recidivism/overcrowding, and a concomi-
tant imperative for prisoner re-entry programming at the federal (e.g. George 
W. Bush’s 2008 Second Chance Act), state (e.g. the Sheridan Correctional 
Center, as well as the 2009 Illinois Crime Reduction Act that includes sen-
tencing reform, the Risks Assets and Needs Assessment task force [RANA], 
and Adult Illinois Redeploy) and municipal levels (e.g. the Cook County Col-
laborative on Re-entry, which includes numerous Green initiatives in envi-
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ronmental programming; in addition to myriad innovative efforts in Cook 
County Jail such as Division 17 transgender programming). 
Third, we have seen proliferation of substance abuse treatment models to 
address the prison crisis. The growing intersection in policy and practice be-
tween criminal justice, substance abuse recovery, and urban social welfare 
has catalyzed a new wave of treatment models deployed in prison administra-
tion, probation and parole programming, and housing/re-entry programming 
for ex-offenders. Most parties now agree that the austere, tough on crime ap-
proach of providing inmates with a mere $50 in gate money for a bus ride 
back to Chicago is simply too costly for the region. A social service bridge is 
necessary for reintegration. Suddenly, rehabilitation is back. 
The Return of Rehabilitative Frameworks in the Double 
Movement 
A central objective of this chapter is to show how drug and alcohol recov-
ery—from its most informal inception in the self-help realm of Philadelphia 
recovery houses to its most formal and monolithic in state prison and parol-
ing practices—works as an ancillary modality of poverty management to re-
solve the current crises of mass incarceration and to reinvent urban welfare 
practices in the 21st century. In this regard, rehabilitative programming oper-
ates across administrative sites and scales in contextually specific forms that 
are nonetheless logically consistent in their path dependent regulatory effects. 
For example, at the heart of my Sheridan study lies a very tentative hypothe-
sis that we may have entered a new, “third” period in the history of prison re-
form. The current trend at least partially harkens back to the rehabilitative era 
of penal welfarism from 1900-1970 (although it should be noted that there 
are no attempts to rehabilitate all prisoners, and the supermax prison is still 
very much intact). But in order to truly understand the historical question: 
Why Sheridan? Why now? We must put the correctional center in a much 
broader light; to show how it resonates and articulates with the larger politi-
cal and economic arrangements of post-welfarism. Let me conclude by offer-
ing a few provisional explanations for the Sheridan prison’s persistence—
even at 43 grand a bed as against 23—in an era of near-unprecedented fiscal 
austerity; I am therefore asking not only why the treatment prison emerges in 
2004, but also and perhaps more importantly: why does it survive? 
My first explanatory remark relies heavily on Loic Wacquant’s notion of 
prisoner reentry as myth and ceremony (Wacquant, 2010: 613). In essence, 
Wacquant draws from Weber, Durkheim and Bourdieu to illustrate how the 
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praxis of re-entry itself becomes a practice or habitus. As seven in ten con-
victs coming out of prison are re-arrested and over half are re-incarcerated 
within three years, it becomes readily apparent that the concept of re-
integration is in fact a misnomer at best. Wacquant’s persistent point is that 
these men were never “integrated” to begin with as there has never been a 
structure to absorb and accommodate them on the outside. 
My research findings to date in fact reveal three ways of “doing re-entry” 
in Chicago, none of which are very promising for the notion of “pathways to 
re-integration.” The first is to find formal employment in the low wage ser-
vice sector. While not impossible, for the better part of the men I am studying 
this option is dead on arrival based on the presence of 50% black male un-
employment in the neighborhoods to which they return. The second strategy 
is to get involved in a kind of entrepreneur training program, wherein provid-
ers offer a 12-15 week “mini-MBA” course on the assumption that most con-
victs are natural born capitalists, or “risk takers” with an aversion to central 
authority and a committed aspiration to working for themselves. At the com-
pletion of the program, which entails writing a “fundable” business plan, ex-
offenders can qualify for low interest start up loans in order to convert their 
entrepreneurial dreams into actual businesses. We can call this trajectory a 
“Stringer Bell” modality of re-entry, whereby the convict merely needs to 
learn how to code switch and acquire the requisite social, cultural, and literal 
capital to learn how to hustle on the legitimate side of the economy2. The 
third and more common channel of re-entry, and the one I will focus on for 
the remainder of this chapter, is to enter into recovery through the many state 
sponsored avenues of practicing sobriety and self-transformation. In essence 
the ex offender becomes a recovering addict in perpetuity, and recovery itself 
becomes something of a job. In addition to the rigorous activity of maintain-
ing their own sobriety, many ex offenders try to become para-professional 
counselors, motivational speakers in programs such as “scared straight” that 
send ex gang bangers into high schools, or residential case managers in the 
very houses to which they returned upon release from prison. Others hang 
around programs and politicians in hopes of somehow coming into contact 
with trickle down stimulus dollars, which might allow them to get into social 
service programming in the re-entry field. In this regard addiction has come 
to be seen as a problem in and of itself—quite distinct from actual crime and 
                                                          
2 Here I am referring to the character Stringer Bell from David Simon’s acclaimed HBO se-
ries The Wire. Bell is portrayed as a civilized and civilizing force (against his partner Avon 
Barksdale’s more primitive gang violence and tendencies toward warfare and barbarism) in 
his attempts to adopt corporate practices, implement Robert’s Rules of Order, and code 
switch as a businessman in the city’s deeply politicized real estate circles in order to claim 
legitimacy as well as new forms of social and cultural capital. 
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victimization—and with its fashionable emergence recovery has become part 
of a broader compendium of distinctive policies and practices developed to 
reduce recidivism without much promise of reintegration to meaningful em-
ployment. 
In many respects, re-entry through recovery entails something more of a 
trans-institutionalization rather than a de-carceration per se. In this sense re-
covery comes to embody what Lauren Berlant (2011) refers to as a cruel op-
timism: the affective structure associated with increasing precarity in the face 
of waning sovereignty and dissolving assurances. Berlant contends that 
amidst the fraying of contemporary fantasies—of upward mobility, job secu-
rity, gainful employment even—recovery becomes somewhat doubly cruel 
insofar as it entails being inside a relation that becomes sustaining regardless 
of the content of the relation. Recovery for the ex-offender entails becoming 
bound to a set of practices, rituals, and discourses that simultaneously come 
to churn the subject in regulatory eddies at the same time that the recovery 
narrative becomes profoundly confirming. 
In light of these reflections, what I like to suggest in conclusion to this 
chapter is that re-entry is currently operating as a new form of political pat-
ronage and a new form of what Karl Polanyi (1944: 150) famously referred 
to as the “double movement.” I will provisionally contend therefore that at 
least in part, what has come to replace the streets and sanitation jobs of public 
works clientalism in the Chicago of old is a form of social service patronage 
in the double movement. To make this point let me briefly invoke Polanyi’s 
central thesis. Polanyi contended that market liberalism evolved into a verita-
ble faith in man’s secular salvation via the self-regulating market, or laissez 
faire. He turned the notion of laissez faire on its head, however, with his con-
cept of the double movement, insisting that disembedding the economy from 
social relationships and political institutions necessarily entails an ongoing 
role for the state in the management and regulation of society via social pro-
tection in pre-capitalist (or extra capitalist) forms of aid and de-
commodification. By illustrating how the role of the state is to be found, em-
pirically, in welfare measures seeking to alter, regulate, or slow the rate of 
change, Polanyi’s study gave birth to a long welfare analytical tradition in 
regulation theory and political economy. 
In my own case, resurrecting Polanyi’s thesis for refinement of the fash-
ionable term “post-welfarism” entails thinking critically about what Bernard 
Harcourt (2011: 40-44) has termed “neoliberal penality.” As Harcourt argues 
in his indictment of the Chicago School, the tension of neoliberal penality 
lies in what several have referred to as the cost of our current political and 
economic arrangements: the price we pay for our unyielding belief in the 
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economy as the realm of natural orderliness (dating back to the Physiocrats) 
and the concomitant belief that the legitimate and competent sphere of gov-
ernment lies in policing (see Harcourt, 2011). For Harcourt the steep price of 
neoliberal penality lies in the following two consequences. First, we natural-
ize the myriad existing regulatory mechanisms in contemporary markets, 
thereby obfuscating the distributional consequences of these very mecha-
nisms. Second, we resort to mass incarceration as the quintessentially legiti-
mate form of state building. Harcourt documents how this messianic belief 
bestows upon a series of thinkers, from Adam Smith to von Hayek, from 
Bentham to Gary Becker, the task of establishing a theory and philosophy of 
punishment for classical liberals and their neoliberal counterparts (see Har-
court, 2011: 121-150). 
Ultimately, Harcourt illustrates how the final task of articulating this the-
ory of punishment fell on Richard Posner and Richard Epstein, who con-
verged on a similar view of political economy and punishment that was insti-
tutionalized in the Chicago School of Law and Economics. As Harcourt 
shows, this vision replicates the curious alchemy of orderliness in the eco-
nomic sphere, and state intervention/competence in the penal sphere. Consid-
er for example Posner’s definition: 
The major function of criminal law in a capitalist society is to prevent people from 
bypassing the system of voluntary, compensated exchange—the “market,” explicit 
or implicit—in situations where, because transaction costs are low, the market is, 
virtually by definition, the most efficient method of allocating resources. Attempts 
to bypass the market will therefore be discouraged by a legal system bent on pro-
moting efficiency. (Posner, 1985; as cited by Harcourt, 2011: 138) 
For Posner then, what becomes forbidden is a class of “inefficient acts” that 
include not just market bypassing in the case of stolen goods that could have 
been otherwise purchased, but also the market for labor (see Harcourt, 2011: 
136). In other words, crime represents an express bypassing of the traditional 
means of obtaining money, i.e. gainful employment. 
While I am largely in agreement with Harcourt’s impeccable indictment 
of the Chicago School of Law and Economics as well as his overall attempt 
at theorizing neoliberal penalty, I am concerned with the tendency here3 to 
conceive of the state in an over-determined or monolithic light. I want to ar-
gue in contrast that welfare state transformation is more nuanced, and that the 
contradictions of neoliberal penality actually open the door for another type 
of state building that cannot best be described as the iron fist in the velvet 
glove. I am ultimately interested here in a softer and gentler side of political 
                                                          
3 This tendency is shared in a distinctive way by Loic Wacquant (2009). 
104 Robert P. Fairbanks II 
development locatable in the partial decay or at the very least fraying of the 
regulatory framework of mass incarceration. This can only be found in the 
realm of welfare professionals and the social service delivery matrices of cit-
ies. Urban Poverty and its associated regulatory problems emerge cyclically 
in public life as issues to be solved. Market liberalism typically contradicts it-
self in the sense that it is repeatedly forced to rely on pre-capitalist institu-
tions unable to play the market game due to burdens of social responsibility 
(churches, family, prisons, social work) (see Polanyi, 1944; Esping-Ander-
sen, 1990: 37). And while this conundrum is a recurring theme in history, as 
Jamie Peck (2001: 38) shows there may always be echoes and tendencies, but 
history never repeats itself. 
Poverty governance can never be fixed, and it must always keep time 
with the rhythms of political life and the economic imperatives of late capital 
(Soss, Fording and Schram, 2011). 
It is here that I want to locate the Sheridan Correctional center as well as 
the Philadelphia recovery house movement. In the marketless re-entry sphere, 
whereby statebuilding occurs in the realm of monitoring subjects awash in 
jobless economic recoveries and the speculative bubbles of post-fordist fi-
nancialization, politics in the double movement brings welfarism back in. 
Context specific forms of regulatory experimentation are critical forms of ur-
ban political development that contain elements of continuity and novelty 
with the history and philosophy of welfare arrangements. My contention here 
is that these forms of state building are often overlooked and in urgent need 
of study. As Garland intimates (2001), they relate to an expanded infrastruc-
ture of re-entry, crime prevention and community safety—preventative part-
nerships, safer cities programs, Business Improvement Districts (BIDS) 
neighborhood watch, all strange bedfellows oriented toward new urban ob-
jectives and priorities such as security, prevention, harm reduction, fear re-
duction. These mechanisms are all low key boutique programs, efforts to 
build up the control of neighborhoods largely through the patronage and cli-
entalist logic of recovery programming. 
In this regard, my ultimate goal in this chapter has been to suggest the 
ways in which the state is managing the urban crisis against a wave of fiscal 
austerity. I have sought to provide an inroad for consideration of how sub-
stance abuse treatment works as an ancillary modality of criminal justice to 
resolve urban crises of surplus labor populations as well as institutional crisis 
of recidivism, re-entry, and overcrowding as the most visible forms of crisis 
in the regulatory framework of mass incarceration. This crisis has led to con-
text specific forms of planned and unplanned experimentation such as recov-
ery houses and prisoner re-entry programming. 
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As Esping-Andersen stated long ago, it is in the quality and arrangement 
of social rights, not in their existence per se, that we can identify a distinct 
welfare approach (1990). Dimensions of variation should be empirically 
identifiable not necessarily by expenditures alone or by the efficacy of treat-
ment interventions per se (i.e. “what works,” intervention x produces out-
come y), but rather via analysis of rules and standards, eligibilities, re-
strictions, and so forth; and perhaps more importantly via analysis of the 
lived experience of social policy and practice interventions. In each dimen-
sion, the welfare state is a continuously stratifying institution and an active 
force in the ordering of social relations (Esping-Andersen, 1990). But we 
would be remiss to believe that these stratifying dimensions would have any 
degree of functionality in historical transformation if they were immutable. 
Across my projects, my goal is to discern the significance of contempo-
rary welfare state transformation for marginalized groups and the political 
economy of cities. I believe this type of analysis is necessary to help social 
workers, policy makers, and social scientists better specify the political pos-
sibilities available to reduce inequality and to better assess how the restruc-
turings of postindustrial urbanism increasingly marginalize the poor. In the 
case of recovery programing—formal in prisons, informal in recovery hous-
es—we begin to see how governmental agendas of austerity and devolution 
are at least partially facilitated by offloading responsibility to the poor 
through ethical registers of emancipation and empowerment. Efforts to har-
ness and shore up human potential should be augmented by a re-
consideration of redistributive urban policies. My findings suggest that social 
work practitioners take a broader view of recovery and empowerment strate-
gies as important supplements but not as panaceas. Hearkening to the profes-
sion’s long tradition of systemic contextualization and social justice, my find-
ings show how recovery practices can ring hollow in the new economy and 
can even facilitate a pernicious reworking of institutional arrangements in 
postindustrial capitalism. 
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Philipp Sandermann      
The German Welfare System and the Continuity of 
Change1 
The German welfare system is currently in the midst of a far-reaching histor-
ical transformation. While this fact is now widely acknowledged within the 
scholarly discourse of social work, the extent of the transformation and its 
precise characteristics continue to be the subject of much debate. 
A possible explanation for this may be that the scholarly debate on social 
work still—after more than a century of disciplinary development—takes lit-
tle account of one essential reference point for the theoretical analysis of 
change: the notion of continuity. Yet a sophisticated discussion of change re-
quires an equally sophisticated idea of what remains the same across varia-
tions, what remains permanent within the process of change. Only in this way 
will the phenomenon of change become accessible to understanding. In con-
crete terms, if we want to talk about change in social work, we need a theory 
of social work that takes up an analytical stance allowing it to define what 
social work “is,” and to do so across variation until the point is reached when 
it no longer seems analytically appropriate to continue calling the phenome-
non under examination “social work.” 
Looking at current German-language scholarly discourse on social work 
through the prism of this theoretical assumption (on which, more generally, 
see Luhmann, 1986: 180), a dual picture emerges. On the one hand, we find 
highly differentiated, multifaceted diagnoses of the contemporary social envi-
ronment that seek to describe “change in the welfare state,” “change in social 
work,” “change in child welfare services,” and so on. On the other, these de-
bates largely lack embedment in a clear theoretical delimitation of what actu-
ally, in structural terms, constitutes a “welfare state,” “social work,” “welfare 
practice” et cetera. 
In the following, I first present this problem through the example of re-
cent debates on what is in German termed Post-Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit, liter-
ally “post-welfare statism”; I then outline an approach of my own. That ap-
                                                          
1  This article is a revised version of a paper originally published in German (Sandermann, 
2010). The English translation is by Kate Sturge. 
108 Philipp Sandermann 
proach proposes to critically examine important questions around change in 
social work that are currently being discussed under the heading of “Post-
Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit.” At the same time, it specifically brings together the 
factors of change and continuity in a single approach to describing the cur-
rent state of the German welfare system. 
1. Change Without Continuity? “Post-
Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit” 
In German-speaking scholarship on social work, “Post-Wohlfahrtsstaatlich-
keit” is currently widespread as an analytical label attempting to capture the 
present phase of the welfare system. Several authors may be credited with 
having taken up the difficult analytical task of identifying the contemporary 
transformation of the welfare system (see, e.g., Lutz and Ziegler, 2005; 
Bütow, Chassé and Hirt, 2008; Kessl and Otto, 2008a; Heite, 2010; Kessl, 
2009; ; Lutz, 2010; Oelkers and Richter, 2010). Evidently drawing on the 
concept of “post-welfarism” taken from the Anglophone debate (see, e.g., 
Hancock and Sjoberg, 1972; Gewirtz, 2002), the German term “Post-Wohl-
fahrtsstaatlichkeit” is used to signal a radical change. With more or less obvi-
ous recourse to the poststructuralist arguments of Michel Foucault, it is gen-
erally assumed that the current change in the welfare system represents a re-
calibration of individual and collective interests and of the influence of the 
market and the state (see Kessl and Otto, 2008b: 9). 
We may accept these assumptions on principle. Closer scrutiny reveals, 
however, that the analytical findings—largely generated using Foucauldian 
analytical instruments—remain vague. This is especially true for the relation-
ship between continuity and change in such models, as problematized at the 
start of this paper. The difficulty of specifying that relationship by means of 
the analytical methods adopted becomes clear at several different points. In 
my view, it arises primarily from the fact that although such analyses, de-
ploying Foucauldian tools and the concept of “Post-Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit,” 
enable a relatively thick description of what is changing, they face the prob-
lem that these frameworks offer neither the means to develop explanations of 
why it is changing nor insights into the exact structural logic of the changes 
described. This is because they fail to include an explicit definition of the un-
changing component within change (see, e.g., Kessl and Otto, 2008b: 10). A 
related problem is that analyses adopting these instruments find it very diffi-
cult to work out prognoses that would help us understand how the welfare 
system may develop in future. 
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The diagnosis of “Post-Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit” thus remains stuck, so to 
speak, at a stage where it provides striking social comment, but is somewhat 
shaky in analytical terms. This is underlined by the frequently blurred use of 
the label “Post-Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit” in at least two senses at once: the 
prefix “post-” appears sometimes to modify primarily the idea of the state, at 
others primarily the idea of welfare. In other words, “Post-Wohlfahrtsstaat-
lichkeit” can be deployed on the one hand to address a “post-welfarist state,” 
on the other as a circumlocution for “post-state welfare.” There is clearly an 
important distinction to be made between these two possible usages, yet it 
has received almost no attention thus far (for a critical view of the Anglo-
phone debate, see Clarke in this volume and, in outline, Clarke, 2004: 49). 
To put what I have said in more positive terms, if the idea of “Post-
Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit” is an effective way of generating commentary on the 
contemporary environment, that effectiveness lies in the term’s very open-
ness, its capacity to tentatively embrace both the notion of post-state welfar-
ism and that of the post-welfarist state. Seen this way, there is clearly some 
value in the talk of “Post-Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit” as a transitional formula in 
such commentary; my aim here is certainly not to discredit that. At the same 
time, however, constant use of the term “Post-Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit” in the 
scholarly discussion creates considerable analytical problems—once again, 
precisely because of its openness. Generally speaking, these problems lie first 
of all in the fact that the label’s inexactitude can be used to suggest, at least 
implicitly, a radical counterreality to an earlier (“welfarist” or “welfare-
statist”) welfare system. This implication is directed at both state and welfare, 
generating a degree of synergy. As a result, and despite its reflexive and at-
tenuated application by some authors (e.g., Kessl and Otto, 2008b: 7; Ziegler, 
2008: 160-161), the label frequently obscures the fact that at present, based 
on the empirical evidence available, there is no reason to expect the end or a 
substantial weakening of the Western, even just the German, welfare sys-
tem—either in the domain of state influence or in that of social policy and 
social work services. I would like to sketch out certain concerns around this 
point, countering the notions both of a currently emerging “post-state welfar-
ism” and a developing “post-welfarist state.” 
1.1 Post-state Welfarism? 
To begin with the idea of “post-state welfarism,” in Germany today there is 
certainly a change in the weighting of control instruments within the welfare 
system. This can be seen, for example, in decentralizing tendencies and an 
increasing move toward pedagogization, under the new slogan of “activa-
tion.” However, this shift cannot be simply equated with a general withdraw-
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al of the state from the welfare system. The model of the “activating state” 
and the forms of its realization must not be conflated with notions of a “lean” 
or even “weak” state (see Olk, 2011: 422). The legal provisions of the Ger-
man Social Code, Book II (SGB II), in force since 2005, offer a striking case 
in point.2 They suggest that the contrary is the case: the “activating state” is a 
strong, even authoritarian state that intervenes very actively in the domain of 
welfare production and may use sanctions to force its addressees into social 
integration by means of work.3 
The diagnosis that regards “Post-Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit” as a new wel-
fare without the state thus falls short, in particular because it pays too little 
regard to the role of the state within the entirety of the welfare system’s pro-
cesses—a role that remains quite as salient as before. Further doubt is cast on 
the hypothesis of an increasingly destatized welfare system when we turn to 
more quantitative data. For example, looking at social expenditure ratios in 
the past forty-five years, no sudden change can be observed in the 1970s or 
1990s (for critical remarks on this point in the UK setting, see Clarke in this 
volume). Rather, although the phase beginning in the 1970s, commonly cate-
gorized as the era of “Post-Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit” (see, e.g., Kessl, 2009), 
is marked by multiple dips and rises in the social expenditure ratio, since 
1972 that ratio has always been higher than it was in the late 1960s and be-
fore; in 2008, it was approximately the same as the ratio in years as divergent 
as 1976, 1982, and 1994 (see Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, 
2008). The overall number of people working for the German welfare system 
certainly has not experienced a sudden decline (see Züchner, 2007: 213–
214), and neither has the number of direct state employees among them. 
In other words, there is far less empirical evidence than it might at first 
appear for the general thesis—implicit in the label “Post-Wohlfahrtsstaat-
lichkeit”—of a novel “destatization” of the welfare system in Germany. But 
what about the second possible reading of the term? Is it not the case that 
since the programmatic shift to an “activating state,” a kind of state may be 
observed that, despite projecting a continued claim to provide welfare and in-
tegration, no longer delivers genuine integration but instead merely dictates 
integration to its addressees without regard for non-individual, resource-
                                                          
2  Book II of the Social Code (Sozialgesetzbuch II) is a key component of the “Hartz IV” re-
forms to German social security (for a succinct survey, see Kemmerling and Bruttel, 2006). 
3  In this sense, I would also dispute the claim that the welfare state’s orientation on paid em-
ployment is being increasingly queried within the current turn toward a “post-welfare state” 
(see Kessl and Otto, 2008b: 13). Although this may appear to be the case in view of the 
continuing debates around civil society, the provisions set out in 2005 in the SGB II legisla-
tion crassly contradict it. The German welfare system’s traditional focus on paid employ-
ment actually seems if anything to have intensified, both in legislation and in the practices 
of its implementation (see, e.g., Sandermann, Urban and Schruth, 2007). 
The German Welfare System and the Continuity of Change 111 
 
based barriers to integration? Might this not quite rightly be thought of as a 
kind of “post-welfarist state”? 
1.2 A Post-welfarist State? 
When we turn to this second argumentational variant of “Post-Wohlfahrts-
staatlichkeit,” particular epistemological pitfalls come into play. They take 
the shape primarily of normative notions of “real” or “appropriate” welfare: 
the hypothesis of post-welfarism clearly rests upon a normative idea, usually 
unspoken, of “real welfare” as the necessary basis for a diagnosis of “non-
real welfare,” or, precisely, “post-welfare.” A similar point can be made re-
garding the idea of a “semiwelfare state” (Katz, 1996: 115), which has gained 
ground mainly in the United States, although Katz’s idea of “real welfare” 
evidently arises from a comparison with continental European welfare sys-
tems rather than from the implicit notion of a decline in values. 
The normative character of this argument does not in itself constitute an ana-
lytical problem—or not as long as the idea of “real welfare” is set out explic-
itly as being a normative argument. However, if the normative argument is 
simultaneously to be used to assert a radical historical rupture in the logic of 
Western welfare systems, more is required than a purely normative construc-
tion of “real welfare.” “Real welfare” must not only be assertible in norma-
tive terms; it must also be assumed to have actually existed in a phase of the 
welfare system, historically precedent to today’s phase, and to that end must 
be framed in ontological patterns of argument. Specifically, to be able to posit 
“Post-Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit” not merely in the sense of a normative decline 
in values, but also in the sense of a historical decline in welfare, we must start 
from the assumption that “Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit” once existed as an actual 
redeemability of the promises of welfare. In other words, we will need to 
construct a historical perspective in which the welfare system that was pro-
grammed along Fordist and Keynesian lines in the 1960s and 70s actually 
did, at that time, function in accordance with its public claims for itself. To 
assume this means presuming that the welfare system actively socially rein-
tegrated its addressees in the 1960s and 70s and, in contrast, that it no longer 
does so today. Sure enough, this assumption—sometimes implicit, sometimes 
explicit—can be identified in the current German-language discourse around 
“Post-Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit” (see, e.g., Oelkers, 2008: 77). 
Upon closer scrutiny, the claim that before the advent of the new doctrine of 
the “activating state,” the German welfare system was actually functioning to 
deliver “welfare” as it is construed today proves to be a theoretical assump-
tion that—while it may be politically expedient from the point of view of the 
German social work profession—must be considered rather dysfunctional in 
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analytical terms. A review of the available empirical data on the German wel-
fare system that was once doctrinally framed in Fordist and Keynesian terms 
most certainly does not yield unambiguous evidence that the welfare system 
of the time structurally effected greater reinclusion, in contrast with a lesser 
reinclusion in the present day (for more detail, see section 2). Without such 
findings, it seems theoretically audacious, in the “post-welfarist state” variant 
of the argument as well, to describe the situation facing German social work 
today as a historical phase of “Post-Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit.” If it became 
more established, this diagnosis could easily lead to a kind of structural 
“hindsight bias” within the disciplinary debate on social work: retrospective-
ly, what is past appears “more real” and thus, in normative terms, often also 
more humane, more fit for purpose, more valuable than what obtains today. 
Interestingly—and this is particularly perplexing for the careful observer—in 
the scholarly debate of the present, the Fordist-Keynesian welfare system ap-
pears as more valuable than it did in the scholarly debate in the era when the 
Fordist-Keynesian welfare doctrine historically prevailed. This becomes es-
pecially striking when present-day descriptions of that doctrine are compared 
with the academic discourse of the 1970s and 80s on the topic (for more on 
this, see Sandermann, 2009: 163-198). 
This analytical discrepancy within many present-day diagnoses may arise 
partly from the fact that current retrospective analyses of the Fordist-
Keynesian welfare system tend to be based less on the level of practice and 
the empirical realities produced by the system than on the purported, or self-
declared, model of the Fordist-Keynesian welfare system.4 One crucial reason 
for this is doubtlessly the extreme sparsity of empirical data on the practical 
realities of the welfare system of the period. Yet this lack of evidence does 
not justify grounding an analysis on the doctrine that prevailed at the time, 
assuming its validity and setting it against the effects observed or feared to-
day in the implementation of the new doctrine of the “activating state.” This 
amounts to comparing a program in the past with the effects of a program in 
the present day, instead of carrying out a comparison consistently on the 
same plane. In effect, it results in the Fordist-Keynesian welfare system being 
perceived as “real” social work in a “real” welfare state that always kept its 
promises, whereas today’s system is interpreted as a merely superficial wel-
fare state from whose scope contemporary social work is increasingly ex-
cluded. 
                                                          
4 Clearly, the discrepancy is not limited to those portraits of the era that use the term Post-
Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit; it is also found, for example, in the notion of a “neo-social” wel-
fare (see, e.g., Kessl, 2006; Lessenich, 2011). It is widespread, and as such is relevant to the 
scholarly study of welfare. 
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2. The Federal Republic of Germany’s Welfare System: A 
Theoretical Model Inspired by Systems Theory 
The blurred edges I have described in contemporary diagnoses of change in 
social work and the welfare state pose an especially serious analytical prob-
lem for scholarship in those cases where, in the course of a surely valuable 
and thick description of the details of that change, they threaten to obscure 
something that is equally vital to a systematic study of the German welfare 
system’s current transformation: the continuities within the process of 
change. 
In the following, therefore, I outline a model that offers a corrective based 
on a critical reading of the debate,5 seeking to trace in particular the continu-
ing function of the welfare system within social change. For the reasons giv-
en above, my analysis consciously avoids a purely poststructuralist approach, 
instead working with some fundamental assumptions of systems theory. It 
builds upon two premises in particular. The first is the need to maintain a 
“candidly disinterested” approach to the object of the study during observa-
tion (Neumann and Sandermann, 2007: 14); the second is the need to distin-
guish between the values and the functions of the German welfare system. 
Observing the German welfare system with candid disinterest means ob-
jectifying it outside of any professionally motivated commitment to its exist-
ing practices. Only in this way can we create spaces for a critical interpreta-
tion of functional relationships between the practice of social work and its 
societal relationality, spaces that open up in various different directions. 
Here, social work is regarded not as a “downstream,” reactive part of society, 
but as an active part of the coproduction of social practice (see Blank, 2004: 
41; more generally also Brodkin, 2009; for Germany Sandermann et al., 
2011; with an early international impact Lipsky, 1980). 
Distinguishing between the system’s “value ideas” and its functions 
means consistently interpreting the German welfare system’s own claims to 
produce “social justice,” “social equality,” “equal social opportunities,” etc., 
as contingent value ideas and not as functions of the system. In turn, this 
means that these value ideas, usually deployed as promises of integration, are 
neither accepted as “true” nor discredited as “untrue.” Instead, they can be 
described as ideas, in a critical and distanced observation, and distinguished 
from the functions of the German welfare system as deduced from a systems-
theoretical perspective. It is then possible to analytically explore the relation-
                                                          
5  More generally, the opposition between systems theory and poststructuralism seems emi-
nently resolvable (see, e.g., Pottage, 1998). 
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ship between changing value ideas and the continuing functions of the sys-
tem. 
In order to analyze the relation between value ideas and functions in the 
German welfare system in this way, however, it is necessary first to open up 
discursive access to the phenomenon of the “German welfare system” itself. 
To this end, I will present the academic debate, now quite differentiated, 
around the German welfare system’s genesis and dynamics, aiming to devel-
op an explicit analytical notion of what it might mean to speak of such a sys-
tem (see also Sandermann, 2009: 128-142). It is only through a reflexive, 
theoretical model of this kind that comprehensive analytical scrutiny of con-
tinuity and change in current developments will be possible. 
2.1 System, Guiding Distinction, and Change in the Value Ideas 
of the Welfare System 
Research into the welfare state has been a distinct branch of research for 
around sixty years now (see Leisering, 2001: 1214), so in order to analyze the 
phenomenon “welfare system” it is initially important to get a grip on the 
discursive field of welfare state research. Yet even the definition of the de-
bate calls for terminological differentiation. Within the existing literature 
very different terms are used, sometimes quite unsystematically, to describe 
what is more or less seen as the same thing. In fact, however, it would seem 
important to keep rigorously to a single term. In the following, I use “German 
welfare system,” which avoids implying an orientation on state and politics 
but nevertheless retains a historically specific reference to the model of post-
war Germany. I specifically favor this term over “welfare state,”6 and inten-
tionally focus on the German case since international comparisons continue 
                                                          
6  Stephan Lessenich (2000: 41) presents very fair arguments in favor of using the term “wel-
fare state.” A key advantage is that it names a specific mode of politically implemented so-
ciation, a historically specific type of society that may be regarded as a postwar phenome-
non of Western societies and is historically anchored in the period since the 1950s (ibid.). 
However, it remains dubious whether the term’s focus on statehood really does justice to 
the social phenomenon that it names (for a critical account, see Willke, 1989a). Especially 
for a study that expressly sets out to integrate the societal project of social work into the so-
cial phenomenon at stake here, the term “welfare state” appears unsatisfactory: if we want 
to include social work at least as a part of what we are describing, then we cannot speak of 
a clearly state phenomenon—even if statehood is intended only in an institutionalist sense, 
based on “political structures.” Furthermore, the German welfare system is by no means 
fully steered by the state, but is structured on principles of subsidiarity right down to the 
domain of social insurance (see also Kaufmann, 2012a). As a result, there are good reasons, 
in terms of social theory, to locate welfare beyond organizational mechanisms that emanate 
directly from the state (see, from various different perspectives, Leisering, 2005: 120; 
Bode, 2006: 346–347; Lampert and Althammer, 2007: 11–12; Hegelich and Meyer, 2009; 
Schmid, 2010: 42–45). 
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to show substantial differences between different welfare practices (see the 
contributions in this volume). 
To the extent that a distinct reality (Leisering, 2004: 20; see also, e.g., 
Lamping and Schridde, 2004: 60; Leisering, 2005: 200; in part Achinger, 
1958: 51; Luhmann, 1990: 26) of the German communicative context on the 
theme of welfare has now been identified, the concept of system seems useful 
here. If we understand the term “system” in strictly systems-theoretical 
terms, as designating a relatively closed communicative context in the sense 
of a distinct logic (see Stichweh, 2000), without resorting to a search for con-
trol instruments obviously exclusive to the welfare system, then it is perfectly 
justifiable to speak of a “welfare system” in the narrow, systems-theoretical 
sense—even if Luhmann himself never adopted this perspective (though see 
the “second generation” of sociological systems theorists following him: 
Willke, 1989b: 113–114; Willke, 1993: 93–94; Leisering, 2005: 259; 
Stichweh, 2005: 164–165; and more explicitly Kuchler, 2006: 13–15). 
From this point of view, it seems possible to offer a reasonably unambig-
uous answer to the question (crucial to systems theory) of the respective sys-
tem’s basic or guiding distinction (Leitdifferenz) and hence to the question of 
what “occasions” the distinct reality of the German welfare system that is de-
scribed by Leisering and other authors. As the occasion for the welfare sys-
tem’s communication we may identify continuing issues around the societal 
inclusion or exclusion of individuals and groups in modern social contexts 
(see Luhmann, 1998: 633–634; Bommes and Koch, 2004: 80; Scherr, 2004: 
66–67). Accordingly, the guiding distinction of the welfare system in general 
might be defined as “societal inclusion/exclusion.”7 
This hypothetical definition of the guiding distinction in systems-
theoretical terms provides an initial outline of the German welfare system’s 
system–environment relationship. At the same time, it gives a first, approxi-
mate idea of the kind of “irritations” or perturbations to which the system is 
communicatively receptive, in other words which stimuli have a certain 
chance of entering the welfare system’s communicative circuit. These are 
stimuli whose direct connection with the guiding distinction of societal inclu-
sion/exclusion is discernible for the system and that also resonate with an in-
ternal need for change within the system, that is, which fall on receptive 
ground. 
                                                          
7 In systems theory, there can be no complete societal inclusion or exclusion of individuals, 
but only inclusion or exclusion with respect to a particular part of society. Thus, the guid-
ing distinction of the welfare system would be more precisely defined as that of inclusion 
into/exclusion from parts of society. Conversely, this shows that, in a systems-theoretical 
reading, a welfare system can potentially declare itself responsible for everything—since 
there are always inclusions and exclusions in parts of society. 
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However, the guiding distinction of societal inclusion/exclusion that I 
have just hypothesized initially seems somewhat abstract, and looked at criti-
cally may even appear ahistorical and static. It is fair to ask whether the wel-
fare system’s communication is not, rather, oriented on historically specific 
value ideas or value perspectives, such as ideas of “social equality,” “social 
justice,” “equality of opportunities,” “social security,” and so on (see, e.g., 
Kaufmann, 1977: 511; and for a critical account Leisering, 1997: 258–259). 
At first glance this kind of theorization, focusing primarily on the dynamics 
of political and social processes, seems to be a more plausible description of 
the welfare system’s communication. Yet at the same time such specifica-
tions, addressing particular points in history, actually block our theoretical 
view of the communicative logic that structures the particular, historically 
observable variations in welfare communication. They thus inevitably also 
block our view of what is general in the historically particular—that is, the 
continuity within change, as was discussed above for the case of poststruc-
turalist-inspired discourse on “Post-Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit.” Identifying 
these value ideas, then, does offer the observer a valuable cross-sectional his-
torical and socio-historical perspective, since the various value ideas identi-
fied can usually be found not only in welfare, but also in the historically par-
allel communicative contexts of politics, economics, the media, and so on. 
However, for the longitudinal historical perspective, and especially for the 
specific observation of a part of society (in our case, the welfare system in-
cluding social work), this approach offers little more than, say, telling us the 
shade in which a room, itself presumably constant, is painted at a given mo-
ment. What room it is, whether or to what extent it really retains the same 
form, and which colors it permits in principle—all these matters remain un-
explained. 
It therefore seems more helpful to combine the two perspectives I have 
sketched—the diachronic and synchronic—as far as possible, within a sys-
tems-theoretical approach.8 The abstract distinction “societal inclusion/  
exclusion” would then not be understood as contradicting per se the assump-
tion that the welfare system’s guiding distinctions become manifest in con-
ceptual pairs such as “social justice/social injustice” or “social equality/social 
                                                          
8 I am by no means claiming that systems theory can open up a total view onto the social re-
ality of the welfare system. A systems-theoretical approach to the phenomenon can com-
bine historical longitudinal and cross-sectional perspectives, weaving them into a picture 
that is meaningful in abstract terms but also capable of empirical specification. However, a 
perspective of this kind at no point “covers” reality; by its very construction, it necessarily 
remains a reduction of complexity, and thus a scientific theory. As such, of course, it is 
right to compete with other scientific objectifications and continue working on itself by 
drawing in other perspectives, in order to avoid falling prey to naive objectivism. 
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inequality.” Instead, it is more promising to regard concepts such as “social 
justice” or “social security” as particular, historically specific value ideas of 
the welfare system that historically assure the system’s connectivity with its 
societal environment. Value ideas can then be understood as communicative 
historical “color” that semantically specifies the abstract distinction “societal 
inclusion/exclusion” and makes it graspable in historical terms—but the 
guiding distinction that spans the historically divergent value ideas remains 
the structural question of societal inclusion/exclusion. 
2.2 The Continuing Logic and Function of Communicative 
Processes in the Welfare System 
Hypothetically naming the German welfare system’s guiding distinction does 
not in itself tell us much about the internal logic of the system’s communica-
tion. To be sure, identifying a guiding distinction opens up a path to under-
standing the welfare system’s constant occasions for communication: it gives 
us access to a reflective self-description of the system. But it says nothing 
precise about the system’s internal dynamics. How exactly does the system 
process the irritations it receives in accordance with its guiding distinction? 
How exactly does it deal with those stimuli, and what dynamics arise from 
this for the system itself and for its interaction with the environment? 
“Pure creativity” does not look likely to provide an answer to these ques-
tions. Once again, it makes sense to study carefully the existing scholarly 
communication on the phenomenon of the welfare system. Scrutinizing the 
debate, it is striking that the dynamics of the object itself—that is, the internal 
context and the effects that the German welfare system exerts upon itself and 
other parts of society—were long ignored. Instead, attention focused almost 
exclusively on the causes and conditions of the welfare system’s emergence 
(see Leisering, 2001: 1216). It is only since the late 1970s that the internal 
dynamics, consequences, and interactions of the welfare system have also at-
tracted wider interest in the social sciences. 
The much-cited crisis rhetoric of this discourse is conspicuous (see, 
among many others, Alber, 1988; Leisering, 2004: 31-34), but at first sight 
the more general diagnostic value of such judgments seems to be limited. 
Crises can hardly be considered specific to the welfare system; there is now 
broad agreement that they are a general feature of the developmental dynam-
ics of modern societies (see Schimank, 2007: 10).9 Looking again, however, 
                                                          
9  As more and more different, system-specific logics are simultaneously established and rad-
icalized, modern society can be interpreted in general as a social phenomenon that continu-
ally produces and intensifies new conflicts and crises. Systems theory describes these as 
simultaneous and lasting conflicts between different system logics—conflicts that, taken 
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what makes the judgments of crisis respecting the German welfare system ac-
tually quite helpful for a deeper understanding of the system’s communica-
tive logic are the empirical findings upon which, at least in some cases, they 
are based. This is because such findings permit conclusions to be drawn on 
the German welfare system’s ineffectiveness in achieving the more or less 
unanimously articulated norms of “social justice,” “social integration,” and 
so on (on the formulation of these norms see, e.g., Thole et al., 2005; for the 
U.S. see, e.g., Figueira-McDonough, 2007). According to much research, the 
existing German welfare system produces very little added “social justice” 
and/or “social integration” (Dollinger, 2008: 36). If anything, some of the 
system’s attempts to exercise influence seem to generate quite contrary ef-
fects (see, e.g., Kaufmann et al., 1982: 81; Leisering, 1997: 253; Leisering 
and Voges, 1997; Leisering and Leibfried, 2001: 144-167; Alber, 2003; 
Schelkle, 2004: 138; Gredig and Wilhelm, 2007; Mohr, 2007: 64-72; Lessen-
ich, 2008: 10–11; for the U.S. also, e.g., Hasenfeld, 1992: 268–269). This oc-
curs both directly, when problematic consequences arise immediately from 
interventions, and indirectly: when some individuals are more fully included, 
the exclusion of the others is aggravated (see Leisering, 2005: 260). 
Yet it would be wrong to make or understand this assertion of ineffec-
tiveness or counterproductivity too sweepingly. To reach adequately nuanced 
judgments on the inclusion or reinclusion effects of the welfare system, clear 
distinctions must be drawn between individual subgroups of addressees (see, 
e.g., Leisering, 1997). In fact, in most cases the likelihood of particular popu-
lations’ societal inclusion or reinclusion appears to depend on their own re-
spective skills and resources (Leisering and Voges, 1997). That implies not 
an inclusion effect (or at least not a structural one) in terms of social redistri-
bution, but rather that the German welfare system reproduces a “Matthew ef-
fect” of accumulated advantage in respect to social life situations (see 
Tennstedt, 1976: 145).10 
This statement should not be equated with the assertion that the existing 
German welfare system is somehow futile in itself. After all, if the German 
welfare system were futile, presumably it simply would not exist at all. If 
studies of the German welfare system come to contradictory conclusions re-
                                                                                                                             
together, lead to a continuing state of crisis. At the same time, however, it is precisely this 
situation that assures the relative stability of modern societies, because the different, con-
flicting subsystem logics constantly limit each others’ expansionism (for more detail see, 
e.g., Luhmann, 1998: 1087; Willke, 1993: 94; Leisering, 2001: 1218). 
10 At this point it becomes clear why the German welfare system is often attributed to the po-
litically conservative, because status-maintaining, regime (see Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Seeleib-Kaiser, 2007; for social work, see also Jewell, 2007; for a more differentiated view, 
see Leitner in this volume). As I will show further on, the systems-theoretical perspective 
on the German welfare system goes a step further in its analysis. 
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garding the success with which “social justice” is produced and addressee 
groups societally reincluded, that may prompt political deliberations on 
whether the system is working “wrongly” or ineffectually. In terms of sys-
tems theory, however, a more pressing implication is the need to ask critical-
ly what the key function of the German welfare system is if it is not the actu-
al production or redistribution of social justice. 
The ambivalence of existing theoretical and empirical findings on these 
objectives suggests that the German welfare system’s frequently propagated 
claim to produce “social justice,” “social integration,” and so on does not co-
incide with the sociologically discernible function of the system. It therefore 
seems misleading to assess the function of the welfare system in terms of the 
direct accomplishment of the goals customarily named by the system itself 
(see also Kaufmann, 1977: 497–498; Offe, 1993: 196; Gredig and Wilhelm, 
2007: 244–245; Kaufmann, 2012b). At the same time, of course, we cannot 
ignore the fact that communication within the welfare system takes place 
with constant reference to precisely those goals. It is by setting the two levels 
in relation to each other that a key insight can be attained through a systems-
theoretical approach to the welfare system. Using this approach, it becomes 
clear that the function of the German welfare system lies in its use of labels 
such as “social justice” or “social integration” to communicatively process 
the problem of societal inclusion/exclusion by constantly highlighting it. In 
fact, the problem is not solved but, precisely, highlighted, through broader 
concepts such as “social justice,” “social security,” or “social integration” 
and on a more specific level through the semantics of “case,” “support meas-
ure,” or “outcome” (see Fuchs, 2004: 25; more generally also Luhmann, 
1973: 179-181). The functional logic of the welfare system is thus not the ac-
tual accomplishment of “social integration” or “social justice” through social 
redistribution, securing social status, etc., but rather the constant talk of these 
matters in combination with institutionalized measures—measures whose 
positive impact on inclusion is not, however, structurally demonstrable but 
only made communicatively connectible with the social environment. 
The German welfare system11 is not, then, structured such as to generate 
processes that include or reinclude groups of addressees into other societal 
subsystems. Although this may occur in individual cases, it is not purposeful 
or targeted. A specific case could turn out quite differently without essential-
ly affecting the communicative logic of the welfare system. The German wel-
fare system—and this also applies to the specific case of social work—fulfills 
its function by the mere fact of recognizing and negotiating a particular case 
                                                          
11 Hypothetically, these points could be extrapolated to other national welfare systems, alt-
hough to my knowledge no detailed studies of this kind yet exist. 
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as such, in other words by drawing it into the communicative context of 
problems of societal exclusion. This alone already constitutes the crucial res-
olution of the societal problem. One might also say: The function of the 
German welfare system consists neither in producing or favoring societal in-
clusion, nor in actively preventing it. Rather, it is found in the communicative 
concern with societal exclusion using a distinct language by means of which 
the notion of “total social inclusion” is represented as normatively desirable 
and realizable. 
3. Conclusion: The Continuous Change of German Welfare 
What conclusions can we draw from the above discussion for the question of 
the relationship between change and continuity in the German welfare system 
today? 
According to the analysis I have presented, the continuing communicative 
thematization of societal inclusion/exclusion may be named as a lasting func-
tion of the German welfare system. In that process, successive vocabularies 
of ideal values arise and subside, corresponding historically to the wider de-
velopment of society. In recent times, the vocabulary of “activation,” “work-
fare,” or “social investment” has been conceptually en vogue, but this by no 
means poses a substantive challenge to the welfare system’s guiding distinc-
tion. The problem of social or societal inclusion/exclusion, which the system 
must constantly resolve, is now merely eclectically reinterpreted through the 
lens of “activation,” whereas in the past it was viewed through the lens of 
“relief” or “protection.” That does not fundamentally change the function of 
the welfare system in relation to society (see also Lamping and Schridde, 
2004: 44). 
Concomitantly, we may assume that although the role of the state has 
changed in the welfare system’s program, in other words in doctrinal terms, 
this does not vindicate objectivist assertions of a general destatization of the 
system and a change in its manner of functioning. Neither does it imply a 
lesser or greater degree of effectiveness in accomplishing the goals that the 
system sets out in doctrinal terms. In the era of the “activating state,” the 
German welfare system’s claims to produce social justice, social security, 
prosperity, and integration within society as a whole palpably fail to match its 
empirically and theoretically observable effects. Yet this does not distinguish 
the current epoch from previous phases. The incongruence of doctrine and 
function that we see today is anything but a new phenomenon. Perhaps it is 
merely more clearly visible in the current phase of doctrinal upheaval than in 
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times of a “normal” welfare state, to paraphrase Thomas S. Kuhn (1970): be-
cause the German welfare system’s adjustment to the new doctrine is still in 
progress, and the new doctrine is not yet presenting a unified external front, it 
is easier for social science to identify incongruences and discontinuities—but 
at the same time it is more difficult to keep sight of the congruences and con-
tinuities that accompany the transformation. 
The approach I have applied, inspired by systems theory, may provide an 
instructive complement to the currently prevalent discourse on the transfor-
mation of social policy and social work, especially regarding the hypotheses 
of an increasing orientation on economics and competition (see also Bode, 
2004: 79). It has the advantage of keeping visible the ways that the German 
welfare system continues to function across all its doctrinal transformations. 
The system—such is my proposed systems-theoretical explanation—does 
just what it has done throughout its existence: doctrinally it declares exclu-
sionary tendencies to be scandalous, while programmatically it responds to 
them with its three key forms of control, legislation, money, and profession-
alism, by constantly processing them in communication. The system does not 
thereby create solutions for problems of social inclusion and exclusion. It is 
their solution. And we may predict that it is likely to remain their solution for 
the time being, well beyond the current phase of doctrinal reencoding. 
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Vincent Dubois      
The Functions of Bureaucratic Routines in a Changing 
Welfare State: On Interactions with Recipients in 
French Welfare Offices 
The relationships between clients and agents at the front desks of government 
agencies, particularly welfare agencies, have received unprecedented atten-
tion in France since the 1990s. A number of reasons explain this surge of in-
terest in a dimension of public policy hitherto generally neglected both by in-
stitutional actors and observers alike. First, so-called public service moderni-
zation programs and then state reform programs have included the objective 
of improving relationships between the administrations and their “usagers” 
[users], now referred to as clients (see Warin, 1997). Welfare agencies were 
quickly and intensely enlisted in this general reform undertaking. Combining 
a management-oriented approach and the specialization of services provided 
to disadvantaged persons (see Siblot, 2006), these programs have contributed 
to the practical and symbolic production of the problem of “handling the ex-
cluded,” even beyond the level of welfare organizations, especially when 
public service agents deal with those referred to as “des publics difficiles” 
[difficult publics] in the institutional lingo: “jeunes des cites” [inner-city 
kids] in public transport, “SDF” [homeless people] in hospitals, and “les ex-
clus” [the excluded] in general. Lastly, such a framing of social issues reso-
nated with the development of studies focusing on individuals or micro-
relationships in social sciences (see Weller, 1998). As a result, scholars were 
eager to take interpersonal exchanges in public administrations and welfare 
as an object of study or as a level of observation. Yet, I argue that there are 
deeper and less contextual reasons to focus on inter-individual relationships 
in welfare administrations, mainly exemplified here by front desk interac-
tions. 
Building on Simmel's approach, I posit that the objective condition of 
economic deprivation is not a sufficient criterion to define the poor as a so-
cial group (see Simmel, 1965); it is rather the acknowledgement of a collec-
tive duty to provide them support that defines the poor as such. In this per-
spective, the social existence of the poor relies on the “assistance relation-
ship.” While deciding whom society has to help, this relationship institutes 
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the poor as a group and designates the individuals who are part of it. Front 
desk relationships in welfare organizations are the practical realizations of 
the assistance relationship: those asking for help meet those invested with the 
authority to provide it. Therefore, studying these encounters does not only 
amount to describing how social service provision works; it also means ob-
serving the concrete process of the institution of the poor, in the dynamic 
sense of the term. 
Front desk interactions and more broadly direct exchanges between ad-
ministrative agents and recipients reveal the type of relationship that devel-
ops between welfare provision and those entitled to benefiting from it. They 
are quite as mutable as the social definitions of poverty they are associated 
with. By studying their transformations, we can evidence new ways of defin-
ing the poor (the “entitled”) at work in the concrete functioning of the wel-
fare state. In this chapter, I set about to do this focusing on contemporary 
France. I rely on a study conducted in family benefit offices, which, in addi-
tion to the usual family and housing benefits, also attribute minimum benefits 
(see Dubois, 2010) and on an investigation of the practices used to control 
minimum benefit recipients. I show that the importance taken on by these 
face-to-face administrative interactions owes much to the redefinition of this 
relationship in an unprecedented context of progressive decline of social 
rights and worsening socio-economic problems. Then, I show that far from 
being merely a neutral routine of a social policy implementation, the methods 
used in this relational and bureaucratic work constitute its very core. Ulti-
mately, I assess the impact of these new relationships and methods on wel-
fare recipients. 
Declining Social Rights and Increasing Need for Assistance 
The meaning and the importance of face-to-face relationships between welfare 
claimants and the representatives of institutions in charge of welfare provision 
vary depending on the features of the welfare benefits and on the socio-
economic situation, and therefore according to the periods and national con-
figurations under consideration. I posit that these relationships have become 
increasingly important in France, particularly since the late 1980s, and that 
they are less and less mere bureaucratic routines. Instead they have become 
more strategic interactions—in the strong sense of the term. This evolution de-
rives both from transformations in the status of welfare applicants and in so-
cial policy, and from the effects of persisting mass unemployment, which 
keeps much of the population dependent towards welfare organizations. 
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Recipients or Entitled? 
In order to illustrate the impact of different types of social policy on adminis-
trative relationships between applicants and agents, I suggest starting from a 
rough ideal-typical distinction. In a welfare system where acquiring a specific 
status gives access to benefits (particularly when contributions have been 
paid), the relationship to welfare administrations pertaining to welfare provi-
sion can be limited to a formal and mostly technical exchange, in the sense 
that the way the interaction goes has no effect on the actual payment of bene-
fits. In such a setting, the street-level bureaucrat's work consists in checking 
the presence of the documents required for processing the file, and if need be 
give additional information on the calculation of benefits or the schedule of 
payouts. The recipient is mostly asked to provide the required certificates and 
attestations, and occasionally to give additional explanations in the most 
complex situations. The face-to-face relationships can therefore be reduced to 
a limited number of brief interactions (sometimes only one), and seen merely 
in terms of effectiveness in the processing of files. 
In other systems, exemplified among others by the U.S. case, which tend 
towards a model of public charity (see Castel, 1978) or “regulation of the 
poor” (see Piven and Cloward, 1993), the situation is entirely different. In the 
absence of well-defined social rights, replaced by allowances and assistance 
in kind handed out on a case-by-case basis, confrontation to the institutions 
becomes a complex and crucial matter. The welfare agent assesses the appli-
cant’s situation and decides which features to take into account in the process 
of ruling on each case. The “client,” on the other hand, must present his situa-
tion and his person in a way that gives credit to his request for assistance. 
Such interactions are structured by a key requirement: establishing the truth-
fulness of the claimant’s presentation to come up with a decision on the need 
for assistance, the form it will take and the amount of money provided (if 
any). As Frederic Wiseman’s illuminating documentary on a New York City 
welfare office (“Welfare”) shows, the administrative relationship is then far 
from a mere formality; it becomes a tense, complex and literally decisive sit-
uation, since it is on this occasion that welfare provision is granted or re-
fused. 
These interactions have also become decisive, albeit for partly different 
reasons, after the welfare reform that puts strong emphasis on returning to 
work (see Morgen, Acker and Weigt, 2010). Face-to-face encounters are no 
longer only about granting a benefit; they are conceived as incentives to 
work. Agents paradoxically strive to “enforce ‘self-sufficiency’” (above ref-
erence: see especially p. 323 and 325-27), by teaching welfare recipients the 
value of work or having recourse to more directly coercive practices (see 
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above reference: 64-83). Recipients must show that they “deserve” public 
support, not only because they are poor, but because they are showing efforts 
to fight their poverty. The legacy of the paternalistic tradition of public chari-
ty combined with the rise of workfare leads to a form of “disciplinarization” 
of the poor, displayed in their encounters with welfare agents (see Soss et al., 
2011). 
Describing recent transformations in French social policies as a return to 
the public charity model or an application of the workfare model (which is 
composite anyway) would be an exaggeration. They have, however, been 
getting closer to this ideal-type; a number of recent trends in the public 
treatment of poverty in France have impacted the recipients' relationships to 
welfare organizations. The emergency fund implemented in 1998 following a 
mobilization by the unemployed constituted a typical manifestation of the 
new obligation required from the poor, who no longer have to fulfill a range 
of criteria, but must be able to showcase their poverty (see Fassin, 2012). 
This exceptional program required the unemployed to send a claim consisting 
in a letter explaining their situation and all information they would find rele-
vant in order to convince ad hoc local committees that they deserved this oc-
casional help. Conversely to a classical social welfare program defining a 
priori general rules to be applied to individual cases, this emergency aid was 
decided after the a posteriori evaluation of rationales conceived on an indi-
vidual basis by the claimants themselves. More broadly speaking, the imple-
mentation of the so-called “new social policies,” including an increasingly 
important minimum benefit in 1998, the “Revenu Minimum d’Insertion” 
(RMI), has resulted in a more case-based approach, with individual accounts 
being produced for and assessed by institutional representatives (see Astier, 
1996). Increasingly, fact-based criteria (subject to appreciation) prevail over 
law-based criteria (relating to a status), which makes the process of assessing 
individual situations in legal terms more difficult (see Choquet and Sayn, 
2000). For instance, the very vague criterion of “isolement” [isolation] con-
sidered in the provision of the “Allocation de Parent Isolé, API” [single par-
ent benefit] and of the minimum benefit [RMI] is interpreted in very diverse 
ways. The evaluation of individual cases is now a complement, if not a re-
placement, to the attribution of social rights. In this increasingly workfare-
oriented system, behaviors are assessed to establish whether individuals real-
ly want to return to work or not. This transpired first in the field of employ-
ment: in 2001, the implementation of the “Plan d’Aide au Retour à l’Emploi 
PARE” [return to work assistance plan] reinforced the obligation for the un-
employed to bring evidence of an “active job search” during regular inter-
views. Numerous reforms have since resulted in the increase in the number 
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and importance of institutional interactions: interviews are more frequent and 
may lead to the suspension or cancellation of unemployment benefit payouts 
and more and more checks are conducted to ensure that recipients are genu-
inely looking for work. In the field of so-called solidarity policies, reforms 
have been pushing for “activation.” The “Revenu de Solidarité Active, RSA”  
[active solidarity benefit], more work-oriented and whose provision is subject 
to regular individual follow-up interviews, has for instance replaced the RMI 
and API in 2009.  
In a context of persisting mass unemployment, the individual responsibil-
ity of the “able-bodied poor” is increasingly singled out, and assistance rela-
tionships tend to be structured around the suspicion of institutional agents 
towards the applicants’ justifications. Since both the conviction that every 
salary deserves work (see Murard, 2002) and the idea that this work or the 
hindrances to doing this work might not in fact exist have come to prevail, 
the relationships between institutions and welfare claimants have become in-
creasingly decisive and conflict-laden. The claimant must declare, explain, 
prove, justify and convince, as opposed to the agent who must understand, 
control, assess and rule. Checks and individual rulings have always been car-
ried out by social workers, who generally have dispositions (a “vocation”) 
and a professional socialization that allow them to master these practices. 
They are now also administrative employees who control and rule on indi-
vidual cases, but with no “tools” at their disposal and generally less critical 
distance. All of this illustrates the general thesis of the "policy-making role of 
street-level bureaucrats" (Lipsky, 1980: 13-25) and more precisely, shows 
how social and historical conditions are crucial to the importance of that role. 
In the case under study, I have not observed the decline of their discretionary 
power (see Evans and Harris, 2004). Rather, I argue that this discretionary 
power has been extended to the lower levels of welfare administrations. Dis-
cretion is no longer the privilege of trained and professional social workers 
and is now also being exerted by bureaucratic clerks who master the adminis-
trative procedures but who have had no training in social work. 
A Growing Demand 
The new importance and meaning of administrative relationships cannot only 
be attributed to transformations in social policy. It also relates to socio-
economic conditions that affect the volume and the structure of demand. 
Self-evidently, the degradation of the economic situation in the poorest 
households and continuing high unemployment rates have resulted in a 
steady increase in welfare applications and recourse to charity. Every year, 
the media reports the increase in the number of meals served by the “Restau-
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rants du Coeur” charity; though they make for less good TV, the statistics on 
visits to the front desk of welfare organizations are no less edifying. Admit-
tedly, the number of visits is only a very rough indicator of the evolutions in 
front desk relationships. However, insofar as the reasons for visiting—fearing 
payouts might not arrive, looking for additional benefits when suffering from 
great financial difficulties, not knowing how the administrative machinery 
works or needing to talk about one’s problems—orient the attitudes and prac-
tices of the claimants (deference, prospection, aggressiveness, self-surren-
dering or display of misfortune), this indicator at least reveals possible trends. 
The number of visits has increased from slightly below 15 million in 1995 to 
more than 18 million in 2008 and nearly 21 million in 2009: the increase ob-
served was higher during the first year of the financial crisis than over the en-
tire preceding decade. This is a far greater increase than that of the number of 
recipients, which has gone from 9.5 million in 1995 to slightly above 
11 million in 2009: it can therefore be explained by a greater frequency of the 
visits. While this is not the only explanation, the global socio-economic situa-
tion in terms of poverty and employment therefore has a direct impact on the 
relationships with relevant administrations, including as far as physical re-
ception is concerned. 
The evolution is not only quantitative; it derives from the expression of a 
more complex and varied demand. The instability and the complexity of in-
dividual situations, which grow as the boundaries between work and unem-
ployment become increasingly unclear and as family structures change, lead 
applicants to expose problems that call for active involvement from the 
agents, particularly since, as part of the aforementioned evolutions in social 
policy, the adaptation of the institutional response to the diversity of the situ-
ations has become a requirement where the standardized enforcement of gen-
eral rules used to prevail. 
Furthermore, the relationship with a welfare institution, even in such an 
impersonal and bureaucratic setting as front desk reception, does not only 
amount to attempts to solve objective problems through the provision of a 
regular or occasional benefit. Despite the inconvenience of dealing with an 
administration in terms of waiting times and bureaucracy, which are per-
ceived in variable ways depending on the visitor’s objective position and 
“moral career” (Goffman, 1961: 117-158), as well as the potential effects of 
domination that can derive from the scornful attitude of a reception agent or 
an institutional sanction, welfare claimants still may expect secondary bene-
fits from the administrative relationship. The front desks of welfare organiza-
tions are subject to a number of lateral uses which, as they develop, contrib-
ute to reinforcing and diversifying the social function of the relationships that 
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take place there: being reassured about the processing of a request, finding 
someone with whom to share one’s troubles, sometimes getting advice when 
lost in life or taking steps to maintain the identity of individuals who are lia-
ble to pick themselves up and get out of poverty… 
The “Relational” as a Way to Handle Social Issues 
The increasing importance of face-to-face relationships is not simply, as we 
have seen, an organizational epiphenomenon of the transformations of social 
issues. Quite the opposite in fact: it is part and parcel of the handling of so-
cial problems, since the practical redefinition of the institutional treatment of 
the precarious fractions of the working-class has given way to a new form of 
management. 
A New Social Administration 
As they move away from an impersonal model characterized by the routine 
application of standardized rules, front desk relationships in welfare organi-
zations have arguably become less “bureaucratic.” Meanwhile, the growing 
complexity of the procedures and situations often leads social workers to de-
vote more and more of their time to file processing and committee meetings 
to the detriment of direct interaction with the population. The “relational” 
still constitutes the central feature of social workers’ professional identity 
(Dubet, 2002: 231); whether it is still their main activity is less certain, how-
ever. At any rate, the “relational demands” of unprivileged populations are 
now less than ever met by social workers, who are overwhelmed and held up 
by multiple tasks. As a result, part of the relational work with the clients that 
used to be carried out by social professionals, whose “job and vocation” were 
initially based on helping the poor, is now being taken over by administrative 
professionals (such as reception agents), who are supposed to be competent 
as far as enforcing standards and procedures go, but who have not been 
trained or prepared to handle poverty. In other words, the “socialization” of 
the administrative relationship is also the counterpart of a “bureaucratization” 
of social work. 
These two concurrent trends have a combined effect resulting in a wa-
tered-down treatment of poor populations, which goes beyond the internal 
functioning of welfare-oriented organizations. The “excess in social demand” 
triggered by the increase and diversification of requests for assistance and— 
at least partly and temporarily—encouraged by calls for general mobilization 
in the “fight against exclusion,” has led front desk agents in all kinds of pub-
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lic services to become involved in the follow-up of individuals in difficult 
situations (Jeannot, 1996), as the case of post offices in working-class neigh-
borhoods shows (Siblot, 2003). 
Instead of promoting a specific competence in the handling of social 
problems, the relational skills of street-level public servants have been val-
ued. Reception trainings generally grant much importance to communica-
tional skills (“being able to listen and make yourself understood”), alterna-
tively borrowing from techniques used in commercial interaction trainings 
(from smiling to neuro-linguistic programming) and from a psychology-
tinged register that matches the overall trend towards the individualization of 
social problems. The strictly social dimension of the relationship is all too of-
ten reduced to one session on the “diversity of the publics” or to a role-
playing game aimed at “dealing with situations of conflict.” 
New Forms of Management of the Poor 
All of this contributes to encouraging a diffraction of the social question. 
Front desk agents do not address the “global situation” of the applicants, but 
specific issues regarding them, conceived and delineated as a result of the 
segmentation of benefits and institutions: housing, health, children, etc. Col-
lectives are not mentioned; “collections of individuals” receive a distinct 
treatment, broken up into waiting lines and numbers. This reveals an unlikely 
affinity between recent trends towards the individualization of welfare and 
the fragmentation that occurs in practice at front desks, often considered as 
the symbol of bureaucratic archaism. These front desk relationships and the 
new assistance relationships they witness contribute to replacing the produc-
tion of the poor as a group by the identification of individuals with distinctive 
issues, expressed in terms of personal suffering immediately translated into 
institutional language. 
This individualization comes with contrasting trends in the determination 
of the distance between the protagonists in the relationship. In welfare ad-
ministration and politics alike, “proximity” is in fashion. This can physically 
entail the opening of offices in the neighborhoods where poor people live. At 
another level, this can mean the development of “personalized” relationships 
that make it possible for reception agents and welfare recipients to know each 
other, which both facilitates administrative formalities and induces new 
forms of dependence (Dubois, 2010). Furthermore, this personalization takes 
on a paradoxical form, as it partly consists in the implementation of a tech-
nique linked to the specialization of so-called “relational” professions. 
When measuring distance and proximity on the basis of the agents’ re-
spective social positions, a growing social gap can be observed. The people 
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who come to the front desks have an increasingly low social level since the 
arrival of the “new publics” (as they are called in the institutional lingo) start-
ing in the late 1980s (RMI recipients who until then did not frequent social 
security organizations, later refugees and immigrants from Central or Eastern 
European countries, for instance). Concurrently, the educational and/or social 
level of the public service employees (including those in direct contact with 
the population) has become higher, as such functions have become fallback 
solutions in high unemployment periods for agents that would have held 
higher positions in better times. 
The effects of this growing social gap are not univocal. There can be reac-
tions of rejection and practices of stigmatization of the poor, but there are al-
so cases of unplanned commitment to the socio-relational dimensions of an 
administrative job chosen by default. In such cases, this commitment does 
not derive from established professional skills in social matters, but on the 
agents’ personal predispositions: their social “sensibility,” the categories of 
perception of the issues and of the populations they have forged during their 
trajectory. The forms and limitations of this commitment are determined by 
professional relationships between co-workers and with the hierarchy, often 
more prone to spreading stereotypes about the “entitled” poor and to impos-
ing a management and productivity-oriented rationale than to committing to 
the defense of the underprivileged. 
Due to the practical rationales of these “bottom-up social policies,” wel-
fare recipients have to contend with greater requirements under the influence 
of governmental bodies and of the media. “Responsibilization,” a word used 
to call for more autonomy and to express the idea that the poor are responsi-
ble for whatever problems they are dealing with is both an official catch-
phrase and the practical horizon of these face-to-face encounters. 
Consequently, instead of merely contrasting the “social magistrature,” 
based on case-by-case appreciation, with a “front desk logic” supposedly 
amounting to the routine application of pre-established general standards, I 
argue that it is necessary to comprehend the origins, the rationales and the 
stakes of the exercise of this power to rule on individual situations, to assign 
statuses or promote behaviors in bureaucratic relationships. 
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